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iAbstract
Information security communities are always talking about ”attackers” or “blackhats”, but in reality very little
is known about their skills. The idea of studying attacker behaviors was pioneered in the early nineties. In the
last decade the number of attacks has increased exponentially and honeypots were introduced in order to gather
information about attackers and to develop early-warning systems. Honeypots come in different flavors with
respect to their interaction potential. A honeypot can be very restrictive, but this implies only a few interactions.
However, if a honeypot is very tolerant, attackers can quickly achieve their goal. Choosing the best trade-off
between attacker freedom and honeypot restrictions is challenging. In this dissertation, we address the issue of
self-adaptive honeypots that can change their behavior and lure attackers into revealing as much information
as possible about themselves. Rather than being allowed simply to carry out attacks, attackers are challenged
by strategic interference from adaptive honeypots. The observation of the attackers’ reactions is particularly
interesting and, using derived measurable criteria, the attacker’s skills and capabilities can be assessed by the
honeypot operator. Attackers enter sequences of inputs on a compromised system which is generic enough to
characterize most attacker behaviors. Based on these principles, we formally model the interactions of attackers
with a compromised system. The key idea is to leverage game-theoretic concepts to define the configuration
and reciprocal actions of high-interaction honeypots. We have also leveraged machine learning techniques for
this task and have developed a honeypot that uses a variant of reinforcement learning in order to arrive at the
best behavior when facing attackers. The honeypot is capable of adopting behavioral strategies that vary from
blocking commands or returning erroneous messages, right up to insults that aim to irritate the intruder and
serve as a reverse Turing Test distinguishing human attackers from machines. Our experimental results show
that behavioral strategies are dependent on contextual parameters and can serve as advanced building blocks
for intelligent honeypots. The knowledge obtained can be used either by the adaptive honeypots themselves or
to reconfigure low-interaction honeypots.
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Chapter 1
Re´sume´ en franc¸ais
1.1 Introduction
Dans la dernie`re de´cade le nombre des rapports de vulne´rabilite´s des logiciels a explose´. Ce phe´nome`ne a e´te´
de´crit par Frei et al. [54] et nous avons pu confirmer ce phe´nome`ne dans le chapitre 2. La pre´valence d’une
nouvelle technologie est suivie par une nouvelle famille de rapport de vulne´rabilite´s. Les vulne´rabilite´s de´crites
dans ces rapports sont exploite´es par des attaquants jusqu’au moment de la stabilisation de la technologie. Ce
phe´nome`ne est meˆme acce´le´re´ par l’interconnexion globale des syste`mes. Dans le de´but des anne´es 2000,
Spitzner [154] a de´couvert qu’une machine a` e´te´ compromise quelques minutes apre`s avoir e´te´ connecte´e
a` Internet. Sept anne´es plus tard Provos et al. [130] ont fait une expe´rience similaire ce qui confirme la
persistance du proble`me. La plupart des internautes connectent leurs syste`mes a` n’importe quel re´seau et
exposent tous les services selon le paradigme preˆt a` tourner. Les internautes ne veulent pas passer du temps
a` configurer leurs syste`mes ayant comme objectif un maximum de se´curite´. Ce comportement de masse a
mene´e a` la propagation des vers informatiques qui infectaient des milliers d’ordinateurs en tre`s peu de temps.
Provos et al. [130] ont constate´ que la naissance des programmes malicieux ne cessent pas de croıˆtre et que les
re´actions manuelles sont inefficaces. Les constructeurs de syste`mes d’exploitations et les fournisseurs Internet
ont fait des efforts e´normes pour se´curiser leurs solutions. Des organismes officiels charge´s d’assurer des
services de pre´vention des risques et d’assistance aux traitements d’incidents ont fait des efforts pour e´duquer
les utilisateurs en vue de combattre les attaques contre les syste`mes informatiques. Dans les de´buts des anne´es
quatre-vingt dix, Cheswick [27] a recommande´ de diminuer les services expose´s a` l’exte´rieur afin de re´duire
le risque de se faire attaquer. Cette approche pragmatique a e´te´ formalise´e par Howard et al. [72]. Les
auteurs ont formalise´ la surface d’attaque qui est de´rive´e par protocoles de communications et les droits d’acce`s
au sein d’un syste`me d’exploitation. `A cote´ du roˆle d’e´ducation les organismes officiels charge´s d’assurer
des services de pre´vention des risques et d’assistance aux traitements d’incidents mesurent les attaques et ils
e´tudient le comportement des attaquants. Dans ces travaux, nous nous concentrons sur les attaques contre des
victimes arbitraires qui sont recherche´es par des me´thodes automatiques. L’objectif d’un attaquant est d’utiliser
leurs ressources. Ces attaques sont particulie`rement inte´ressantes car elles peuvent eˆtre mesure´es de fac¸on
automatique. Les attaquants balaient des plages d’adresses IP publiques. Un hoˆte qui re´pond a` une tentative
de connexion est une victime potentielle. Les attaquants peuvent aussi monter un serveur auquel ont acce`s des
utilisateurs le´gitimes et qui se font compromettre durant leur visite. Par contre, ces types d’attaques ne font
pas l’objectif de nos travaux. Apre`s avoir de´couvert une cible, les attaquants essaient d’y acce´der. Ensuite,
ils essaient d’avoir acce`s a` la machine. Ils peuvent soit faire une attaque de dictionnaire contre un service
le´gitime, soit utiliser un code d’exploit. Ramsbrock et al. [135] ont e´tudie´ le comportement des attaquants qui
ont re´ussi a` pe´ne´trer la cible. Ils ont mode´lise´ ce comportement avec une machine a` e´tat. Un e´tat repre´sente
un type de comportement des attaquants. Un attaquant peut soit changer le mot de passe, soit faire l’inventaire
des logiciels installe´s ou du mate´riel utilise´ soit te´le´charger des logiciels supple´mentaires et les installer. En
inte´grant les mode`les de de´couverte de cible, le processus d’exploitation de la cible, et les activite´s par la cible
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nous aboutissons a` un mode`le d’anneau pre´sente´ dans la figure 2.2. Chaque anneau correspond a` un type
d’activite´ d’un attaquant ou type d’information sur les attaquants. Par exemple, l’anneau, note´ R0 contient
toutes les activite´s de de´couverte de la cible. L’anneau, note´ R1 de´crit tous les processus d’exploitation. Apre`s
avoir pe´ne´tre´ un syste`me, les attaquants entrent dans une phase de reconnaissance ou` ils inspectent le syste`me.
Cette phase est repre´sente´e par l’anneau R2. Dans l’anneau R3 les attaquants modifient le syste`me. Un exemple
est de garantir des acce`s aux futures attaquants ou d’effacer les traces de pe´ne´tration. Finalement, les attaques
entrent dans l’anneau R∗ mode´lisant les objectifs de l’attaquant. Le mode`le des anneaux est hie´rarchique et
correspond a` la profondeur des attaquants sur le syste`me et est relie´ au niveau de controˆle de l’attaquant. Sur
l’anneau R0 ils n’ont pas de controˆle sur le syste`me par contre sur l’anneau R∗ ils controˆlent le syste`me. La
technologie des pots de miel est utilise´e pour observer et e´tudier les attaquants. Un pot de miel est un syste`me
sans objectif le´gitime et toute activite´ sur un tel syste`me est par de´faut suspect. Chaque anneau repre´sente
un type de connaissance sur les attaquants et diffe´rents types de pots de miel ont e´te´ propose´s pour collecter
des informations sur des attaquants. Les pots de miel destine´s pour l’anneau R0 collectent des informations
sur la source des attaquants comme leur adresse source et le service demande´. Les exploits utilise´s par les
attaquants sont identifie´s avec des pots de miel ope´re´s dans l’anneau R1. Les connaissances sur les attaquants
contenues dans les anneaux R0 et R1 peuvent eˆtre collecte´es avec les pots de miel a` faible interaction. Par
contre les observations d’attaques relie´es aux anneaux R2, R3 et R∗ sont collecte´es avec les pots de miel a` forte
interaction. L’avantage de la technologie des pots de miel c’est qu’il n’y a pas de faux positifs comme c’est
le cas pour les syste`mes de de´tection d’intrusion. Par de´finition, toute observation sur un pot de miel duˆ a` une
attaque peut eˆtre conside´re´ comme attaque. La technologie de pot de miel est une technologie comple´mentaire
aux syste`mes de de´tection d’intrusion et permet d’e´tudier les actions des attaquants.
Les pots de miel sont soit utilise´s pour mesurer des attaques soit pour apprendre les me´thodologies d’attaques
imple´mente´es par les attaquants. Dans nos travaux, nous nous concentrons sur le deuxie`me objectif. Dans le
de´but des anne´es 2000, Spitzner [154] a de´fendu la the`se selon laquelle les attaquants peuvent apprendre a` la
communaute´ des chercheurs en se´curite´ informatique leurs techniques d’attaques, leurs outils utilise´s et leur
strate´gies employe´es. En observant la de´cennie de travaux de recherche sur les pots de miel, nous constatons
qu’une partie des travaux ont participe´ dans la course des pots de miel. Dans une telle course, un nouveau pot de
miel est suivi par des techniques de de´tection ou d’e´vasion. Cohen [31] a pre´sente´ les techniques d’illusion dans
le contexte des attaques informatiques. Par contre, les seules techniques d’illusion utilise´es dans le contexte des
pots de miel est d’e´muler des faux services. Ces techniques sont adapte´es a` collecter les outils utilise´s par les
attaquants et les pre´de´cesseurs des attaques. Les pots de miel ont e´te´ de´ploye´s de fac¸on distribue´ et les tactiques
et strate´gies des attaquants ont e´te´ de´rive´es graˆce aux donne´es collecte´es par les diffe´rents pots de miel. Par
contre, les pots de miel eux meˆmes ne sont pas capable de de´river les strate´gies des attaquants de fac¸on automa-
tique et les pots de miel en eux-meˆmes ont un comportement de sondes statiques. Nicomette et al. [112] ont
de´couvert qu’il existe des attaques automatiques et des attaques manuelles ce qui est difficilement distinguable.
Les pots de miels sont classifie´s comme pot de miel a` forte interaction et pot de miel a` faible interaction. Cette
classification est assez rudimentaire et ne prend pas en compte les capacite´s des attaquants. L’objectif de ces
travaux est de de´terminer les capacite´s des attaquants en construisant des pots de miel qui re´sistent de fac¸on
strate´gique aux attaques. Ainsi une re´action d’un attaquant peut eˆtre de´clenche´e. Afin d’aboutir a` cet objectif
les effets de bord des observations doivent eˆtre examine´s pre´cise´ment. Comme de´taille´ dans le chapitre 3, il y
a une course entre ope´rateurs de pots de miel et les attaquants. Certes, les pots de miel ont des faiblesses qui
peuvent eˆtre prises en compte en utilisant des techniques d’illusion lors des attaques. Les attaquants peuvent
mal interpre´ter les re´ponses rec¸ues des pots de miel, et ainsi leurs comportements peuvent mieux eˆtre e´tudie´s.
Le but est de mode´liser ces diffe´rents objectifs et d’aboutir a` ces objectifs de fac¸on automatique.
Dans nos travaux, nous e´laborons des pots de miel adaptatifs qui sont capables de changer de manie`re
continue leur comportement avec le but de de´couvrir les meilleures actions. Ce manuscrit est divise´ en deux
parties. La premie`re partie contient un re´sume´ des travaux de recherche ante´rieurs. La deuxie`me partie contient
une description de nos travaux de mode´lisation ainsi que les expe´rimentations des nos pots de miel adaptatifs.
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Cette partie est divise´e en deux chapitres. Nous commenc¸ons a` re´sumer les activite´s ante´rieures dans le domaine
des pots de miel et nous identifions leurs limites. Ensuite nous donnons un aperc¸u sur les the´ories que nous
utiliserons dans nos contributions.
1.2.1 Pots de miel
L’ide´e d’observer des attaquants sur des syste`me informatiques graˆce a` des leurres est ne´e dans les anne´es
quatre-vingt. Stoll [158] a observe´ une attaque dans le laboratoire Berkeley. Il a pris la de´cision de distribuer
des faux documents et il a surveille´ les acce`s a` celles-ci. Apre`s un certain temps, il a pu identifier l’attaquant.
Un peu plus tard dans les anne´es quatre vingt-dix, Cheswick [26] a eu l’ide´e de de´ployer des faux services
accessibles depuis Internet afin d’observer des attaques. Dans les anne´es 2000, Spitzner [154] a introduit la
terminologie des pots de miel qui est de nos jours accepte´e dans la majorite´ des communaute´s de se´curite´
informatique. Un pot de miel est une ressource de´die´e a` eˆtre de´couverte, exploite´e et attaque´e. Les pots
de miel sont fre´quemment utilise´s pour collecter des donne´es sur les attaquants. La plupart des travaux se
concentre a` collecter des donne´es techniques des attaquants, comme leur adresse source, leurs logiciels et
les re´pertoires des logiciels malicieux. D’autres travaux se concentrent sur les e´tudes de comportement des
attaquants qui ont re´ussi a` compromettre un syste`me. Une condition essentielle d’un pot de miel ayant comme
but d’e´tudier le comportement des attaquants est que celui-ci soit attractif pour les attaquants et qu’il imite un
syste`me re´el. Dans le cas contraire, les attaquants se rendent compte qu’il ne s’agit pas d’un syste`me re´el,
et en conse´quence ne l’attaquent pas ou se de´connectent rapidement. Dans le chapitre 3, nous e´tudions les
tendances sur les pots de miel graˆce aux donne´es de Google. Le moteur de recherche Google a acce`s a` des
milliards de requeˆtes des utilisateurs. Google a cre´e´ des indices par mot clef. Une synthe`se de ces indices est
publiquement accessible, de l’anne´e 2004 jusqu’a` pre´sent. Un indice plus e´leve´ que son pre´de´cesseur indique
que le mot clef est devenu plus populaire. Si l’indice est plus petit que son ante´ce´dent le mot clef a perdu
de popularite´. En 2004, Provos et al. [128] ont publie´ Honeyd, un pot de miel a` faible interaction. Le code
source de ce pot de miel a e´te´ publie´ et le pot de miel est facile a` utiliser. Ceci avait comme conse´quence que de
nombreux utilisateurs ont commence´ a` utiliser cet outil. En 2006, les re´seaux de programmes malicieux appele´s
botnets e´taient une menace omnipre´sente sur Internet et les pots de miel ont e´te´ utilise´s afin de les e´tudier et
de les combattre, ce qui explique la croissance de l’indice. En comparant les pots de miel re´cents utilisant
la technologie d’introspection des machines virtuelles avec les pots de miel de type Honeyd, nous constatons
que la complexite´ logicielle est beaucoup plus e´leve´e pour ces nouveaux types de pot de miel. Ceci a comme
conse´quence qu’ils sont ope´re´s par des communaute´s plus restreintes et plus par le grand public. Pour confirmer
cette affirmation nous avons e´tudie´ les nombres de publications mensuelles scientifiques sur les pots de miel.
Bien que le indices de Google incluent toutes les communaute´s d’utilisateurs, le moteur de recherche Google
Scholar se concentre sur les bases de donne´es scientifiques. L’analyse de´taille´e est de´crite dans le chapitre 3.
Dans l’anne´e 2008, l’introspection des machines virtuelles est a` la mode pour construire des pots de miel ce qui
exige des connaissances syste`mes pousse´es et implique un risque plus e´leve´ que celui relie´ aux pots de miel a`
faible interaction.
Diffe´rents types de classifications ont e´te´ propose´s pour les pots de miel. Seifert et al.[147] les classifient
selon six crite`res qui sont e´nume´re´s de fac¸on informative. Le premier crite`re est le niveau d’interaction avec
les attaquants. Le niveau d’interaction est de´rive´ du nombre de fonctionnalite´s expose´es aux attaquants. Le
deuxie`me crite`re de classification est le niveau de capture de donne´es. Un pot de miel peut collecter des
e´ve`nements, des attaques et des intrusions. Le troisie`me crite`re est le niveau de confinement du pot de miel.
Le quatrie`me crite`re distingue des pots de miel distribue´s des pots de miel autonomes. Le cinquie`me crite`re
est de´rive´ des moyens de communications avec le pot de miel. Le sixie`me crite`re distingue les pots de miel
ayant un roˆle de serveur avec les pots de miel qui pre´tendent eˆtre un client. Malgre´ cette fine classification nous
utiliserons dans la suite la classification e´labore´e par Spitzner [154] prenant en compte le niveau d’interaction
avec les attaquants car elle nous permet le mieux de situer nos travaux.
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Un pot de miel a` faible interaction est un syste`me qui e´mule des faux services. Selon notre mode`le des
anneaux, des informations relie´s aux anneaux R0, et R1 peuvent eˆtre recueillies comme l’adresse source des
attaquants, le service demande´. Un attaquant se connectant a` un tel service rec¸oit un contenu pre´fabrique´. Les
attaquants n’ont ni le droit de stocker ni d’exe´cuter leur propres programmes. Cette contrainte assez stricte
permet de re´duire le risque d’ope´ration de pot de miel. Ce bas risque permet d’ope´rer ces pots de miel a` large
e´chelle. Fin des anne´es quatre-vingt-dix, Cohen [31] a propose´ un outil d’illusion (Deception Tool Kit (DDK)).
L’ide´e est de me´langer sur un hoˆte des services re´els et des services e´mule´s. Dans un sce´nario d’attaque d’un
tel hoˆte un attaquant doit distinguer les vrais services des faux ce qui implique une augmentation de charge de
travail. Le pot de miel a` faible interaction le plus populaire est Honeyd. Ce pot de miel est capable d’e´muler
des piles re´seaux. Ainsi un seul hoˆte peut e´muler plusieurs hoˆtes e´mulant diffe´rents syste`mes d’exploitations.
Avec un seul hoˆte des topologies entie`res de re´seaux peuvent eˆtre e´mule´es ce qui est facile a` ge´rer. Honeyd
contourne la pile re´seau de son hoˆte re´el et re´pond a` toutes les requeˆtes e´mule´es. Honeyd permet de de´finir
plusieurs personnalite´s qui correspondent a` une pile de re´seaux et une collection de programmes qui peuvent
eˆtre rattache´s aux services demande´s. Chaque programme est responsable d’e´muler un service de´die´ ce qui
peut eˆtre vu comme un de´savantage de cette approche. Leita et al. [91] ont propose´ une approche pour de´river
ces faux services a` partir des traces re´seaux.
Cette approche est assez puissante car elle permet aussi d’e´muler de faux programmes malveillants pour
lesquels le code source n’est pas disponible. Les pots de miel a` faible interaction permettent de ge´rer les
premie`res interactions avec les attaquants et sont donc suffisants pour quantifier et mesurer les attaques. Par con-
tre, ils ne permettent pas d’e´tudier le comportement des attaquants qui ont re´ussi a` compromettre un syste`me.
Dans notre mode`le avec les anneaux, les attaquants essaient d’exploiter le syste`me, ce qui est mode´lise´ avec
l’anneau R1. Ceci est fait graˆce a` un code d’exploit. Un tel code est souvent encode´ dans un message mal-forme´.
Lors de la phase de de´composition de ce message dans le service attaque´, une partie de celui-ci est exe´cute´e par
erreur. Une interruption du service est la conse´quence si cette partie contient des donne´es ale´atoires. Cepen-
dant, les attaquants encodent du code machine dans cette partie qui est exe´cute´ sur l’hoˆte. L’exe´cution de ce
dernier donne le controˆle d’exe´cution aux attaquants. Ce code machine est appele´ shell code car, pour des
raisons historiques, ce code donnait normalement acce`s a` une ligne de commande. Souvent ce code machine
te´le´charge un programme malveillant qui prend le relais de l’attaque. Si un tel message arrive a` un pot de miel
de´crit pre´ce´demment, le code d’exploit peut eˆtre observe´. Baecher et al. [7] ont propose´ un pot de miel qui est
capable d’e´muler des vulne´rabilite´s connues et qui te´le´charge les programmes malveillants comple´mentaires.
Malgre´ cette interaction supple´mentaire, les auteurs qualifient de faible interaction ce type de pot de miel.
D’autres propositions de faux services capable d’e´muler des vulne´rabilite´s connues ont e´te´ sugge´re´es [6, 60].
Une hypothe`se de ces approches est que la vulne´rabilite´ est connue et peut eˆtre e´mule´e. Les attaques qui
exploitent des vulne´rabilite´s inconnues ne peuvent pas eˆtre collecte´es avec les pots de miel pre´ce´demment dis-
cute´s. De plus, les activite´s des attaquants apre`s l’exploit (anneaux R2, R3, R∗) ne sont pas prises en compte
avec les pots de miel a` faible interaction.
Par contre, ces activite´s sont observe´es avec les pot de miel a` forte interaction. Historiquement, ces pots
de miel sont les plus anciens. En fait, des ressources re´elles sont expose´es aux attaquants. Ceux-ci peuvent
utiliser toutes les fonctionnalite´s du syste`me observe´. Cheswick [26] a baptise´ ces ressources comme des
machines jetables ayant des failles de se´curite´ re´elles. Il recommande de capturer tout le trafic re´seau de´die´
a` ces machines afin d’observer les activite´s des attaquants. `A cette e´poque cette approche e´tait parfaitement
valide car la majorite´ des protocoles de communications utilise´s par les attaquants e´taient non chiffre´s. De
nos jours, avec l’utilisation des re´seaux sans fil publiquement accessibles, les protocoles de communications
chiffre´es sont devenus tre`s populaires. Si un attaquant utilise de tels protocoles, ces commandes ne peuvent pas
eˆtre observe´es, ce qui n’est pas acceptable pour un ope´rateur de pot de miel. Souvent, celui-ci est le´galement
responsable de ses ressources et quand il les offre a` des attaquants, il peut participer a` des attaques vers des tiers
[2]. Un controˆle strict est ne´cessaire durant l’ope´ration de pots de miel pour e´viter les de´gaˆts collate´raux. De`s
que des attaques sont lance´es vers des tiers, l’ope´rateur doit pouvoir intervenir et de´connecter les attaquants.
Spitzner [154] recommande d’avoir plusieurs points de vue d’observation afin de garantir un controˆle des
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attaquants. Il a propose´ d’observer les attaquants au niveau re´seau mais aussi au niveau syste`me. Comme
exemple de controˆle du syste`me, il a donne´ l’exemple d’une ligne de commande modifie´e qui exporte toutes les
commandes vers un autre hoˆte. Les attaquants ont change´ ce programme et leurs actions passaient inaperc¸ues.
La re´action de la communaute´ des ope´rateurs de pot de miel est l’observation d’une couche plus basse dans le
noyau du syste`me d’exploitation [9]. Balas et al. [9] ont propose´ un module noyau dans cet objectif. Un peu
plus tard, McCarty [101] a publie´ une me´thode pour de´tecter et de´sactiver ces techniques d’observation. La
communaute´ des ope´rateurs est alors descendu a` un niveau plus bas et a ainsi choisi le point d’observations a`
l’inte´rieur d’une machine virtuelle.
Parmi les activite´s de recherche se concentrant sur l’ame´lioration syste`me des pots de miel, des activite´s
connexes se sont cre´e´es comme la gestion des pots de miel, la collaboration des ope´rateurs de pots de miel et
des nouvelles approche d’analyse de donne´es dans les pots de miel. Les pots de miel servent principalement de
source de donne´es sur les attaquants. Nous avons synthe´tise´ un mode`le a` anneaux ou` chaque anneau repre´sente
une couche d’information sur les attaquants. Nous avons constate´ que les informations relatives aux anneaux
R0 et R1 peuvent eˆtre collecte´es avec les pots de miel a` faible interaction et les informations relevant de R0−3 et
R∗ peuvent eˆtre collecte´es avec les pots de miel a` forte interaction. Les pots de miel a` forte interaction couvrent
plus d’information sur les attaquants que les pots de miel a` faible interaction. Par contre, la gestion des pots de
miel a` faible interaction est plus facile et le risque d’ope´ration est plus faible. De ce fait, les pots de miel a` basse
interaction passent mieux a` l’e´chelle. Les ope´rateurs de pots de miel sont souvent le´galement responsables de
leurs pots de miel et ils doivent e´viter que les attaquants prennent le controˆle absolu du pot de miel en attaquant
des tiers. Cohen [31] a discute´ dans le contexte des attaquants des techniques d’illusion. Les pots de miel a`
faible interaction e´mulent des faux services et utilisent une technique d’illusion. De plus, les pots de miel a`
forte interaction essaient de ressembler le plus a` des hoˆtes normaux (de syste`mes de production). Les deux
types de pots de miel utilisent des techniques de de´ception statique et tre`s peu de travaux ont e´te´ effectue´s pour
rendre les pots de miel eux-meˆmes plus intelligents et adaptatifs. Dans le contexte des pots de miel a` forte
interaction, un attaquant peut compromettre le syste`me, le modifier, installer et lancer ses propres outils. Si le
but de l’attaquant e´tait d’exe´cuter ses outils, il aboutit a` son objectif d’ attaque sans aucune re´sistance venant
du pot de miel. L’attaquant n’a pas e´te´ de´fie´ car toutes les actions ont e´te´ permises. Dans le cas ou` le pot de
miel aurait interfe´re´ de manie`re strate´gique avec les actions de l’attaquant, des comportements supple´mentaires
auraient pu eˆtre observe´s. Ceci permettrait de de´river les capacite´s des attaquants confronte´s a` la re´solution
d’un proble`me. Les pots de miel pourraient utiliser des techniques de de´ception dynamiques avec l’objectif
d’apprendre les capacite´s des attaquants ainsi que leur nature et leur bagage linguistique. Afin de mode´liser
des pots de miel intelligents et adaptatifs, nous donnons un aperc¸u des fondations the´oriques utilise´es dans nos
contributions.
1.2.2 Apprentissage dans les jeux
Dans le chapitre 4, nous nous concentrons sur la the´orie des jeux et sur l’apprentissage par renforcement dans
le contexte the´orique des processus de de´cision Markovien ainsi que des processus stochastiques. De plus, nous
mettons en e´vidence des liens entre ces diffe´rentes the´ories. La the´orie des jeux permet de mode´liser des jeux
entre joueurs ou` chacun d’entre eux a ses propres inte´reˆts et de´pend des autres. `A chaque joueur est associe´
un ensemble d’actions et chacune d’elle est associe´e avec un gain ou une perte. Donc, chaque jouer a une
fonction de gain. Dans le cas ou` le gain d’un joueur correspond a` une perte de l’autre, le jeu est dit a` somme
nulle. Dans le cas ou` la magnitude de gain d’un joueur est diffe´rente de celle d’un autre joueur le jeu est dit
a` somme ge´ne´rale. Les jeux peuvent eˆtre repre´sente´s soit sous forme normale soit sous forme extensive. La
forme extensive est plus approprie´e pour mode´liser des jeux re´pe´titifs. La forme normale permet de calculer
des e´quilibres de Nash qui de´finissent les meilleures strate´gies pour chaque joueur dans le contexte des jeux
simples. Pour les jeux sous forme extensive, les jeux sous forme normale doivent eˆtre de´rive´s afin de calculer un
e´quilibre de Nash. Les strate´gies calcule´es a` partir d’un e´quilibre de Nash ne sont pas force´ment Pareto-optimal.
Une strate´gie d’un joueur peut de´te´riorer le gain d’un autre joueur. Dans le contexte d’un e´quilibre de Nash
dans un jeu simple, il est suppose´ que tous les joueurs doivent eˆtre rationnels, c’est a` dire visant a` maximiser
6 CHAPTER 1. R ´ESUM ´E EN FRANC¸AIS
leurs gains. Un non-respect de cette condition re´sulte en des gains errone´s. Le proble`me des gains errone´s peut
eˆtre analyse´ avec une analyse d’e´quilibre quantal en vue de de´terminer les impacts sur les e´quilibres de Nash.
La the´orie des jeux a de´ja` e´te´ employe´e dans le cadre des pots de miel. Par contre, la majorite´ des contributions
se concentrent sur des jeux joue´s au niveau infrastructure qui est compose´e de machines de production et de
pots de miel. Les pots de miel fre´quemment utilise´s sont des pots de miel a` faible interaction. Garg et al. [108]
a mode´lise´ un jeu entre deux joueurs. Le premier est le de´fenseur et le deuxie`me un attaquant omnipre´sent. Le
de´fenseur posse`de une infrastructure qui est compose´e de machines re´elles et de pots de miel. Un attaquant
peut attaquer soit une machine re´elle soit un pot de miel mais il pre´fe`re attaquer le premier type. Il rec¸oit
donc un gain positif s’il attaque une machine re´elle et un gain ne´gatif s’il attaque un pot de miel. Pour le
de´fenseur, les gains sont distribue´s de fac¸on inverse. Les auteurs ont de´fini les gains de fac¸on manuelle. Lye
et al. [98] ont de´fini un jeu similaire. Par contre ils ont de´rive´ les gains a` partir d’un questionnaire qui a e´te´
rempli par les administrateurs de leur universite´. Ces deux mode´lisations exigent que les comportements et les
gains soient connus a` l’avance et donc soient statiques. En vue de re´soudre ces proble`mes, nous avons envisage´
l’utilisation d’apprentissage par renforcement. Dans un tel cas, un agent est capable de faire des actions dans
un environnement. Chaque action est soit punie, soit re´mune´re´e. L’objectif d’un agent est de maximiser son
gain. Les bases the´oriques dans l’apprentissage par renforcement sont les processus de de´cisions Markovien.
Un tel processus est compose´ d’un ensemble d’e´tats qui peuvent eˆtre visite´s par un agent. Dans chaque e´tat
l’agent peut choisir une action parmi un ensemble d’actions. Une fonction de´finit les gains qui sont distribue´s
apre`s chaque action. Un agent recherche une politique de´finie par une relation entre les e´tats et les actions.
L’objectif de l’agent est de trouver la politique en maximisant le gain a` court, moyen, ou long terme. Si un
tel proble`me est mode´lise´ avec un processus de de´cision Markovien et si tous les parame`tres sont connus alors
cette politique optimale peut eˆtre de´termine´e graˆce aux e´quations de Bellmann comme de´crit dans le chapitre 4.
En pratique, quelques parame`tres demeurent inconnus ce qui a pour conse´quence de rendre impossible le calcul
des e´quations de Bellmann. Habituellement, la fonction de transition dans le processus de de´cision Markovien
ainsi que la fonction de gain sont inconnues. De plus la complexite´ de calcul des e´quations de Bellmann est tre`s
e´leve´e. Ces deux proble`mes nous ont mene´s vers l’apprentissage par renforcement (“model-free methods”),
qui nous permet d’approximer les politiques optimales. Le de´savantage majeur d’une telle approche est le
compromis entre exploration et exploitation. Un agent n’est pas cense´ connaıˆtre son environnement.
Dans un tel cas, il doit explorer des actions dans des e´tats donne´s et en observer les effets. Ceci est fait
dans une phase d’exploration. Dans la phase d’exploitation un agent exploite les connaissances apprises au-
paravant. Les de´cisions sont prises par une re`gle d’apprentissage. Une exigence est que l’environnement doit
eˆtre stationnaire ce qui entraıˆne que les probabilite´s de transition entre e´tats et les gains ne changent pas au
cours du temps. Dans un contexte avec plusieurs agents concurrents, ce pre´requis n’est pas toujours respecte´.
Les processus Markoviens de de´cision ont e´te´ e´tendus en prenant en compte ces contraintes, ce qui a mene´ a` la
de´finition de jeux de Markov stochastiques. Fink [50] a formellement prouve´ l’existence des points d’e´quilibre
dans les jeux stochastiques. Ce re´sultat permet de combiner des approches d’apprentissage avec la the´orie des
jeux.
1.3 Contributions
1.3.1 Mode´lisation du comportement des attaquants
Dans les anne´es quatre-vingt dix, Cheswick a e´tudie´ le comportement des attaquants en interagissant manuelle-
ment avec eux. Graˆce a` une expe´rience similaire, nous avons constate´ qu’en interfe´rant avec un attaquant nous
pouvons e´tendre nos connaissances a` propos de lui. L’objectif de nos travaux est de mode´liser, imple´menter
et d’e´valuer des pots de miel intelligents qui s’adaptent aux attaquants en vue de les de´fier et d’apprendre
plus de connaissances sur eux. Dans le chapitre 5, un mode`le ge´ne´rique de comportement des attaquants a
e´te´ pre´sente´ et les possibilite´s d’adaptation. Nous avons focalise´ notre travail sur les attaquants qui pe´ne`trent
les serveurs SSH, car ce type d’attaque est tre`s populaire. En effet, derrie`re ces serveurs se cachent souvent
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des syste`mes puissants et attractifs pour les attaquants. Le mode`le de comportement doit eˆtre assez ge´ne´rique
pour qu’il puisse e´galement eˆtre adapte´ a` d’autres types d’attaques. Une fois que les attaquants ont pe´ne´tre´ un
syste`me, deux types de comportement sont envisageables. Le premier est appele´ comportement d’avancement
et le deuxie`me se nomme comportement de re´ponse ou re´action des attaquants. De`s que les attaquants ont
pe´ne´tre´ un syste`me, ils exe´cutent une succession de commandes en vue de re´aliser une attaque. Le fait d’entrer
successivement des commandes de´finit le comportement d’avancement qui correspond a` des transitions dans
un automate hie´rarchique probabiliste. Cet automate est compose´ de macro-e´tats repre´sentant des programmes
installe´s sur le syste`me. Chaque macro-e´tat se de´finit aussi comme un automate probabiliste ou` chaque e´tat est
e´quivalent a` un argument transmis au programme. La hie´rarchie est ne´cessaire car la se´mantique des arguments
est diffe´rente selon les programmes. L’alphabet de l’automate est associe´ aux chaıˆnes de caracte`res entre´es
par les attaquants. Parmi les commandes ou les arguments des programmes, les attaquants ont la possibilite´
d’entrer des informations non valides comme des commandes pour exe´cuter leurs propres programmes, des
erreurs typographiques, des insultes ou des tests de disponibilite´ de la ligne de commande. Pour cette raison
nous avons introduit trois e´tats spe´cifiques nomme´s insult, custom, empty. Chaque chaıˆne de caracte`re entre´e
par un attaquant est associe´e a` une des quatre cate´gories suivantes:
1. Commande syste`me
2. Commande relative a` un programme installe´ par un attaquant
3. Commande vide
4. Insulte ou erreur typographique
Un attaquant peut entrer une commande syste`me, ce qui e´quivaut a` l’exe´cution d’un programme installe´
par de´faut sur le syste`me. Cependant, si la commande n’exe´cute pas un programme installe´ par l’ope´rateur
du pot de miel, une transition dans l’e´tat custom est de´clenche´e. L’observation d’une entre´e vide nous indique
que l’attaquant a teste´ la re´ponse de la ligne de commande et, dans un tel cas, une transition vers l’e´tat empty
est effectue´e. Si une entre´e ne correspond a` aucun cas pre´ce´demment de´crit, l’attaquant est conside´re´ comme
ayant tape´ une insulte dans son terminal. Cette de´finition d’insulte comprend les erreurs typographiques des
attaquants. Dans le chapitre 6, nous utiliserons la distance de Levenshtein afin de classer les diffe´rentes entre´es
qui sont responsables d’une transition dans l’e´tat insult. D’un premier point de vue, cette mode´lisation semble
assez abstraite mais elle permet d’eˆtre imple´mente´e de fac¸on syste´matique. En vue d’observer les commandes
entre´es par un attaquant, nous observons les appels syste`mes dans le noyau. Pour chaque appel associe´ a`
l’exe´cution d’un programme, l’identifiant du processus, l’identifiant du processus pe`re ainsi que le nom du
programme avec ses arguments sont me´morise´s. Ces informations permettent la reconstruction de la structure
arborescente des processus qui sont actifs dans le syste`me. Le serveur SSH cre´e un processus responsable de
ge´rer la connexion d’un attaquant. Ce processus est la racine d’un sous-arbre de l’arbre global des processus
du syste`me. Tous les nœuds de ce sous-arbre sont donc corre´le´s aux exe´cutions de programmes d’un attaquant.
L’analyse des arbres de processus permet de ge´rer plusieurs attaquants simultane´s tout en diffe´renciant les
processus invoque´s par le syste`me lui-meˆme. Chaque lien entre nœuds dans un sous arbre est e´tiquete´ de la
diffe´rence de temps entre le pe`re et le fils. Ainsi nous pouvons reconstruire l’ordre des commandes exe´cute´es
et nous pouvons transformer les sous-arbres en des suites de commandes entre´es par un attaquant. Cette suite
de processus est qualifie´ de vecteur de processus. De plus, nous proposons une me´thode pour recueillir les
probabilite´s de transition entre commandes.
Quand un attaquant a pe´ne´tre´ un syste`me, il exe´cute des commandes pour atteindre son objectif. Un pot
de miel de´fie l’attaquant en interfe´rant avec l’attaque. Nous de´finissons quatre actions pour un pot de miel
adaptatif dans le but de de´clencher une re´action chez l’attaquant:
permettre l’exe´cution d’une commande. Si un pot de miel adaptatif permet l’exe´cution d’une commande, il
se comporte comme un pot de miel a` forte interaction traditionnelle. Cette commande est ne´cessaire pour
permettre l’avancement dans la re´alisation de l’attaque.
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bloquer l’exe´cution d’une commande. Lors de cette action, le pot de miel adaptatif retourne volontairement
une erreur a` l’attaquant indiquant que l’exe´cution du programme de´sire´ a e´choue´. Un attaquant est bloque´
durant son avancement et doit re´agir s’il veut aboutir a` son objectif.
substituer l’exe´cution d’une commande. Un pot de miel adaptatif exe´cute un autre programme a` la place de
celui qui a e´te´ de´sire´ par l’attaquant. Cela est une technique d’illusion qui de´clenche e´galement une
re´action chez l’attaquant. Son de´fi consiste alors a` comprendre le comportement du syste`me.
insulter l’attaquant. Dans un tel cas le pot de miel e´crit une insulte dans le terminal de l’attaquant. Cette
approche est une technique d’illusion qui de´clenche aussi une re´action de l’attaquant. Elle doit permettre
de distinguer si l’attaquant est un eˆtre humain ou un robot. Dans le contexte d’un humain cette technique
permet d’augmenter le niveau de stress pour le pousser a` commettre des erreurs et pour de´terminer son
origine linguistique.
Graˆce a` ces interactions supple´mentaires avec l’attaquant, la re´action des attaquants est particulie`rement
inte´ressante et se caracte´rise par une des cinq cate´gories suivantes :
re´pe´ter la commande e´choue´e. D’un coˆte´, l’e´chec d’une commande peut eˆtre duˆ a` un mauvais argument ce
qui re´sulte en une erreur syntaxique. L’attaquant peut donc choisir des autres arguments ou re´utiliser les
meˆmes. D’un autre coˆte´, l’e´chec peut eˆtre cause´ par un temps de de´bouclement e´merge´ durant l’exe´cution
du programme.
chercher une commande alternative. Apre`s avoir observe´ l’e´chec d’une commande, un attaquant peut tenter
d’en de´terminer la cause. Il a la possibilite´ par exemple de lancer un outil de trac¸age comme strace
en paralle`le du programme qu’il de´sire exe´cuter. Une autre option est de ve´rifier ou de modifier la
configuration du programme. En pratique, nous avons observe´ des attaquants ayant te´le´charge´ le code
source du programme en vue de le transformer en programme exe´cutable sur le pot de miel lui-meˆme.
Graˆce a` cette intervention, nous avons pu re´cupe´rer le code source habituellement non disponible. Ce
type de comportement est significatif d’un attaquant cherchant une solution alternative pour aboutir a` son
but.
insulter le pot de miel. Toute commande ne correspondant ni a` un programme, ni a` une commandes vide est
conside´re´e comme une insulte. L’observation d’erreurs typographique ou d’insultes est fortement syn-
onyme de la nature humaine, et donc diffe´rence celle d’un robot de l’attaquant. Durant nos premie`res
interactions avec les attaquants, nous avons remarque´ des attaquants tapant des insultes dans leur ter-
minal. Ceci e´tait souvent le cas quand ils ont rec¸u une insulte du pot de miel. Une des hypothe`ses
ame`ne a` penser que les attaquants supposent que d’autres avaient de´ja` compromis la machine et sont la
source des insultes. Une supposition alternative est le fait que les administrateurs ont configure´ les mes-
sages d’erreurs de leur syste`me en se servant d’un langage vulgaire. Les insultes sont particulie`rement
inte´ressantes car on peut en de´duire des aspects sociaux et culturels des attaquants et dans certain cas, par
recherche dans des dictionnaires, nous pouvons de´terminer le langage utilise´. Durant nos expe´riences,
nous avons pu constater que le pays de l’adresse IP ne correspond pas au langage utilise´. Par exemple,
beaucoup d’insultes roumaines provenaient d’adresses IP allemandes. Il est alors facilement imaginable
que les hoˆtes affecte´s a` ces adresses ont e´te´ compromis et servent de rebond pour les attaquants.
quitter le pot de miel. Suite a` une intervention d’un pot de miel les attaquants peuvent penser qu’ils sont sur
un pot de miel a` basse interaction et se de´connectent alors du syste`me. D’autres ne trouvent pas de
solution au de´fi impose´ et ils quittent le syste`me.
La re´action des attaquants informe sur leurs capacite´s de re´solution de proble`mes. Afin de mesurer la re´action
d’un attaquant, nous utilisons le temps de re´action entre deux commandes successives ainsi que les chaıˆnes de
caracte`res entre´es par l’attaquant suite a` cette intervention. La distance de Levenshtein permet quant a` elle de
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de´terminer des erreurs typographique ou des insultes. Une faible distance indique une erreur typographique et
une grande distance une insulte.
Ce mode`le de comportement des attaquants et des interventions d’un pot de miel nous permet de construire
des pots de miel adaptatif. Nous proposons un pot de miel adaptatif qui apprend le meilleur comportement avec
des traces d’un pot-de miel a` forte interaction. Ensuite nous proposons deux pots de miel apprenant le meilleur
comportement de fac¸on autonome.
1.3.2 Apprentissage dans les jeux de pot de miel
Dans le chapitre 6 nous de´crivons ces trois pots de miel a` forte interaction. L’interaction entre l’attaquant
et le pot de miel est mode´lise´ par un jeu en se basant sur la the´orie des jeux. Dans un premier temps, nous
conside´rons qu’un pot de miel adaptatif peut soit permettre une commande soit la bloquer. Comme re´action,
un attaquant peut re´essayer la commande, chercher une commande alternative ou quitter le pot de miel. Dans
ce jeu nous de´finissons deux joueurs: un attaquant et un pot de miel. L’attaquant est conside´re´ unique car
notre approche ne s’inte´resse pas aux attaquants individuels mais aux informations que le pot de miel adaptatif
peut apprendre. Chaque joueur a` une fonction de gain de´rive´e de l’automate probabiliste hie´rarchique. Le
but d’un attaquant est d’aboutir a` son objectif avec le moins d’effort possible et le but du pot de miel est de
garder l’attaquant connecte´ le plus longtemps possible. Ainsi deux types de jeux sont de´finis. Chaque jeu
a` sa propre fonction de gain qui prend en entre´e les transitions effectue´es par un attaquant dans l’automate.
Ensuite, nous proposons un simulateur capable d’utiliser des traces de pots de miel a` forte interaction en vue
de calculer les gains pour chaque joueur. De cette manie`re, nous pouvons calculer les e´quilibres de Nash
afin de de´terminer le meilleur comportement pour chaque joueur selon la the´orie des jeux en se concentrant
sur les jeux simples. Le de´savantage d’une telle approche est qu’elle exige un jeu de donne´es e´quilibre´ afin
d’estimer les probabilite´s de transition entre les e´tats. Ces probabilite´s peuvent a` leur tour impacter les gains
de chaque joueur. Dans un second temps, nous avons e´tendu les capacite´s d’interventions du pot de miel
pour augmenter son degre´ d’adaptabilite´. Il peut alors permettre l’exe´cution d’une commande, la bloquer, la
substituer ou insulter l’attaquant. Ce pot de miel est mode´lise´ par l’interme´diaire d’un processus de de´cision
Markovien. Le pot de miel est repre´sente´ comme un agent qui ope`re dans un environnement compose´ de
plusieurs e´tats. Dans notre cas, cet environnement correspond a` l’automate hie´rarchique probabiliste pre´sente´
dans le chapitre 5. Dans chaque e´tat, l’agent a la possibilite´ d’effectuer des actions. Chaque action dans un
e´tat est lie´e avec un gain de´fini par la fonction de gain. Nous avons cre´e´ deux fonctions de gain. La premie`re
a comme objectif de collecter le plus d’informations possibles sur les attaquants comme leurs outils et leurs
insultes. La deuxie`me fonction de gain vise a` les garder connecte´s le plus long possible. Graˆce aux processus
Markovien de de´cision, un agent pourrait calculer les actions optimales pour chaque e´tat et ne pas utiliser les
probabilite´s de blocage pour tous les e´tats. Nous avons donc un degre´ d’adaptabilite´ plus fin. Avec ces valeurs
optimales l’agent pourrait de´river une politique d’ope´ration optimale. Les actions des attaquants influencent
l’environnement en effectuant des transitions dans l’automate. D’un coˆte´ nous pourrions utiliser une approche
par simulation a` l’instar de celle utilise´e dans le premier jeu. D’un autre coˆte´ nous pouvons faire appel a` la
famille des algorithmes d’apprentissage par renforcement. Plus particulie`rement nous nous concentrons sur les
algorithmes ne ne´cessitant pas de mode`le exacts de l’environnement. L’avantage de tels algorithmes est qu’ils
sont robustes a` de le´ge`res variations des probabilite´s de transitions et de la fonction de gain. Ces algorithmes se
de´composent en deux parties: l’explorateur et la re`gle d’apprentissage. ´Etant donne´ que l’environnement n’est
pas force´ment connu par un agent, il doit tout d’abord le de´couvrir. Cette taˆche est accomplie par le composant
d’explorateur. Nous avons choisi l’explorateur  - greedy car il a e´te´ prouve´ que la re`gle d’apprentissage aboutit
a` des valeurs optimales pour chaque e´tat visite´.
La mode´lisation d’un pot de miel comme agent et de conside´rer les attaquants dans l’environnement de
l’agent ne´glige la nature compe´titive entre attaquants et ope´rateur de pot de miel ce qui peut affecter la con-
vergence vers les valeurs optimales. En vue de re´soudre ce proble`me nous utilisons un jeu stochastique. Les
actions sont semblables a` celles de´finies dans le processus de de´cision Markovien et les objectifs des fonctions
de gain sont les meˆmes. Dans un tel jeu chaque joueur apprend des re´actions a` chaque e´tat en prenant compte
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les actions de son adversaire.
1.3.3 Ope´ration des pots de miel
Dans le chapitre 7 nous de´crivons nos contributions comple´mentaires aux bonnes pratiques de l’ope´ration des
pots de miel. Dans le cadre d’un pot de miel a` forte interaction, il est conseille´ d’utiliser des points d’observation
redondants. Un autre aspect important est le controˆle de la source d’observation. Une source d’observation
accessible par un attaquant n’est pas ne´cessairement fiable. Un attaquant peut par exemple effacer ou modifier
ses traces. Une source robuste est la capture du trafic re´seau. Il est souvent suppose´ que l’attaquant ne puisse
pas prendre le controˆle des e´quipements re´seaux qui inter-connectent le pot de miel. L’e´quipement qui connecte
le pot de miel avec les re´seaux publiques est configure´ pour dupliquer l’inte´gralite´ du trafic permettant ainsi
a` l’ope´rateur du pot de miel de l’analyser. Par ailleurs, d’autres sources d’observations, comme le noyau du
syste`me ou la machine virtuelle qui ope`re le pot de miel sont a` conside´rer si l’attaquant utilise des canaux
de communications chiffre´s. L’ope´rateur est le´galement responsable de son pot de miel. Dans tous les cas
et a` chaque instant l’ope´rateur du pot de miel doit eˆtre a` meˆme de voir toutes les activite´s sur son pot de
miel et, de`s qu’il observe que son pot de miel participe a` des attaques vers des tiers, il se doit de prendre les
mesures ne´cessaires afin de minimiser les de´gaˆts collate´raux. En cas de constatation d’activite´s pre´liminaires
qui peuvent mener a` des attaques envers de tiers, nous devons arreˆter les expe´riences. Parmi, les bonnes
pratiques d’ope´ration de pot de miel a` forte interaction, on trouve usuellement:
• Limitation de la bande passante
• ´Emulation d’internet pour les attaquants
• De´ploiement des pare-feux
• De´ploiement des syste`mes de de´tection d’intrusions
• Le fait de modifier du trafic vers des tiers afin de le rendre non-nuisible (connection scrubbing)
Nous proposons des contributions additionnelles en nous focalisant sur les me´thodes de surveillance des ac-
tivite´s du pot de miel, ce qui inclut observations au niveau du re´seau mais e´galement au niveau du syste`me
d’exploitation. En fonction de la disponibilite´ de ces sources d’information, nous proposons une imple´mentation
ge´ne´rique de´die´e pour construire des pots de miel adaptatifs. Cela se traduit par deux propositions de visuali-
sation de trafic re´seau pour ensuite nous concentrer sur l’e´valuation de la qualite´ des outils recommande´s dans
le cadre des bonnes pratiques d’ope´ration de pots de miel pour extraire les informations. Ceux-ci proposent
de capturer et d’analyser l’inte´gralite´ du trafic de´die´ au pot de miel. Cependant, un pot de miel sous une ou
plusieurs attaques massives ge´ne`re rapidement de grands volumes de donne´es qui exigent un temps de traite-
ment important. Durant l’analyse, le pot miel risque d’endommager des ressources des tiers. Afin de diminuer
le temps de re´action de l’ope´rateur de pot de miel, nous pre´conisons l’utilisation d’une technique de visualisa-
tion. Parmi les travaux existants spe´cifiques a` la visualisation des flux re´seaux individuels, nous proposons de
visualiser des flux agre´ge´s pour palier au proble`me des donne´es volumineuses et pour avoir un aperc¸u global
sur les activite´s. Ensuite, notre me´thode de visualisation base´e sur les coordonne´es polaires est capable de:
• de´tecter des balayage de ports
• de´tecter des intrusions re´ussies
• de´tecter des attaques par recherche exhaustive
Dans le contexte d’analyse des traces re´seaux, un proble`me fondamental rele`ve du niveau de de´finition
de l’identifiant d’un flux re´seau. La majorite´ des outils d’analyse de traces supposent qu’un flux re´seau est
identifie´ avec un cinq-uplet compose´ de l’adresse IP source, du port source, de l’adresse IP destination, du port
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destination et du protocole utilise´. Lors des attaques de recherche exhaustive sur un pot de miel un attaquant
ge´ne`re beaucoup de connexion vers le pot de miel. L’adresse du pot de miel ainsi que son port de service est
fixe. Le port source est variable. Due au nombre restreint de possibilite´s de se´lection de port source le meˆme
port source est re´utilise´. Ceci entraıˆne un fonctionnement incorrect des outils d’analyse du a` un me´lange de
flux. Apre`s une investigation de ce proble`me nous pouvons de´duit un exploit de cette faille. Un attaquant peut
cre´er une bombe PCAP ayant comme but de faire un de´ni de service sur la machine de l’analyse. Elle consiste
en quelques paquets TCP/IP. Cette bombe explose lors de l’analyse de ces paquets et a comme conse´quence un
effondrement des ressources de la machine effectuant cette analyse. De plus, nous avons de´crit une attaque pour
cacher un flux dans un autre. Physiquement les paquets correspondant ont e´te´ enregistre´s mais ignore´s par les
outils d’analyse que nous avons e´value´s. Ainsi un attaquant est en mesure cacher le te´le´chargement d’un outil.
Afin d’assurer la collecte des outils te´le´charge´s, nous proposons une me´thode dynamique in-vivo d’analyse de
programmes malveillants. En combinant cette approche avec les me´thodes traditionnelles il est possible de
prendre en compte les quelques cas pour lesquels les conditions initiales garantissant le bon fonctionnent du
programme ne sont pas garanties durant une analyse in-vitro . Dans le cas des machines virtuelles utilise´es dans
le contexte de pots de miel a` forte interaction, une solution facilement modifiable est souhaite´e afin de proposer
une preuve de concept pour construire des pots de miel adaptatifs a` forte interaction. Notre choix s’est porte´
sur User-Mode Linux (UML) qui est un syste`me Linux exe´cute´ dans l’espace utilisateur d’un syste`me Linux
traditionnel. Parmi ses de´fauts reporte´s dans des travaux ante´rieurs, nous avons mis en exergue une faille et une
preuve de concept de de´ni de service d’un tel syste`me. Face a` tous ces proble`mes d’ope´ration de pot de miel,
nous proposons des techniques de limitation des risques afin de pouvoir faire des expe´riences du pot de miel
adaptatif. Finalement, nous proposons une implantation ge´ne´rique de ce type de pot de miel adaptatif. L’ide´e
principale est que chaque appel syste`me relatif a` l’exe´cution d’un programme doit eˆtre confirme´ par un de´mon.
L’ope´rateur de ne doit alors pas rechanger le noyau du pot de miel mais juste ajouter les modules ne´cessaires
d’apprentissage au de´mon.
1.3.4 Validation expe´rimentale
Apre`s avoir mode´lise´ le comportement des diffe´rents intervenants ainsi que les me´thodes d’ope´ration, nous
avons re´alise´ des expe´riences avec des pot de miel qui sont de´crites dans le chapitre 8. Dans une premie`re
e´tape, deux pots de miel ont e´te´ de´ploye´s dans le but de re´cupe´rer des traces d’attaquants servant de base pour
les e´valuations. Nous avons fait une expe´rience avec un pot de miel a` basse interaction et un pot de miel a`
forte interaction. L’automate probabilistes hie´rarchique est infe´re´ a` partir du pot de miel a` forte interaction.
Cette instance nous sert de re´fe´rence pour calculer les gains de chaque joueur et de´river les e´quilibres de Nash
pour chaque type de jeux. Ensuite, nous avons instancie´ et de´ploye´ un pot de miel adaptatif avec les strate´gies
re´sultantes des e´quilibre de Nash. Le re´sultat de cette analyse informe de la probabilite´ de bloquer les exe´cutions
des programmes relatifs aux attaquants. Il a ainsi e´te´ constate´ que les attaquants effectuent trois fois plus de
commandes compare´ a` un pot de miel a` forte interaction standard en se basant sur la longueur des vecteurs
de processus. Cependant, cette approche a trois de´savantages. En premier lieu, la strate´gie optimale de´rive´e
des e´quilibres Nash peut de´pendre des traces que nous avons utilise´es pour le calculer, ce qui implique que
les donne´es d’entre´e doivent bien eˆtre e´quilibre´es. En deuxie`me lieu, cela suppose des attaquants rationnels
alors que ce n’est pas toujours le cas. Finalement, le degre´ d’adaptabilite´ du pot de miel est faible. Le pot de
miel peut accepter ou bloquer une exe´cution d’un programme selon une probabilite´ de blocage sans prendre
en compte le contexte de l’exe´cution. Un attaquant peut ainsi exe´cuter la meˆme commande plusieurs fois et se
rendre compte de la probabilite´ de blocage. Pour ces raisons et en vue d’augmenter le degre´ d’adaptabilite´ nous
avons imple´mente´ un pot de miel adaptatif qui est controˆle´ avec l’apprentissage par renforcement. Il peut ainsi
permettre, bloquer, substituer une commande ou insulter l’attaquant. Avec une telle approche, nous pouvons
estimer les meilleurs actions pour chaque e´tat d’apre`s le point de vue du pot de miel. Cette information a e´te´
recueillie sous forme d’un tableau ou` chaque ligne correspond a` un e´tat et chaque colonne a` une action. Les
cellules avec le nombre le plus e´leve´ est le choix pre´fe´rentiel du pot de miel. Ainsi nous pouvons de´terminer
les programmes qui doivent eˆtre accessibles sur un pot de miel et les programmes qui peuvent eˆtre e´mule´s. De
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cette fac¸on nous pouvons alors ame´liorer les pot de miel a` basse interaction. Une comparaison en termes de
nombre de transitions vers des programmes installe´s par les attaquants souligne un gain de 3 en faveur du pot
de miel adaptatif. Graˆce a` la premie`re approche d’apprentissage par renforcement, le pot de miel ope`re dans un
environnement incluant les attaquants. Cette approche ne´glige la nature compe´titive e´tablie entre attaquants et
pot de miel. Nous avons observe´ que cette simplification impacte la convergence des valeurs apprises. Afin de
palier a` ce proble`me, nous avons mis en œuvre un jeu stochastique dans une autre d’imple´mentation de pot de
miel adaptatif.
1.4 Conclusion et travaux futures
De`s les anne´es quatre-vingt-dix, Cheswick [26] a a montre´ qu’il est possible d’e´tudier le comportement des
attaquants en interagissant manuellement avec eux. Nous avons fait une expe´rience similaire sur un pot de
miel a` forte interaction au cours nous de laquelle un attaquant a installe´e un outil de balayage de machine qui
a monopolise´ les ressources du pot de miel. Ainsi aucun autre attaquant ne pouvait se pouvait plus connecter
au pot de miel. Nous avons injecte´ manuellement du code dans cet outil dans le but de provoquer une panne
de l’outil. Apre`s un certain temps, l’attaquant est revenu pour inspecter les re´sultats de son outil, ce qui lui a
permis de se rendre compte de la panne. Il a alors relance´ l’outil encore une fois pour qui tombera de nouveau
en panne. Apre`s cette deuxie`me panne, l’attaquant a essaye´ en examiner la cause. Il n’a pas re´ussi et il a de´cide´
d’installer un autre outil fonctionnant correctement. Graˆce a` cette intervention strate´gique, le pot de miel a pu
re´cupe´rer deux outils de l’attaquant. Dans ces travaux nous avons propose´ un nouveau paradigme de pot de
miel adaptatif. Dans le contexte des pots de miel a` forte interaction un attaquant peut exe´cuter des commandes
qualifie´ d’eˆtre arbitraires ce qui lui permet d’effectuer les diffe´rentes e´tapes de son attaque. Nous de´finissions
ce type de comportement comme l’avancement de l’attaquant. Un pot de miel adaptatif intervient de fac¸on
strate´gique pendant les attaques. Dans un tel cas l’attaquant est de´vie´ de son chemin de manie`re de de´clencher
une re´action chez l’attaquant pour re´aliser son attaque. Nous appelons cette re´action comportement de re´ponse.
Une attaquant peut soit re´essayer la commande, soit chercher une commande alternative, soit se de´connecter
du pot de miel. En utilisant des crite`res mesurables comme le temps de re´action ou les entre´es de l’attaquant,
le pot de miel peut de´river les capacite´s de l’attaquant. Des attaques automatiques peuvent eˆtre diffe´rencie´s des
attaques humaines. De l’un coˆte´ si le pot de miel intervient lors d’une attaque automatique alors ces attaques
fre´quemment e´chouent. De l’autre coˆte´ si l’attaquant re´pond avec une insulte il est fortement probable que cet
attaquant est un attaquant humain. De plus les capacite´s de re´solution de proble`me peuvent eˆtre estime´es avec
les pot de miel adaptatifs. On peut voir la persistance de l’attaquant. Par exemple si elle re´essaie une commande
plusieurs fois ou si elle abandonne facilement. De plus on peut voir si elle est assez intelligente de choisir
une chemin alternatif pour aboutir a` son objectif. Les pot de miel adaptatifs permettent aussi de de´terminer
la quantite´ de re´sistance qu’ un attaquant peu subir avant d’abandonner. Toutes ses connaissances sur les
attaquants ne peuvent gue`re eˆtre de´termine´ avec les pots de miel a` basse interaction ou a` forte interaction. Dans
les pots de miel a` basse interaction il n’y a pas assez d’interaction avec les attaquants et avec les pots de miel
a` forte interaction la majorite´ des actions sont permises et il n’y a pas de re´sistance aux actions effectue´es par
les attaquants. Les pots de miel adaptatif peuvent servir des nouvelles sources d’information sur les attaquants
permettant d’e´tudier leurs re´actions. L’objectif de mes travaux est de construire des pots de miel adaptatifs qui
exploitent de fac¸on autonome ces caracte´ristiques pour faire face a` la large panoplie des attaques pre´sentes sur
Internet. La the´orie des jeux et l’apprentissage par renforcement permettent au pot de miel de se rapprocher de
comportements optimaux parame´tre´s par l’interme´diaire de fonctions de gains. Deux objectifs sont controˆle´s
par les fonctions de gains:
• Maximiser les informations sur les attaquants comme leurs entre´es ou leurs outils.
• Maintenir les attaquants actifs le plus long temps possible en vue d’e´tudier leur re´sistance face aux
interventions du pot de miel.
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L’avancement des attaquants est mode´lise´ avec un automate hie´rarchique probabiliste qui contient deux
niveaux d’e´tats. Les attaquants communiquent des entre´es qui sont des chaıˆnes de caracte`res. Ces entre´es
sont associe´es a` des e´tats de l’automate. Les e´tats du premier niveau sont appele´s macro-e´tats et repre´sentent
des programmes installe´s sur le pot de miel. Les programmes installe´s par les attaquants sont repre´sente´s
par un e´tat spe´cial appele´ custom. Les entre´es des attaquants qui sont vides sont transpose´es dans un e´tat
appele´ empty. Les entre´es ne pouvant eˆtre affecte´es a` un e´tat selon les re`gles pre´ce´dentes sont regroupe´es
dans un e´tat spe´cifique nomme´ insult. Chaque macro e´tat est un automate qui a des parame`tre du programme
comme e´tats. Dans cet automate hie´rarchique, les attaquants peuvent faire des transitions ou` chacune d’elle
corresponde a` une e´tape d’une attaque. L’avantage de cet automate est qu’(i) il est possible de l’inte´grer
dans les pots de miel a` forte interaction et (ii) qu’aucune aucune intervention humaine n’est ne´cessaire. Nous
avons propose´ une me´thode automatique qui prend des donne´es brutes comme entre´e obtenues par le noyau
du syste`me d’exploitation. Graˆce aux arbres de processus, les commandes exe´cute´es par le syste`me lui-meˆme
peuvent eˆtre diffe´rencie´es de celles des diffe´rentes attaquants. Cette distinction est ne´cessaire afin de ne pas
rendre instable le syste`me d’exploitation. En effet, la perturbation des processus vitaux pourrait induire une
panne du syste`me d’exploitation. Les instances d’automates hie´rarchiques nous ont permis de construire des
pots de miel adaptatifs ayant des buts spe´cifiques. Un objectif d’un pot de miel est controˆle´ avec la fonction de
gain qui est construite a` partir des composants mesurables comme les entre´es donne´es par les attaquants et le
temps e´coule´ entre deux entre´es successives. Parmi les objectifs nous avons de´finis (i) la collecte des outils des
attaquants ou le de´clenchement de nouvelles entre´es sur le pot de miel et (ii) le fait de garder les attaquants le
plus actif possible.
Les outils des attaquants ainsi que leurs insultes sont particulie`rement inte´ressants pour les ope´rateurs de
pot de miel. Les outils malveillants des attaquants permettent d’ame´liorer les logiciels anti-virus. De plus,
si un ope´rateur observe un tel outil sur une machine le´gitime il est fortement probable que cette machine
ait e´te´ compromise. En collectant des insultes, nos mode`les peuvent pre´dire avec une certaine probabilite´
qu’un attaquant est un eˆtre humain re´actif aux pannes. Dans certains cas nous arrivons meˆme a` identifier le
langage utilise´ qui peut eˆtre comparer avec le pays correspondant a` l’adresse source de l’attaquant. L’objectif
de garder les attaquants le plus longtemps actif possible permet d’e´tudier leurs re´actions et de se concentrer
sur les attaquants inte´ressants. Les attaques automatiques ont de faibles capacite´s de gestion des erreurs et
e´chouent directement face aux interventions strate´giques du pot de miel. Les attaquants novices abandonnent
rapidement et les plus curieux restent. Les pots de miel adaptatifs permettent d’exploiter une nouvelle source
d’information sur les attaquants qui consiste en la re´action de ces derniers.
Les objectifs de nos travaux e´taient d’e´laborer des pots de miel adaptatifs qui de´clenchent des re´actions chez
les attaquants sans s’engager dans la course entre de´veloppeurs de pots de miel et attaquants. Nous sommes
convaincus que la cre´ation des pots de miel adaptatifs est inde´pendant de la technologie utilise´e et nous avons
donne´ une preuve du concept ou` nous avons identifie´ trois types d’attaques sur nos pots de miel adaptatifs.
Deux classes d’ attaques viennent des pots de miel a` forte interaction et une classe d’attaque est de´die´e aux pots
de miel adaptatifs.
• Attaques du syste`me
• Attaques du noyau
• Attaques comportementales
Nos pots de miel adaptatifs interviennent au niveau des commandes exe´cute´es par les attaquants. Ceci
ne´cessite une distinction claire de celles exe´cute´es par le pot de miel et celles exe´cute´s par le syste`me lui-
meˆme. Ce proble`me a e´te´ re´solu en analysant les sous-arbres de processus affilie´ au processus d’entre´e qui
est dans notre cas le serveur SSH. Une fois entre´ dans le syste`me, un attaquant peut exe´cuter des commandes
arbitraires. Il peut par exemple installer un programme qui continue la suite des ope´rations de fac¸on automa-
tique. L’attaquant peut aussi modifier ensuite le syste`me de telle fac¸on que le syste`me lui-meˆme exe´cute le
programme injecte´. Le pot de miel adaptatif permet par de´faut toutes les actions du syste`me et donc aussi
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l’exe´cution de ce programme. Un attaquant pourrait aussi installer un serveur de gestion de commandes local
sur le pot de miel. L’attaquant se connecterait ensuite a` un tel serveur a` travers un tunnel SSH. Dans un tel cas
le sous-arbre de processus relie´ a` cet attaquant a une hauteur de 1 et le pot de miel adaptatif n’interfe`re pas avec
les commandes lance´es par le serveur local. Une piste pour contrer ce proble`me est l’analyse par marquage
[81]. Chaque donne´e d’origine d’un attaquant est marque´e et est surveille´e tout au long de son existence sur le
syste`me. Des efforts supple´mentaires doivent eˆtre faits dans le contexte d’observation du syste`me de fichiers
du pot de miel. En effet, en modifiant le syste`me, un attaquant pourrait modifier les e´tats de celui-ci. Si un
attaquant se rend compte que quelques programmes sont toujours permis duˆ au me´canisme d’apprentissage,
il pourrait remplacer ces programmes par d’autres habituellement bloque´s ou substitue´s. Une contre-mesure
a` une telle attaque consiste a` calculer des sommes de controˆle des programmes inclus lors de la cre´ation du
syste`me. Ainsi, un remplacement d’un programme aurait pour conse´quence une modification de la somme de
controˆle. Le pot de miel peut soit pre´venir de telles attaques en interdisant le remplacement des programmes
connus, soit arreˆter de fonctionner si un tel changement est observe´.
Les pots de miel adaptatifs que nous avons propose´s dans nos travaux interviennent au niveau noyau du
syste`me. De ce fait, une menace potentielle serait d’attaquer le noyau du syste`me. En vue d’acce´der a` celui-ci
l’attaquant dispose de plusieurs options comme par exemple en installant un module noyau. Ceci peut eˆtre
e´vite´ en configurant un noyau monolithique lors de sa configuration. L’attaquant pourrait aussi simplement
remplacer le noyau. Par contre, l’attaquant devrait rede´marrer le syste`me. Si le pot de miel est implante´ dans
une machine virtuelle, celle-ci peut eˆtre instrumente´e de manie`re a` substituer l’action de rede´marrer le syste`me
une mise a` l’arreˆt de la machine. Si un ope´rateur d’un pot de miel observe un syste`me a` l’arreˆt, il peut alors
ve´rifier son noyau et constater qu’il a e´te´ modifie´ graˆce a` des sommes de controˆle pre´-e´tablies. L’ope´rateur
du pot de miel a ainsi la possibilite´ de remplacer le noyau modifie´ par le noyau initial. Un attaquant pourrait
aussi directement modifier la me´moire du noyau initiale. L’ope´rateur du pot de miel doit alors pre´venir ces
acce`s. Enfin, l’attaquant a toujours la possibilite´ d’ utiliser un code d’exploit de´die´ pour le noyau. Dans ce
cas, l’ope´rateur du pot de miel devra donc veiller a` mettre a` jour le noyau re´gulie`rement. Nous avons modifie´
directement le code source du noyau afin d’e´viter qu’un attaquant de´sactive nos fonctionnalite´s d’observation et
d’adaptation. Ceci a comme conse´quence que les mises a` jours du code source doivent eˆtre re´alise´es avec notre
noyau modifie´. Actuellement, les pots de miel tendent a` faire les observations a` l’inte´rieure d’une machine
virtuelle. Bien que cette technique soit plus difficile a` tromper, il existe des attaques contre cette nouvelle
technologie que nous avons discute´es dans le chapitre 3 au cours duquel nous avons mis en e´vidence le fait
que les pots de miel a` forte interaction ne peuvent exclure tout risque re´siduel, ce qui doit eˆtre accepte´ par l’
ope´rateur du pot de miel.
Dans le chapitre 6, nous avons pre´sente´ un jeu entre un pot de miel et un attaquant omnipre´sent. Selon
la the´orie des jeux, dans les jeux simples, les joueurs doivent eˆtre rationnels ce qui n’est pas garanti pour les
attaquants. Les script kiddies sont utilise´s par des novices qui essaient les attaques de´crites par des experts. De
meˆme, la spe´cialisation des attaquants peut varier. Il y a des attaquants pre´sentant des connaissances solides
pour un syste`me d’exploitation Windows mais souffrant de lacunes sur le syste`me d’exploitation Linux [197].
De plus la discipline des attaquants est variable. Quelques attaquants sont plus rigoureux que d’autres. Afin de
contrer ces proble`mes, la the´orie des jeux propose des me´canismes pour mesurer ces erreurs. Un pot de miel
adaptatif ope´re´ avec l’apprentissage par renforcement apprend son comportement lors de son ope´ration. Par
contre, avec cette approche, la nature compe´titive entre les attaquants et les pot de miel adaptatifs est ignore´e
ce qui induit des proble`mes de stabilisation de l’apprentissage. En mode´lisant un jeu stochastique prenant
en compte les actions de l’adversaire,la stabilisation des valeurs apprise est ame´liore´e mais le proble`me de
rationalite´ re´apparaıˆt. Afin de mesurer la magnitude de cette incertitude, nous devrons suivre l’approche de´crite
dans [74]. Il faut alors faire des simulations des attaquants qui ne suivent pas l’e´quilibre de Nash et calculer
l’impact sur les valeurs apprises.
En plus de ces proble`mes de stabilisation, un attaquant est e´galement en mesure d’attaquer la me´thode
d’apprentissage. Comme de´ja` discute´ pre´ce´demment, un attaquant pourrait changer les programmes du syste`me
et ainsi influencer les transitions entre e´tats afin que le pot de miel apprenne des valeurs incorrectes. Dans un
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tel cas, un attaquant vise´ a` apprendre les de´tails du pot de miel en sacrifiant ses objectifs initiaux. Une autre
condition dans les jeux simples stipule qu’un joueur ne change pas de strate´gie. Cependant, rien n’empeˆche
un attaquant de le faire en re´alite´ afin d’obtenir des avantages supple´mentaires. Par exemple, un attaquant
peut abuser des commandes pour aboutir a` son objectif. S’il veut lister les fichier dans un re´pertoire, il peut soit
utiliser la commande le´gitime soit utiliser un effet de bord d’une autre commande. Nous pourrions inte´grer dans
notre mode`le des super - e´tats relatifs a` la se´mantique des commandes. Cette solution ne´cessiterait une inter-
vention manuelle de l’ope´rateur du pot de miel. Normalement, les attaques comportementales pre´ce´demment
de´crites exigent que l’attaquant ait conscience de la pre´sence du pot de miel adaptatif. `A chaque exe´cution
d’un programme de´clenche´ par un attaquant, nos pots de miel adaptatifs de´cident d’intervenir ou` non. Sur des
syste`mes Linux, il y a souvent des groupes de commandes qui sont exe´cute´es ensemble. Un attaquant peut
trouver suspect si une partie d’entre elles e´choue et les autres re´ussissent. Afin de re´soudre ce proble`me, la
se´mantique des commandes devrait eˆtre inclus dans le mode`le du pot de miel adaptatif.
Dans nos travaux nous avons mode´lise´ et e´value´ des pots de miels adaptatifs. Nous avons explore´ la
the´orie des jeux et l’apprentissage par renforcement dans le contexte des pots de miel a` forte interaction. Nous
avons e´tudie´ les pots de miel adaptatifs dans le contexte de pots de miel SSH. ´Etendre le paradigme de pot de
miel adaptatif sur d’autres types de pots de miel est envisageable comme ceux de´die´s a` la voix sur IP ou la
messagerie. De plus, nous avons conside´re´ uniquement des pots de miel de type serveur. Nous pourrions aussi
cre´er des pots de miels adaptatifs de type client qui e´muleraient des utilisateurs se faisant attaquer. Ce champ
d’utilisation donnerait lieu a` l’utilisation des algorithmes de renforcement plus complexes a` l’instar d’agents
collaboratifs partageant les informations apprises. En plus des jeux simples conside´re´s dans cette the`se, une
approche alternative pour prendre en compte l’incertitude des joueurs est d’inte´grer la the´orie bayesienne en
mode´lisant des jeux dits bayesiens. Nous songeons e´galement a` explorer diffe´rents types de jeux comme les
jeux de Stackleberg ou` de multiples joueurs collaborent et ou` chaque joueur a un roˆle spe´cifique. Il faut aussi
conside´rer la possibilite´ de mode´liser des jeux entre pot de miels collaboratifs hie´rarchiques en exploitant les
the´ories d’apprentissage par renforcement qui sont en cours de de´veloppement.
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Chapter 2
Introduction
2.1 Context
Many organizations have extended their business capabilities and rely on external providers to accomplish im-
portant missions and business functions [114]. Often, they offer services to external partners or they rely on
external services. These services are outside their organizational boundaries and are not under the control of
the organization. Besides these complex business interactions, the complexity of software is continuously in-
creasing, resulting in an increase of implementation flaws. According to Stefan Frei et al. [54] the number
and diversity of attacks has exploded: In the time period between 1996 and 2006, the number of software
vulnerability reports1 steadily increased. After examining the publicly available dataset of vulnerabilities re-
ports from 1999 to 2010, we can confirm this trend2 (see figure 2.1). The appearance of a new technology
is usually followed by a new class of vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are then exploited by attackers in
an exploitation process, until the technology matures. This cyclic phenomenon is accelerated by the fact that
more systems are globally interconnected and accessible from any country in the world[24]. In this century
the Honeynet community headed by Spitzner [154] made the observation that an unprotected computer would
be compromised within a few minutes. Provos et al. [130] made a similar observation seven years later which
shows the persistence of the problem. They also found 19 different malicious programs on a vulnerable ma-
chine that was directly connected to the Internet for 24 hours. Owners of information systems simply follow
the plug-and-play paradigm, where they just connect their systems to the Internet and expect that everything
works: they do not bother to identify the services they really need and shut them down or mitigate access to
risky services. This lazy behavior has led to self-propagating malicious software, known as worms, which in-
fested the Internet following the turn of the century. Provos et al. [130] reported that the birthrate of malicious
software known as malware is steadily increasing and human intervention is too slow [130]. Operating system
vendors and Internet service providers have undertaken tremendous efforts to secure their solutions in order to
mitigate these outbreaks. Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) and security researchers have
run large-scale compaigns to educate users and teach them basic security practices [114].
Cheswick et al. [27] advise that an exposed system should run as few programs as possible. A system
with a minimal number of exposed programs is easier to monitor and to manage. This pragmatic approach was
formalized and extended by Howard et al. [72]. In order to perform a risk analysis, they developed an attack
surface model with three abstract dimensions to Microsoft operating systems. They considered enablers, com-
munication protocols and access rights. If fewer services are exposed, fewer enablers are exposed, resulting
in a smaller attack surface. The larger a system’s attack surface, the more likely it is to be exploited. Thus,
software vendors and system administrators can reduce the attack surface by exposing fewer services. Un-
1The number of vulnerability reports is measurable. CVE assigns a unique number to each report. However, a software vulnerability
is not in a one to one relation with a vulnerability report. Some software vulnerabilities triggered multiple reports, and a report can
addresses multiple systems. Hence it may describe multiple instances of the vulnerability.
2A detailed description of these measurements is presented in the appendix section A.
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fortunately, some systems can offer little space for reconfiguration and other systems are not under control of
administrators. Proxy servers and firewalls have been proposed to control outgoing and incoming connections
[44].
By the year 2000, the web presence of organizations had became a crucial business factor. Unfortunately,
the developers of these solutions assumed a clean and well-formed inputs from external users. This presumption
led to a pandemic of cross-site scripting exploits [78] and SQL-injection attacks. In addition to controlling or
hijacking visitors’ hosts, attackers can also control the databases that feed the attached web applications. The
countermeasure developed by CSIRTs is the definition of best practices for web development with the intent of
education of web developers.
Besides their education mission, CSIRTs also study the behaviors and origins of attackers. Attackers ac-
tively look for vulnerabilities in new technologies and try to exploit them. A successful exploit usually leads
to a system being penetrated through an exposed service, which is a program that is remotely accessible [47].
Usually, the attackers’ the first step is to gather information about the target. Attacks are divided into two
generic categories. In the first, when attackers have selected a particular victim, for instance a specific industry
or a given organization, the term targeted attack is used [28]. Targeted attacks are often related to industrial
espionage or sabotage. In the second category, when attackers do not care which victim they have selected, the
term of random attack is used [28]. In this case, an attacker is just interested in gain access to the resources
of the selected victim. A hijacked resource is called a zombie, and is used to attack other targets [201]. An
attacker who we call in thesis Eve, could simply probe an address range. If a host replies to the probes, she
has discovered the host. This behavior is usually defined as scanning [154]. Alternatively she could set up a
rogue publicly-available server or compromise a frequently visited server such that users visiting this server are
infected. In this case, the term drive-by malicious software is used [131]. Such attacks are out of the scope of
this thesis.
Attackers often distribute attacking tasks. For instance, groups of attackers specialized in scanning activities
share or sell their results to other attackers [112]. Assuming that Eve has discovered a host, she has to exploit
it to get access. Sometimes, she could apply a ready-to use-proof-of-concept code [53]. If this is not available
she can develop her own exploit code. If she decides to publish it without previously notifying the owners of
the system the term zero-day exploit is used [125]. If the exploit is successful, she obtains access to the host
and the host is compromised. Li et al. [93] used attack observations and created attacker profiles based on the
characteristics of the selected target, the characteristics of observed events, and the consequences of the events.
Ramsbrock et al. [135] observed attacker behaviors after the successful take-over of a machine and modeled
attackers’ behaviors as a state machine having seven states. Once Eve had entered a machine, she could check
the hardware or software configuration, she could change passwords or change the overall configuration of the
compromised system. Following, these activities, Eve usually downloads and installs customized tools and
executes them for her malicious purpose.
A combination and simplification of the scanning activities, exploit process and attacker behaviors follow-
ing the penetration results in the ring hierarchy is presented in figure 2.2. Each ring corresponds to a generic
activity by an attacker and also shows observation levels of attacks. We defined five rings of attacker behav-
ior: discovery, exploit, reconnaissance, customization, and post-attack. The deeper (the higher the index of)
the ring, the nearer to success is the attack. Having discovered the target, modeled with ring R0, Eve tries to
penetrate it via exploits grouped in the ring R1. After penetrating the target, she enters a reconnaissance phase,
represented by ring R2. She tries to discover system details, such as the version of the operating system and
the installed software. Using this knowledge, she starts to prepare the system. In the ring R3 she often takes
steps to assure further logins and wipe traces of her break-in, then starts to abuse the system. An attacker has
a dedicated attack goal presented with ring R∗. For instance, she may want to steal confidential information or
hijack the system in order to performing additional attacks.
Each ring in figure 2.2 also represents a type of knowledge about attackers. An attacker’s source IP ad-
dress and source port can be observed in ring R0. A lookup of the Internet service provider together with the
corresponding country of an attacker can be performed. The exploits used are contained in the knowledge of
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ring R1. An attacker’s strategy for system investigation can be observed in ring R2. Some attackers do a careful
investigation while others attackers show little interest and simply try to proceed. If a system is not ready for
the intended malicious activities, attackers download customized tools. These downloads reveal malicious code
repositories and the tools themselves. This knowledge is presented in ring R3. Malicious code repositories can
be taken down and file signatures can be generated for anti-virus solutions. Rings R2 and R3 include knowledge
of an attacker’s activities following break-in, reconnaissance and customization. The presence of attackers is
detected by intrusion detection systems which raise an alert during an attack. However, indented knowledge
about attackers is currently assessed by deceptive systems known as honeypots. This knowledge is injected in
intrusion detection systems. A honeypot is a system to be probed and attacked but which has no legitimate
purpose [154]. Different kinds of honeypots have been implemented and are specialized to populate one or
more rings of knowledge. One one hand, low-interaction honeypots perform well in gathering information
belonging to rings R0 or R1. An attacker’s source IP address, source ports and the first interaction with a service
are recorded. Some low-interaction honeypots are even capable of handling exploits (ring R1) [7], [60]. For
known exploits, they can even download the injected code. High-interaction honeypots on the other hand are
used to get more information related to the rings R2 to R∗. With high-interaction honeypots, it is also possible to
collect information concerned to the rings R0 to R1. High-interaction honeypots are particularly useful for ob-
serving attackers’ behavior after a successful penetration. Assets of interest are the tools used and the strategies
followed by attackers. Compared to classical intrusion detection systems, honeypots do not have to distinguish
between legitimate and malicious events because there are no legitimate events by design. Hence, all activities
on a honeypot are suspicious by default and therefore not legitimate. False positives can also be present in the
context of honeypots. Such events are triggered by backscatter and misconfiguration [105]. Intrusion detection
systems must have a signature or an heuristic to detect an attack. Honeypots simply expose a vulnerable service
and so they respond to unknown attacks [4]. Hence, honeypots are a powerful technique for gathering malicious
software [7], [130], [139] or information about to attackers [138], [154]. The major advantage of honeypots is
that the threat collection process can be partially automated, instead of collecting the malicious software from
compromised production machines [130]. Although, honeypots do not prevent attacks, they are complementary
tools for detecting and studying attackers. Furthermore, with the information gathered, they provide a means
for improving intrusion detection systems and anti-virus solutions.
2.2 Problem Statement
Honeypots are praised as solution for learning from attackers: the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy even recommends honeypots as a security control mechanism [114]. Early in this century, Spitzner [154],
claimed that most security professionals designing security products are ignorant attackers’ tools, motivation
and tactics. This fact is a strategic advantage for the attacker [154]. Spitzner [154] on page 2 propagates the
message that “Have the enemy teach us its own tools, tactics and motivations”. Looking back at the last ten
years (discussed in chapter 3) of honeypot development and operation, this vision could be updated to “Have
the enemy teach us its own tools, tactics and motivations”.
Honeypots are resources designed to be attacked. They should be completely passive without any legitimate
production purpose. Obviously, due to the legal constraints of honeypot operators, appropriate mitigation
techniques must be employed when facing real attackers. Various level of operation at risks are used, ranging
from the emulation of services to the exposure of real services. As discussed in chapter 3, honeypots have been
proposed for the emulation of dedicated services. Low-interaction honeypots allow to study the first interactions
with attackers and high-interaction honeypots allow to observe attacker activities after they have compromised
a system.
A variety of information levels are recorded according to our ring model. Thus, honeypots focus on the
observation of attackers dependent of their interaction level. The interaction level is defined by the features
exposed to attackers, instead of actively interacting with attackers in a strategic way. In the context of high-
interaction honeypots most research activities have participated in the arms race between attackers and honey-
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pot operators. In this self-sustaining phenomenon, honeypot operators propose a new emulation technique or
monitoring method and attackers try to defeat it.
Cohen [31] discusses the utility of deception techniques in the context of attackers. Low-interaction honey-
pots emulate fake services and thus lure attackers. However, the deception technique employed by state-of-the-
art honeypots is simplistic. A honeypot has quite a limited arsenal to respond to an attacker. Firstly, honeypot
can only offer the emulated service to an attacker. Secondly, the implemented deception technique is applied
in a deterministic way due to the fact that a honeypot can choose only this behavior. Hence, we deduce that
current honeypots are static observation devices instead of intelligent deception systems.
Despite, these limitations as has been previously discussed, current honeypots perform quite well in col-
lecting programs related to attackers. Also, pre-attack patterns like scanning activities can be assessed quite
efficiently. Security researchers have performed distributed honeypot operations [39] and the jointly observed
results can be analyzed. From these, researchers have tried to derive the tactics of attackers, for instance, the
existence of common attack patterns or behaviors. This assessment is either done manually or partially auto-
mated based on the observation results. However, state-of-the-art honeypots are not capable of revealing attack
patterns themselves, due to their fixed capabilities. Hence, they lack additional capabilities which they could
select as a strategic response to attacks. Due to this lack of choice among different responses provided to at-
tackers only the default behavior of attackers such as the pushing of shellcode or the deploying of malicious
software can be observed.
Nicomette et al. [112] report that some attacks are completely automated. Instead of observing a human at-
tacker, the honeypot operator observes an attack script or a malicious program that interacts with the honeypot.
Distinguishing between human and automated attackers is challenging, because only the effects of operations
can be observed. In addition, it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions about the skills of an attacker when
observing the effects of program executions on a passive honeypot which has strictly deterministic behavior. If
additional knowledge should be learned about an attacker, the new type of information has to be measurable
in order to draw meaningful conclusions. However, honeypots can observe only the effects of attack opera-
tions. Consequently, side-effects must be carefully inspected in order to derive this additional information. As
discussed in detail in chapter 3, there is an arms race between attackers and honeypot operators. Attackers
try to avoid honeypots because they are monitored devices with no legitimate purposes. From an economic
point of view such systems are unattractive for attackers. These systems are by definition designed to fool an
attacker and so generally prevent her from reaching her attack goal. From the arms race we can deduce that
emulation of fake services are an essential weakness of honeypots, but attackers too have their weaknesses. For
instance, they may misinterpret the effects of their actions. Therefore, honeypots having additional features to
challenge attackers should act more strategically and defend their interests to so as reveal more information
from attackers.
2.3 Contributions
In this thesis we address autonomous and adaptive honeypots that offer graduated challenges to attackers with
the purpose of revealing their true nature, skills and linguistic background. The thesis is divided into two parts.
The first part describes the previous work and the second part contains our contributions.
Chapter 3 presents the related work on honeypots. It starts with the pioneering activities of the late 1980s,
on the observation of attackers in information systems, followed by deception techniques in information
systems. At the start of the current century a commonly accepted terminology on honeypots was intro-
duced, providing an enabler for the novel honeypot research communities. Honeypot taxonomies are pre-
sented using the commonly accepted honeypot categories, namely low-interaction and high-interaction
honeypots. A low-interaction honeypot provides fake services that try to mimic real ones whereas a high-
interaction honeypot is an actual vulnerable system, exposed to attackers. Distinct communities work on
these different categories of honeypots following a risk management approach. The highest threat is that
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loosing the control over a deployed honeypot, so getting involved in attacks against third parties. On one
hand, the risk in operating low-interaction honeypots is quite low and they are useful for detecting the
presence of attackers. On the other, the risk in operating high-interaction honeypots is quite high because
an actual vulnerable system is exposed to attackers, who could hijack it. Hybrid solutions which allow
the operational risk to be mitigated are discussed. Security researchers [39] use honeypots to measure at-
tack activities in a distributed large-scale manner. Other security researchers focus on the analysis of the
data that is collected via honeypots. In practice, honeypots have been used to collect malicious software.
From an attacker perspective, malicious software is often a precious asset. It serves them as tool for
malicious activity and therefore they want to stop it falling into the hands of security researchers. Should
this happen, anti-virus industry can develop appropriate countermeasures resulting in a disruption of the
malicious business activities in which attackers are often involved. Hence, the attackers point of view is
considered and the technical limits of state-of-the-art honeypots are summarized. Besides, these techni-
cal limitations, neither systems are adaptive and act in a strategic manner such that these weaknesses are
compensated.
Chapter 4 presents theories dedicated to the conceptual design of autonomous and adaptive honeypots capable
of defending their interests to obtain a given type of knowledge from attackers. We start by providing a
short evolution of game theory which is essential to formally frame opponents in a competitive environ-
ment. In order to introduce equilibrium concepts, a short primer on formal games is presented. Rational
players always try to achieve such an equilibrium and equilibria can be discovered with a wide variety of
algorithms. Previous work on the application of game theory to information security is described. Game
theory has already been addressed in the context of honeypots. The majority of the contributions focus on
games at the infrastructure level, where honeypots are used as passive information security sensors which
cannot take individual strategic decisions. In games, players can make errors which may impact their be-
haviors. Countermeasures and mitigation techniques are discussed. In practice, not all the parameters of
a game are known a priori, which motivates further investigations in the domain of goal-oriented learn-
ing. First, we introduce Markov Decision Processes to provide a theoretical foundation. They formally
describe an agent which operates in an environment with the purpose of optimizing a reward signal. Each
decision taken by an agent is rewarded or punished. However, either not all the parameters are known,
or some of the assumptions of the learning model are not true in practice. Therefore, learning methods
are enumerated such that optimal rewards can be learned instead of formally computed. The proposed
learning techniques are then extended with stochastic games, in which two competitive opponents oper-
ate in a shared environment where each agent has its own interests. This approach permits the modeling
of games where each player learns from its interaction with its opponent.
Chapter 5 presents a transversal model of attacker and honeypot behaviors, which is used in the adaptation
mechanisms described in chapter 6. The generic behavior of attackers is consolidated from previous
literature. Attackers input sequences of strings to a compromised system. These strings are sequences
of characters, and correspond to commands, invalid commands, typographic errors or insults. These
strings are then mapped to states in a hierarchical probabilistic automaton. Each program installed on the
compromised system corresponds to a macro state. We introduce a state hierarchy due to the semantic
difference of command line arguments. A program is a distinct automaton and also has states which
model the command line arguments. A major requirement of this model is that it can be implemented in
automated adaptive honeypots without human intervention. Therefore, we formally describe a process
where direct system observations are transformed such that they can be mapped onto the hierarchical
probabilistic automaton. An attacker executing commands on the honeypot causes transitions in the
hierarchical probabilistic automaton. The purpose of this thesis is to make honeypots autonomous and
adaptive instead of deterministically emulating a behavior as it is the case for current honeypots. The
interventions of adaptive honeypots trigger responses from attackers. We defined three actions for an
adaptive honeypot. Firstly, an adaptive honeypot can allow a program execution. In this case it behaves
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exactly like a traditional honeypot. Secondly, it can prevent the execution of a program for strategic
reasons. Third, it can substitute a program execution in order to assess the skills of an attacker. Finally, it
can insult an attacker, aiming to irritate her and to provoke a response that reveals her social and linguistic
background. In response to these interventions by the honeypot, the attacker can retry a command, select
an alternative command, insult the honeypot or leave it.
Chapter 6 presents an adaptation mechanism for honeypots, such that the level of adaptation is continuously
increased and improved. A honeypot usually follows the objective of acquiring information from at-
tackers. As a first step, games are modeled between a honeypot and an omnipresent attacker rather than
individual attackers. Two games are modeled with appropriate payoff functions for each player. These
payoffs are computed with Monte Carlo simulations, which use an instantiated hierarchical probabilistic
automaton as input. From these payoffs the optimal strategy profiles are computed for each player by
following Nash equilibria. For the honeypot the best blocking probability is the most promising result
from these computations. However, this adaptation mechanism is quite coarse-grained and neglects the
contextual state of an attack. Moreover, the optimal blocking probabilities are derived from simulations
which assume perfectly equilibrated bootstrap data. In order to address these issues and to increase the
level of interactions of an adaptive honeypot, we apply a goal-oriented learning approach, namely re-
inforcement learning. An adaptive honeypot, Heliza, is modeled as an agent which optimizes reward
signals in an environment. In this context, the omnipresent attacker is a part of the environment, which
is modeled by the previously developed hierarchical probabilistic automaton. An attacker attempts to
make a transition to a given state. Heliza has to decide whether this transition should be allowed, blocked
or detoured. Each decision yields a reward which is optimized. By following such an approach, the
competitive nature of the relationship between attackers and Heliza is neglected, and this may impact
the learning processes. Therefore, we modeled the interaction between an attacker and the honeypot as
stochastic game and used a learning algorithm to approximate optimal behaviors.
Chapter 7 The operation of honeypots is a risky operation. Three major threats have been identified. Firstly,
attackers could take over the honeypot such that the operator losses control over it. Secondly, an at-
tacker could perform stealthy operations with effects that are not directly visible to the honeypot oper-
ator. Thirdly, attackers could abuse the honeypot to attack third parties. Hence, accurate monitoring
techniques must be be used to monitor operation. The greatest threat is that attackers could attack third
parties resulting in legal consequences for the honeypot operator. Therefore, the honeypot operator needs
to be aware of all the ongoing activities in which the honeypot is involved. Hence, all the network traffic
related to the honeypot is recorded and firewalls and intrusion detection systems are deployed as de-
scribed in the best practices for honeypot operation [154]. However, the volume of recorded traffic may
quickly increase when the honeypot is under heavy attack. While still assuming a quick reaction by the
operator, we propose two novel network visualization techniques. The first is an approach which uses
aggregated networks as inputs, aiming to highlight activities at subnet layer. The second in contrast aims
to detect the nature of outgoing attack. Attackers could push volatile programs to the honeypot such that
no traces are left on the honeypot’s file system. Therefore, we evaluated network forensic tools in order
to ensure that we can recover such programs from the network traces. However, we determined funda-
mental design flaws in the network forensic tools. This led us to examine the system call layer, which
can be considered as an additional monitoring layer. The monitoring of the malicious programs installed
and operated by attackers has the advantage that attackers must first ensure that all the prerequisites of
the tools are fulfilled, a requirement which is often not met for dynamic in-vitro analysis systems [190].
We finally propose a generic adaptive honeypot framework where different learning algorithms can be
quickly implemented and evaluated and which is freely available [174].
Chapter 8 describes the experiments performed during our research activities. A regular high-interaction hon-
eypot was set up to recover the traces of attackers. A low-interaction honeypot was also operated to re-
cover traces which were later used for comparing different adaptive honeypots. From the high-interaction
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honeypot we recovered the process trees, which are transformed into process vectors. These process vec-
tors were then used as input data for the generation of our hierarchical probabilistic automaton. We
implemented a simulator that used such an automaton as input and which could compute the payoffs
for each player. These payoffs were then used to compute the optimal strategy profiles for each player.
We implemented an adaptive high-interaction honeypot which was configured with the results of the
simulations and noticed an increase in interactions with attackers. We increased the level of interaction
by operating an adaptive high-interaction honeypot driven by reinforcement learning. We noticed even
more interaction with attackers by comparing the traces of the adaptive honeypot with the traces from
the low-interaction and the regular high-interaction honeypot. However, with the learning algorithm used
we noticed a slow convergence to optimal values due to the fact that the competitive nature of attackers
and honeypots were being neglected. Therefore we operated another adaptive honeypot using a learning
algorithm derived from stochastic games to take this phenomenon into account.
Chapter 9 formally summarizes our research activities and enumerates potential future work. We suggest a
new paradigm of adaptive honeypots to reveal more information about attackers. These novel honeypots
adapt their behavior to attackers. The adaptation is controlled with game theory and reinforcement learn-
ing aiming at automated operation. We illustrated the example of adaptive high-interaction honeypots
exposing a vulnerable SSH service. However, we believe that the adaptation paradigm to attackers is not
related to a given technology. We could also develop additional games between attackers and a honey-
pot at different levels than those at the operating system kernel. We leveraged adaptive honeypot games
between an omnipresent attacker and a honeypot. We could explore also more complex game scenarios
considering multiple collaborative players.
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The dependencies of the chapters are shown in figure 2.3. The previous work is summarized in the first
part and our contributions are shown in the second part. The previous work allowed the modeling of attacker
behaviors which enabled the modeling of adaptive honeypots that take into account game theory and reinforce-
ment learning. The foundations of these two theories are presented in the first part. We identified challenges
in the previous activities on honeypots and developed honeypot monitoring and control mechanisms influenc-
ing the design choice of our generic adaptive honeypot framework. We have evaluated our various models of
adaptive honeypots using the generic adaptive honeypot framework. Finally, we conclude this dissertation and
summarize the limitations of our adaptive honeypot framework and the various interaction models including
experimental aspects.
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Chapter 3
Honeypots
3.1 Honeypot Evolution
In the late eighties, Stoll [158] reported an attack on the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. Instead of keeping
the intruder out, he took a novel approach. He decided to provide counterfeit military documents as bait and
monitored access to them. These documents were accessed by the intruder, who was then tracked. A little later,
in the early nineties, Cheswick [26] became interested in the attacks on his Internet gateway. He had the idea of
adding some pseudo-services with no production purpose and recording all activities related to those services.
After a while an attacker used these services which provided actual content. The author noticed that the attack
came from a stolen account and that the services needed to be improved. The decision was taken to manually
interact with the attacker by providing him with forged content.
At this time only a few attackers were active and with the help of system administrators, the official au-
thorities took the necessary steps to physically discover attackers and call them to account. Today the scale of
attacks has changed [54]. In the late nineties, Cohen [31] discussed several deception techniques that could
be used to lure attackers. A tool, the deception tool kit (DTK), was developed allowing pseudo services to be
defined in advance. Popular examples are TCP services returning a previously generated content to attackers.
The major contribution of Spitzner [154] is a commonly accepted honeypot terminology for the throw-away
machines [26] and deception devices [31] proposed earlier by others. The commonly-accepted definition is
shown in definition 1.
Definition 1. “A honeypot is security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised.”
[154] page 23.
A honeypot is particularly useful for gathering information about attackers, such as their technological
and ethnological background [139]. Most work in the honeypot communities is centered on the gathering
of technical information such as source addresses, malicious software and the locations of malicious code
repositories. Honeypots should closely mimic real production systems in order to be attractive to attackers
[154]. Spitzner [154] proposes adding user accounts to a system, creating email accounts, forging documents
and synthesizing a command history.
The honeypot movement started in the beginning of this century to grow. More researchers worked on
honeypots. Google offers a publicly available service to determine trends on given subjects. This service is
mainly offered to journalists, economists and investors because these communities often analyze trends on
given subjects. In the past, these communities have had to base their data on monthly governmental reports
that are frequently amended and which lack hard data [76]. Figure 3.1 shows Google’s search trend [76] for
honeypots in the field of information security. The higher the trend, the more popular the keyword is. The
detailed experiment is described in the appendix in chapter B. On the x-axis is represented the time from 2004
to 2010 expressed in months. The data was only available from 2004, which explains why the period from
2000 to 2004 is not covered. On the y-axis is shown the search index. The first peak was mid-2004. At this
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time Provos et al. [128] implemented a honeypot called Honeyd. The paper was published an had a high
impact.Moreover, the authors published the source code. Honeyd is reliable and easy to use. Furthermore, the
operation at risk of such an honeypot is almost zero. Hence, many people were interested in it, explaining
the peak in interest. The following years the interests slightly decreased. However, at the end of 2006, botnets
became an emergent threat on the Internet and became popular in the news. Zou et al. [201], proposed a method
for detecting and tracking botnets with honeypots. Portokalidis et al. [125] modified the popular virtual machine
Qemu [18] with additional monitoring features targeted at malicious software analysis and honeypot operation.
The authors made the source code publicly available and many other researchers started to use it [130], [153].
One year later, Xuxian et al. [194] extended Qemu with further monitoring features such as the availability
to observe executed processes on the guest system. To the best of our knowledge, this implementation is not
freely available. The drawback of modified Qemu is its performance, because every instruction is emulated on
the host CPU. In the same area, researchers [89], [125], proposed automated generation of intrusion detection
signatures from honeypots. This conceptual approach led to new avenues for research. Instead of generating
signatures, Leita et al. [91] generated scripts for Honeyd. At this point in time Honeyd was still the least risky
honeypot to operate [91].
The evolution of the number of scientific publications in the honeypot area is presented in figure 3.2. A
detailed description of the methodology, is presented in the appendix B. The x-axis shows the time while the
y-axis gives the number of scientific publications. In 2000 Spitzner [154] introduced honeypot terminology,
leading to a small number of publications. Honeyd was a major milestone in the field of low-interaction hon-
eypots. Honeyd does not require expert knowledge to be operated and the operational risk is low, because
counterfeit services are emulated in user space. Due to the fact that the source code of Honeyd was publicly
available, numerous researchers [40], [65], [89], [91], conducted experiments with Honeyd and proposed ex-
tensions resulting in the significant growth of papers from 2004 to 2005. Honeyd was also particularly useful
in detecting Internet worms [40], [120].
Although the CPU manufacturer Intel had already introduced a new virtualization technology in 2006, the
major break-through for the honeypot community came in 2007. Compromised honeypots can more easily
be switched off and reinstalled when virtualization is used. Conceptually, the external monitoring of an em-
ulated system was not new, as it had been demonstrated previously by Dunlap et al. [45]. However, Intel’s
virtualization technology (VT) revived the idea of external monitoring. In the case of VT, ring zero from Intel
architectures, is not the lowest anymore. Intel introduced an hypervisor ring, where additional honeypot mon-
itoring capabilities can be implemented [43]. Many other researchers made new propositions based on virtual
machine monitoring in the context of honeypots [68], [155]. The publication peak in 2008, mainly resulting
from the vitual machine introspection revival and observed in figure 3.2, is corresponding only to a minor
peak in Google’s search index in figure 3.1. The search index trend can be seen to be decaying. It reached
a peak in 2004, due to Honeyd. The NIST organization enumerates the honeypot technology in their control
mechanisms. The honeypot control mechanism is defined as: “The information system includes components
specifically designed to be the target of malicious attacks for the purpose of detecting, deflecting, and ana-
lyzing such attacks.” p.119 [114]. A typical implementation of this control mechanism is the deployment of
low-interaction honeypots detecting the presence of attackers.
The operation of high-interaction honeypots is still risky, which discourages people from using it. High-
interaction honeypots are particularly useful to study the behavior of attackers after they penetrated a system.
We believe that most people interested in information security are willing to study break-in attempts and less
people are interested in studying the behaviors of attackers after a successful penetration. Hence, we deduce that
only a small community is interested in this information. Only a few organizations such as CSIRTs or groups of
information security researchers are interested in studying the behavior of attackers after they have penetrated
a system. In addition, the lack of publicly available source code prevents people to use it and to extend it.
Consequently a smaller number of Google queries are observed resulting in a decrease in the presented Google
trend.
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3.2 Honeypot Classifications
Data control and data capture are essential paradigms for a safe honeypot operation [154]. Honeypot operators
should know at any time what is happening to the honeypot and the monitoring system should have multiple
layers in order to mitigate the failure of a layer [154]. McCarty [101] reported a case where an attacker switched
off the honeypot’s monitoring features. This is a worst-case scenario for honeypot operators. If attackers were
able to abuse the honeypot for performing further attacks, honeypot operators would be legally responsible for
their systems and would actively participate in attacks. Therefore, it is essential to be able to classify honey-
pots. When a honeypot operator encounters a new honeypot implementation and if the honeypot category is
known, then a decision on whether to operate the honeypot or not is easier to take. Seifert et al. [147] classi-
fied honeypots according to six classes: interaction level, data capture, containment, distribution appearance,
communication interface, and role in a multi-tier architecture.
Interaction-level Honeypots usually expose some functionality to an attacker. In order to limit the attacker’s
control, the exposed functionality is limited in some manner. From the point of view of interactions, hon-
eypots are divided into low- and high-interaction honeypots [130], [147], [154]. The term mid-interaction
honeypot is also sometimes used [130] to specify honeypots emulating services having more features than
low-interaction honeypots. Multipot is a medium interaction honeypot designed for Windows platforms
capable to emulate known vulnerabilities. Having received the shell code1 Multipot [77] tries to emulate
it with the purpose of downloading the additional payload. The interaction between attackers with a
compromised system is often modeled with attack-trees [145] where a node corresponds to a stage of an
attack and the edges represent the logical connections between nodes.
Data capture Spitzner [154] and Cheswick et al. [27] advise the use of multiple monitoring and data-capture
layers. Seifert et al. [147] propose the use of a honeypot’s data capture capabilities, which describe
the type of data it is able to capture, as honeypot classification criteria. They define four values for this
category: events, attacks, intrusion, and none. When a honeypot collects data such as scanning activities,
it collects events; when it collects data on a brute-force attack on an account, it collects attacks and when
it collects data about an attacker who has penetrated the system, it collects information about intrusions.
Containment In most countries, honeypot operators are legally responsible for their systems [2]. Best practice
shows that a firewall should be put in front of the honeypot in order to protect other organizations and to
prevent it being actively involved in attacks on third parties [154]. Nicomette et al. [112] configured a
firewall in front a honeypot such that attackers could not reach third parties through the honeypot. Such
firewall configurations with additional intrusion detection systems are called honeywalls [25]. Having
penetrated a system, attackers often want to download tools from the Internet [112], [154]. If the firewall
blocks all connections from the honeypot to the Internet, the honeypot is unattractive to attackers and
attacks can only be partially observed [112], [154]. Spitzner [154] proposes limiting the number of
Internet connections from the honeypot. This allows attackers to download their tools but not to perform
destructive attacks [154]. Alata et al. [2] propose simulating external hosts for the honeypot by using
dynamic connection redirection mechanisms. Seifert et al. [147] defined these mitigation techniques
as containment. They identified four containment techniques. Firstly, a honeypot can block actions of
attackers. Secondly, a honeypot could defuse attacker actions. In this case, the attacker can connect to the
target, but the content of the connection is tampered with so as to remove dangerous payloads. Thirdly, a
honeypot can also slowdown an attacker. An example is to artificially slow down connections related to
attacks. Finally, a honeypot can block all actions by attackers.
Distribution appearance Seifert et al. [147] introduced the distribution appearance class as a classification
criterion. Honeypots can be stand-alone or distributed systems. A stand-alone honeypot only interacts
1A detailed explaination of shell code is presented at page 35.
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with the attacker and his environment, while a distributed honeypot interacts both with the attacker and
with additional entities. Examples are automated log file analysis or attacker tracking programs.
Communication interface Seifert et al. [147] also uses the communication interface to classify honeypots.
The communication interface defines the means by which the information about attackers can be col-
lected. For instance, network traffic can be collected or system logs can be recovered, via an Application
Programming Interface (API).
Role in multi-tier architecture Seifert et al. [147] describe server-side honeypots. Such a honeypot passively
waits for connections from attackers and waits to be exploited. He also identified client honeypots, which
try to mimic a user whose machine gets compromised when he or she visits a malicious web server. This
thesis mainly focuses on server-side honeypots.
The voluntary interaction with attackers is the riskiest part of honeypot operation [192]. When a new hon-
eypot design is published, it is usually classified according its interaction level. Low-interaction honeypots
have often a lower software complexity than high-interaction honeypots and hence are easier to manage. Hon-
eypots are divided into research and production honeypots: production honeypots are systems for detecting the
presence of attackers, whereas research honeypots are used to study attacks [154].
Low-interaction Honeypots
The Honeyd community leveraged the low-interaction honeypot definition shown in 1. Low-interaction honey-
pots try to mimic services that are frequently the subject to exploitation. Attackers connect to such a honeypot
and provide some input such as their source IP address, source port and the requested service. However, at-
tackers are usually not allowed to store information and execute their own programs on the honeypot. Hence,
the operation of low-interaction honeypots is less risky than allowing arbitrary code execution. Low-interaction
honeypots are typically production honeypots intended to assess the presence of attackers. The deployment of
low-interaction honeypots helps to understand the evolution of automated threats such as the propagation of
malicious software.
Definition 1. Low-interaction honeypots simulate only services that cannot be exploited to get complete access
to the honeypot [71].
Cohen [31] describes a variety of low-interaction honeypots. He proposed the deception tool kit DTK
to emulate pseudo services. The main purpose is to lure automated attack tools and waste attacker’s time.
When an attacker scans a host that deploys DTK, she sees many vulnerabilities and needs to determine which
vulnerabilities are real and which are fake. Obviously, the attacker should not be able to automate this task, and
thus must spend a lot of time to test them sequentially. Hence, the workload of the attacker is increased and the
defender gains time to track the attacker.
Liston [95] used a similar approach to slowdown self-propagating malicious software. He developed a pro-
gram called Labrea, which uses unused IP address space aiming to decelerate worms. When a worm connects,
Labrea artificially slows down the connection attempt. It listens for network packets using the pcap library
[79]. When there is a connection attempt, it periodically announces a TCP window size of 0, simulating net-
work congestion on the targeted host. Most TCP/IP implementations on attacking hosts then wait for a time
slot t and retry. Furthermore, the interval t grows exponentially if the congestion persists increasing the slow-
down factor. Honeyd is a program that runs in user space emulating a complete TCP/IP stack. This means that
the program does not need to run in kernel space, which reduces the operational risk. It can be configured to
respond to requests for an entire sub-network, meaning that it responds to each request to any host address ha
in this network. When an attacker probes the address ha, Honeyd catches the corresponding IP packet via the
pcap library and crafts a response packet that is sent via a raw socket [186]. The reason for using raw sockets
with pcap is that arbitrary packets can be intercepted and crafted. A regular TCP/IP stack is not designed to
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respond to arbitrary IP addresses. A honeypot operator can configure forged outputs for any given service. For
instance, a Perl script could suply the code for a minimal web server that uses the standard input and standard
output file descriptors. This script is then attached to port 80 which is the default port for web servers com-
municating via HTTP. When an attacker probes this port, the customized program is executed and the content
is returned to the attacker. Each TCP/IP stack has its own characteristics and can be fingerprinted [57]. Thus,
for low-interaction honeypots it is important to mimic these behaviors in order to be similar to a real TCP/IP
stack and so to lure network scanners [128]. Honeyd uses the signatures database of the network scanner Nmap
and it can be configured to make a given IP address emulate the TCP/IP stack of a particular operating system.
Provos et al. [128] call such a behavior a personality. The configuration file of Honeyd allows arbitrary routing
topologies to be emulated using manipulated TTL (Time to Live [156]) fields .
Honeyd is a powerful tool for emulating known services. The back doors of malicious programs have been
reverse-engineered and scripts have been developed to emulate those back doors. An example is the Kuang2
back door2 [65]. However, some malicious programs use their own communication protocols on random ports
and have not yet been reverse engineered. Hence, Tillman proposes Honeytrap [164]. This program listens for
TCP packets. When a SYN packet [156] hits Honeytrap, it dynamically assigns a listener to that port and can
respond according to four modes. Firstly falsified content can be returned to the attacker. In this case Honeytrap
behaves like Honeyd. Secondly, Honeytrap can mirror the connection attempting to connect to the same port
on the attacker. An attacker is often a compromised machine and is looking for a vulnerable service s0. Due
to the fact that the machine is already compromised and is running the service s0 it is likely to interpret the
requests. Honeytrap mirrors the received request to the attacker and records the resulting conversation. Thirdly,
Honeytrap can forward the requests to another host such as a high-interaction honeypot. Finally, Honeytrap has
an ignore mode. In this mode, the packets are just dropped. Bakos [8] used a different implementation approach
in order to attract connections to arbitrary ports. If a service is not running on a regular host, the corresponding
TCP/IP stack replies with a TCP [156] packet having the RST flag [156] set to tell the requester that the service
is not running [157]. In contrast of emulating a TCP/IP stack [128], [95], Bakos [8] use iptables to redirect the
traffic to a dedicated service capable of replying. Antonatos et al. [5] exploited the DHCP protocol in order to
get more IP addresses for a host aiming for greater network visibility. Their honeypot is called Honey@home
and requests additional IP addresses by sending DHCP requests to a local DHCP server. The required addresses
are then used for setting up tunnels to high-interaction honeypots.
Now that we have discussed the monitoring techniques for multiple IP addresses and arbitrary ports, we
enumerate techniques for determining the content to be returned to an attacker. For instance, efforts have been
undertaken to simulate real production services with Honeyd [65]. This is usually achieved with scripts written
in bash, perl, python, Windows Command-Line Shell Language, Visual Basic or JavaScript. However, Honeyd
is not particularly bound to a particular scripting language. It provides input, output and error channels and
passes information through environment variables to use the script, a process that is executed by the operating
system. When an attacker sends a request, it can be read from the standard input file descriptor, while replies are
communicated through the standard output file descriptor. Honeyd sets environment variables for the source IP
address, the source port, the destination address, the destination port and the protocol used (UDP, TCP, ICMP)
[156]. These variables can be accessed and further processed by the script. Honeyd ships with some useful
default scripts [65], for instance, the banner of an SSH server. Obviously, an attacker can only connect to
this pseudo-service and can neither perform a complete key-exchange nor get a login to the machine. There
are also scripts that emulate a telnet login on common CISCO routers. These always respond to the attacker
that credentials are incorrect and emulate connection timeouts. [65] also presents a script that lists a directory
for an IIS server (Microsoft’s proprietary web server). Email server scripts have also been developed, as have
pseudo-FTP servers returning static content.
Leita et al. [91] propose a more advanced alternative to manually implementing scripts: automated gen-
eration of scripts from recorded honeypot traces. Their solution, Scriptgen, is composed of four functional
2Many malicious programs establish back doors. These present themselves as new services that, for example, allow the attacker
continuing access to the compromised system.
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modules. The message sequence factory module uses a pcap file containing captured network traffic as input,
and produces messages. A message is defined as the longest consecutive set of bytes going in the same direc-
tion. Two possible directions are handled: the first is from client to server and the second is from server to
client. The authors use these messages with their state machine builder module in order to generate raw state
machines, which are composed of edges and states. An edge is annotated with an exchanged message recovered
from traces and the observation frequency. The authors then simplify these raw machines with a module called
the state machine simplifier. To do this, they first do macro clustering based on a sequence alignment approach,
then perform a region analysis, where they group homogeneous sequences of bytes. Both clustering methods
help to reduce the number of states and edges. The regrouped states become abstract states. Finally, they use
the simplified automaton for feeding a script generator in order to generate scripts for Honeyd. The authors
acknowledged that their generated scripts are only approximations to real services but they claim that they are
sufficient to fool automated attacks.
In the previous static configuration examples3 for Honeyd [65], only the initial interactions are recorded.
On one hand, using such an approach reduces code complexity and thus the risk that attacker can take over the
honeypot is reduced. On the other, not much can be learned from attackers because only the first interactions
can be observed. The counterfeit SSH server, proposed in [65], can only present a banner to the attacker. In
this case only the source IP address can be logged; the credentials of attackers cannot be observed because this
level of complexity is not implemented in the script. Coret [34] implemented a pseudo SSH server, Kojoney,
simulating a complete SSH login and some basic bash commands. All his code is implemented in Python, and
an attacker cannot execute or install her own programs. Hence, this Kojoney is classified as a low-interaction
honeypot.
Allowing the execution of arbitrary code by attackers is a dangerous decision. The attacker could switch of
the monitoring capabilities [101] or abuse the honeypot to attack third parties. In this case, the honeypot actively
participates in malicious attacks and in most countries the honeypot operator is legally responsible. Attackers
often exploit vulnerabilities. They send a crafted request, known as an exploit, to a vulnerable service. The
vulnerable service wrongly interprets the request in such away that the crafted request is partially executed.
The hostile code that is executed in a defective service is called shellcode. Historically, this code spawns a shell
enabling an attacker full access to the machine [122]. For self-propagating worms, the infected code usually
downloads another malicious program instead of spawning a shell [122]. These shellcodes are particularly
dangerous, because when they hit their target, they allow attackers to take over a service without any human
intervention. In the network intrusion community much efforts has been undertaken to detect shellcode [122].
Historically an attacker simply added their shellcode in a legitimate requests without any attempt to hide it. For
a traditional buffer-overflow exploit, the return address is overwritten. However, finding this address depends
on the process running the service and stack offsets differ slighly. Attackers use a NOP sled, which is often
considered as landing-zone. This means that the beginning of the shellcode starts with No OPeration (NOP)
instructions in order to make the code more robust against slightly different offsets [116]. When the offset is
only one byte ahead, the opcode alignment might be incorrect leading to invalid instructions and results in a
failure of the shellcode. For the instruction detection community such an attack is relatively easy to detect.
They simply need to search for a 0x90 byte sequence defining the NOP sled [122]. Erickson et al. [47] noticed
that instructions using one word are need to constructed a landing zone. The richness of Intel’s x86 instruction
set provides many other alternatives. For instance, the instruction to increment the register ECX by 1 has an
opcode of 0x41. When the intrusion detection system interprets this opcode, it sees the ASCII code A and some
intrusion detection systems consider that ASCII codes are benign. The advantage of this approach is that a
landing zone populated with such irrelevant instructions is still robust for attackers because the value of the
ECX register is discarded anyhow. Most exploits want to download another program or to spawn a shell. Due
to Intel’s i386 instruction set shellcodes share common features [47]. Intrusion detection systems use these
common parts to detect shellcode. As a countermeasure, attackers encrypt their shellcode resulting in a small
routine that decrypts the remaining shellcode. After the exploit, the shellcode is decrypted in the defective
3Scriptgen is excluded.
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service and the decrypted shellcode is executed [122]. Even in this case an intrusion detection system can still
create a signature for the encrypted hostile shellcode. Hence, attackers have created polymorphic shellcodes
which slightly changes a few instructions such that the shellcode looks different for each target. Intrusion
detection systems have two choices: they can try to decrypt the shellcode or they can emulate it.
The danger of self-propagating malicious software comes from the fact that the exploit process is fully-
automated. An infected machine scans for other vulnerable machines. After having found one, the exploit is
automatically performed and the new infected machine starts to infect other vulnerable machines. Malicious
programs often share the same spreading code, but download a different malicious program. The previously
described honeypots can capture the connection attempts of malicious machines and the exploit code. How-
ever, they are unable to download the malicious program. Hence, Baecher et al. [7] developed a tool called
Nepenthes. The purpose of Nepenthes is to collect malicious programs. It exposes services on a host denoted
collector which emulates fake vulnerable services. When a compromised machine connects to the collector it
can upload the shellcode. The corresponding vulnerability module on the collector decodes the shellcode and
downloads the malicious program as if it were a normal infected host. However, the program is not executed
but stored for later analysis.
Baecher et al. [7] define that Nepenthes is a low-interaction honeypot because it simply emulates known
vulnerabilities. When new vulnerabilities are discovered, a vulnerability module must be developed for Ne-
penthes. Nepenthes is implemented using the C++ programming language. A worst-case scenario is a software
vulnerability in Nepenthes’ implementation. Provos et al. [130] illustrated that malware collecting tools can
be detected. After such a detection an attacker could craft a special request to take over the collector. Hence,
Go¨bel [60] developed a similar tool called Amun. The major difference is that Amun is developed in Python
which is less vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. In the worst case, attackers could crash the collector by
triggering an exception instead of taking it over. The latest example of this type of honeypot is Dionaea [6] able
to handle IPv4, IPv6 and voice over IP services.
One one hand, low-interaction honeypots are partially useful for detecting attackers. The source address and
the requested service can be recorded. In the best case, known exploits can be emulated and malicious programs
can be downloaded. The software complexity of low-interaction honeypots is usually low and attackers cannot
execute arbitrary code on them. Hence, their operational risk is low, which is an advantage for those who wish
to run them in large numbers. On the other hand, they cannot collect malicious programs that use unknown
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, an attacker’s activity after having exploited a system cannot be observed with a
low-interaction honeypot. However, all the rings of our ring hierarchy, presented in section 2, can be addressed
with high-interaction honeypots.
High-Interaction Honeypots
Cheswick [26] mentions throwaway machines having real security holes with the sole purpose of being attacked
a long time before the honeypot movement. These services can be compromised by attackers and their behavior
can be studied. He also discusses jails created with the chroot command. This command permits a different
system root to be set for a process. The new root may be a subdirectory of the overall file system and a program
running in this jail can only access the files in this subdirectory and its descendants. He concludes that such a
jail is not perfectly secure and not entirely invisible. He advised using throwaway machines with real security
holes that are externally monitored by a second machine. He proposes capturing all the network traffic and
thus observes an attacker’s activity. This was a valid solution for its time, because attackers connected to the
service using clear-text protocols for remote access. Hence, their activities could be monitored. However by the
mid-nineties, encryption was gaining popularity. Most telnet services [126] were replaced with SSH [196] and
a significant fraction of communications became encrypted. In 2000, Spitzner [154] called these throwaway
machines high-interaction honeypots. In order to overcome the problem of monitoring encrypted network
traffic, data capture should be performed on the honeypot itself. Spitzner [154] proposes the use of a modified
command line shell to monitor an attacker’s activity [154]. He also defended the idea that no information about
attackers should be locally stored on a honeypot: if information is locally stored, an attacker could tamper
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with or delete the recorded information. Attackers often installed their own command line interpreters on
honeypots [9]. This prevents an attacker from being monitored by the honeypot’s shell. To counteract this
trend, the monitoring features moved into kernel space. Balas et al. [9] implemented Sebek a Linux kernel
module for monitoring an attacker’s keystrokes and related file accesses. Sebek uses the rootkit technology
initially developed by attackers who wished to hide their presence on compromised machines. It detours the
read system call, and so is able to capture the content of opened files and the standard input stream. Hence, even
encrypted communications can be captured because the monitoring happens after the decryption. Moreover,
Sebek transmits the acquired data over a network to a server that is unlikely to be under the control of an
attacker.
A little bit later McCarty [101] published an article in which he describes techniques to detect these addi-
tional monitoring features. Attackers inspect the addresses of the system calls. When a function is detoured
its address appears in an unexpected address range. McCarty [101] also describes techniques that attackers
could use to switch off the monitoring features. Dunlap et al. [45] argue that the kernel monitoring approaches
depend on the integrity of the operating system and assume that the operating system is trustworthy. As proved
by McCarty, this is not always the case. Hence, Dunlap et al. [45] suggest performing the monitoring at virtual
machine level. This approach implies that the honeypot is operated in a virtual machine. A virtual machine is
a program that emulates a complete operating system and is run under another operating system. A popular
open-source virtual machine is a Linux or Windows operating system that uses the emulator Qemu [18]. Por-
tokalidis et al. [124] extended Qemu with additional monitoring features in order to detect zero-day exploits.
These features make it suitable for the operation of honeypots. The authors developed a generic method to de-
tect stack smashing, heap corruption and format string attacks. The key idea is to detect them at the CPU level.
Qemu is a virtual machine allowing each executed instruction to be monitored and controlled. Something that
is hardly possible with a kernel level approach. The honeypot of Portokalidis et al. [124] generates signatures
when an attack is encountered. A honeypot operator can see the exploit when it happens but is still not able to
track all the regular commands that an attacker has entered. Hence Xuxian et al. [194] extended Qemu such
that the executed programs be recovered. With such an approach, a honeypot operator is able to determine the
actions of an attacker following a successful exploit. Qemu translates each instruction in user space resulting a
high performance overhead comparing to the hardware-assisted virtual machines.
As previously discussed, with low-interaction honeypots attackers can only perform a limited set of inter-
actions with the honeypot. This limitation helps the operator to control the honeypot. Consequently, this model
scales better than the model of high-interaction honeypots. Hence, low-interaction honeypots are better suited
for assessing attacks and for collecting a significant amount of data [112], [167]. However, low-interaction hon-
eypots are not suitable if the intend is to study attacker’s behavior within a system due to the limited amount
of exposed features. While had Cheswick [26] discussed throwaway machines with real security holes in the
early 90s and Bellovin had implemented pseudo services it was not until 2000 that evolve quickly. Figure
3.3 shows the evolution of the numbers of scientific publications about low- and high-interaction honeypots.
A detailed description about the experiment is presented in appendix B. Publications in 2000 and 2001 dealt
only with high-interaction honeypots, describing the experiments made by the authors did with high-interaction
honeypots, explaining what the attacker did. The deception toolkit had been available since 1998. In 2003 first
implementations of Honeyd appeared. Gupta [113] discussed the effectiveness of both tools. He pinpointed
their limits and proposed an iterative approach to the operation of honeypots because the attackers’ tactics and
strategies are unknown. In 2006 virtual machines gained popularity for the operation of honeypots. The advan-
tage of virtual machines is that they can be set up easily and can be reset to a clean state without reinstalling a
machine from scratch. This process can even be partially automated.
The breakthrough for high-interaction honeypot can be observed in the year 2008, when the VT technology
is used for building honeypots. Instead of making the observations in kernel space they are performed at virtual
hardware level. The major disadvantage of virtual machine introspection is that assumptions must be made on
the interpretation of the collected data. A deeper monitoring level implies a larger interpretation effort. Inside
a virtual machine, memory chunks and CPU registers could be inspected. A system call number is put in a
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register. A honeypot operator must know it and to which system call its value corresponds. An attacker could
thus change the system call numbering scheme by modifying the local kernel. In this scenario, a honeypot
operator could believe that an attacker read a file but in reality she wrote a file. The honeypot operator must
also be capable of determining the results of a system call. The CPU registers EAX or RAX contain the
return value of a system call. If an attacker redesigns these return values in the local kernel, the honeypot
operator might believe that the system calls failed but they were successful in reality. Hence, we believe that
the operation of a high-interaction honeypot always includes a residual risk that has to be accepted by the
honeypot operator. However, high-interaction honeypots are particularly interesting to study attacker behaviors
following a successful penetration.
3.3 Honeypot Research Activities
This powerful idea of honeypots, leads to numerous research activities. The major trends of research activities
are grouped in this section.
3.3.1 Attacker Observation and Information Gathering
The basic idea of honeypots is to provide a counterfeit infrastructure in a dangerous environment. This in-
frastructure is closely monitored. When, the infrastructure is attacked, intruders’ behavior is studied and in-
formation is gathered from the attackers. Low-interaction honeypots only provide a limited set of features for
attackers, but they are quite useful for detecting attacks in networks. A connection to Honeyd discloses the
source IP address of an attacker. The requested service is also revealed. An attacker can also connect to a
high-interaction honeypot. Portokalidis et. al. [124] proposed Argos a customized virtual machine to detect
zero day exploits. The high-interaction honeypot community is also interested in post-exploit activities. Most
research efforts have focused on improving the monitoring capabilities of high-interaction honeypots. Alata et
al. [3] modified the TTY driver installed on the honeypot which enabled them to mirror the attacker’s terminal
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and gather key-strokes dynamics. Moreover, they track system calls to the kernel for the case attackers bypass
a terminal. Attackers often switch of the terminal’s echo and blindly type commands. Xuxian et al. record only
processes that are executed [194]. Alata et al. [3] introduced an additional system call that is used within their
exposed program to differentiate system calls related to attackers and the system itself. Xuxian et al. [194]
simply trap all the system calls. Zuge et al. [199] use high-interaction honeypots to collect self-propagating
malicious software. The authors compared the amount of data they collected with their high-interaction honey-
pot with the programs they collected from the low-interaction honeypot Nepenthes running the two experiments
the same time. They collected more unique malware samples with their high-interaction honeypot because Ne-
penthes only emulates a subset of vulnerabilities. The authors used the TCP stream reassembly engine snort
from the open source intrusion detection system and looked for Portable Executable (PE) files in the network
streams tapped from the honeypot. This approach is used to collect malicious software targeted at Microsoft
Windows operating systems. In addition, they monitored the file system of the virtual machine that is operating
the honeypot. If a new malicious program is installed, it is automatically copied. The file system is periodi-
cally remotely imaged and all the files are traversed. Each file is compared with a list of initial files installed
on the honeypot. If a new file appears, a new malicious program has been detected. The advantage of this
approach compared to those used by Nepenthes, is that samples that use unknown malicious programs can be
collected. Hence, low-interaction and high-interaction honeypots enable to collect programs related to attack-
ers. However, the current honeypots do not reveal any information about the usefulness of these programs from
the attacker’s points of view. For instance, a tool to unpack commonly used archives has a lower value to an
attacker, than a database program including stolen information.
3.3.2 Honeypot Management
The operation of a high-interaction honeypot often involves costs. The major challenge is to handle arbitrary
code execution by attackers. Honeypots may crash and need to be restarted, or additional firewall rules must
be configured. The reason for this partially retroactive method is that the attackers’ actions and objectives are
often unknown. The operation of a honeypot is an iterative process [113]. Initially assumptions are made about
attackers’ behaviors. After a while, attackers violate these assumptions. The honeypot operator has to adjust
the honeypot according to new assumptions. Further important considerations are the scalability and network
visibility. A honeypot that is operated on only one public IP address has a lower visibility than a collection of
honeypots. Honeypot operation is subject to legal restrictions. If the honeypot gets involved in further attacks
that involve third parties, the honeypot operator is legally responsible [2]. Hence, Spitzner [154] and Balas et
al. [10] propose letting attackers in, but using intrusion detection systems and customized firewalls to prevent
them from attacking third parties. Chamales [25] calls these firewalls honeywalls. Portokalidis et al. [125] and
Jianwei et al. [199], claim that honeywalls are perfectly suited to high-interaction honeypots that aim only to
collect the first program that is acquired by attackers. In case an attack exploits the services and pushes the
shellcode, the honeypot operator has already achieved his goal. However, if the objective is to study attacker
behaviors after the break-in, providing a honeywall is not really effective. Attackers usually try to connect to the
Internet after they have compromised a system [2], [3], [181]. When they fail, they usually give up and leave the
honeypot. Alata et al. [2] proposed a customized Linux firewall that can dynamically redirects connections or
simulate or drop them. They give an example in which an attacker scanned an entire network. In this case, the
customized kernel forged connections to make an attacker believe that Internet connectivity was available. In
the scanning example, only SYN/ACK [156] or RST TCP packets are forged. However, if an attacker connects
to a pseudo-service, a content has to be returned. In essence, this is the same problem faced by low-interaction
honeypots.
The risk of not attacking third parties can be reduced by using a number of different strategies. Xuxian et
al. [193] proposed a hybrid honeypot solution. The low-interaction honeypot Honeyd is installed at different
locations on different IP addresses forwarding the traffic to a centralized cluster of high-interaction honeypots.
This centralized approach helps to handle failures. On the client side, code complexity is reduced, resulting in a
low failure rate. However, the operational risk of the centralized high-interaction honeypot remains, and a trust
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relationship has to be established among the entities operating the low-interaction honeypots and the central-
ized high-interaction honeypots. Vrable et al. [173] address the scalability issues of high-interaction honeypots.
They claim that most high-interaction honeypots waste CPU cycles during the long periods when they are wait-
ing for attackers. The authors exploit these cycles using a distributed architecture of high-interaction honeypots
to emulate on-demand a large fleet of high-interaction honeypots while using minimal physical resources. Most
of the proposed concepts to mitigate the damage resulting from honeypots are static solutions based on fixed
assumptions. However, honeypots themselves do not address self-management aspects such that they assess
the benefits and losses during operation.
3.3.3 Distributed Honeypot Operation
Setting up of a honeypot on a public IPv4 address permits an observation of only 1232 of the address space
4
.
A Linux kernel can be configured to have more than one IP address per network interface [127]. However, it
is recommended that no more than 16 addresses should be used in order to avoid instability [94]. If a larger
address space is to be monitored, more physical interfaces are needed. This limitation can be overcome by
using Honeyd. In this case the kernel TCP/IP stack is not used, but is emulated in user space. Honeyd enables
entire subnetworks to be emulated. However, no organization can emulate all free IP addresses. Firstly, an
organization can use only IP addresses that they own. Several organizations such as [141] manage the address
allocation. Secondly, the networks need to be properly routed in order to guarantee the stability of the Internet.
In this case, only owned networks can be monitored, and no meaningful assumptions about the neighboring
networks can be made. Hence, Dacier [38] described the setup of a distributed network of honeypots composed
of a set of low-interaction honeypots. He created a project, Leurre´.com to which people could contribute by
setting up a low-interaction honeypot. Information is centrally logged and each partner can access the common
collected data. In 2008, the project comprised 50 different platforms in 30 countries. Initially (Leurre´.com
V.1.0), Honeyd was deployed aiming to reduce operational risk. The EURECOM institute offered a Compact
Disk with the necessary software to facilitate deployment. They also offered a centralized log collection facility
and granted access to partners. In Leurre´ V.1.0., The authors focused mainly on the measurement of scanning
activities, but subsequently the authors focused on collecting malicious programs with their low-interaction
honeypots.
The Leurre´.com project evolved into an EU project called WOMBAT [39]. The authors used SGNET
instead of honeyd. The authors collected malicious programs using feedback from dynamic malware analysis.
Any pointers to other malicious programs found by the analysis were acquired. The authors of this project have
three objectives: Data acquisition, data enrichment and threat analysis. The NoHa, a framework 6 EU project
[88] is a similar European project to set up honeypots. In the intrusion detection community, the SurfIDS
[160] is a distributed intrusion detection system project capable of identifying malicious traffic by means of
shared information retrieved from other sensors. The purpose of these projects is to collaboratively share threat
information and collect malicious data on a large scale, aiming to provide a better visibility and understanding
of global malicious activities. An exhaustive list of distributed malicious data collection projects can be found
in [99]. The advantage of distributed honeypots is that a higher visibility of malicious activities is reached than
with a single honeypot. The higher visibility frequently results in a larger amount of data that is collected with
such solutions. Hence, data aggregation techniques and an evaluation of data processing tools is mandatory for
a meaningful interpretation of the data.
3.3.4 Honeypot Data Analysis
Threat collection and measurement is of particular interest is particularly for the anti-virus industry. Their
portfolio of commercial security products must keep track of the attackers. In addition to the submission of
malicious software by their customers, they also use honeypots. Once they have a malicious program, they
4The number 232 is only a theoretical value. Some addresses should not be assigned and some addresses should not be routed [157]
resulting in a smaller address space.
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can generate a signature for it then update and distribute their malicious software database. A customer hit by
the new threat can then detect the infection and in some cases undo its effects. In order to undo the effects of
malicious software, these effects must be known. Because the source code is seldom available, the software
must be reverse-engineered. Two approaches are used: A static analysis of the malicious program can be
performed [49]. In this case the program is not executed, but disassembled. The machine code is transformed
into assembly code which is semi-automatically analyzed. Malicious software developers are aware of this
technique and use tricks to confound the analysis. In order to counter such evasion techniques, a malicious
program can be dynamically inspected [49]. To do this, the program is executed in isolation and environmental
changes are recorded. A fundamental problem of a dynamic analysis is that it is not known if all code branches
are executed. This problem can be reduced to the Halting problem [49]. In addition, attackers try to detect such
environments and provide erroneous analysis results on encountering them. Malicious software researchers try
to make the environment robust against such attacks. Ironically, this has led to a an arms race situation similar
to that which the intrusion detection and honeypot community has encountered. In the malicious software
analysis community a similar downward spiral like that previously discussed, can be observed: Function hooks
have been moved from user space [190] to kernel space and have ended up in virtual hardware space [43].
Besides installing programs on a honeypot attackers often interact with files on honeypot. An operator
should always be aware of exactly what has happened on a honeypot. In his PhD thesis, Fairbanks [48] de-
scribed new forensic techniques focusing on EXT3 and EXT4 file system structures. File system changes
are recovered from the file system journal. His Timekeeper tool permits the recovery of sequences of file
system events such as file modification, file creation and file removal. Nicomette et al. [112], operated a high-
interaction honeypot for 419 days. They exposed a vulnerable SSH server hosted on a Linux operating system
to the Internet. The SSH server was constantly under attack and brute force attacks were launched against it.
The authors of the paper focused on differentiating between human and automated attacks. In addition, they
analyzed the user name and password pairs that the attackers used. They clustered these pairs and compared
the lists used by attackers with popular password crackers. Their purpose was to identify attacker communities
which share password lists and compromised accounts. The authors concluded that attackers use customized
dictionaries and discovered that there are specialized attacker communities for focusing on brute-force attacks.
According to the authors, only a few dictionaries were shared among attackers. Due to the long-term nature of
the experiment, the authors observed that some dictionaries were stable over time. Furthermore, the authors no-
ticed that high- and low-interaction honeypots running at the same time were targeted by different communities
of attackers: none of the IP addresses observed on their high-interaction honeypot appeared in the records of the
low-interaction honeypot deployed in the Leurre´ project. The authors used the presence of typographic errors
and the mode of data transmission with the honeypot as criteria to distinguish human attackers from automated
attacks. Automated attacks transmit the data faster, and more often group it into blocks, than human attackers.
An examination of the TTY buffer [33] enabled the authors to identify copy and paste actions on the honeypot
and thus they were able to distinguish script kiddies from more experienced attackers. They concluded that
they observed more script kiddies than experienced attackers. They also found out that attacks are composed
of various attack phases and that the attackers use different source addresses to perform attacks. Besides the
collection of malicious tools and the assessment of the nature of attackers, additional information could be
assessed such as their reactions to failures aiming to reveal their skills and social background.
3.4 Detecting Honeypots
Honeypots have become popular and their deployment has increased. Attackers are aware of this trend, and try
to avoid. A honeypot tries to mimic a legitimate server. This leads to artifacts that are searched for attackers.
Provos et al. [128] note that this happens as early as the in the discovery phase. When an attacker scans a
network he may analyze the arrival of network packets. A Windows kernel behaves differently from a Linux
kernel; each host’s TCP/IP stack has its own fingerprint [57]. These differences allow an attacker to expect the
services that are available. In [130] Provos et al. considers the case where a host’s TCP/IP stack behaves like that
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of a Linux host yet announces typically Windows services. Obviously, an attacker can determine this mismatch,
assume that the host is a honeypot or a gateway and stay out. In [128], Provos et al. discuss techniques for
fooling commonly-used fingerprinting techniques. Looking for artifacts on a host is also a valid approach. The
resulting Linux kernel can be complied as regular program and emulate an entire operating system. This kernel
is called User-Mode-Linux (UML) and is popular for setting up high-interaction honeypots. Holz et al. [70]
described UML detection techniques. For instance, the CPU information from the /proc file system already
reveals that UML is in use. A listing of running processes shows the processes emulating the kernel, which are
not present on a regular system. The kernel command line also shows that a UML is running. Linux kernel
messages also give some configuration hints concerning UML. The set of running processes is also a different
from that on a regular Linux system. Wagener et al. [180] went a step further. After successfully identifying
the User Mode Linux, they could generate a system call with specially crafted parameters to take down the
entire emulated operating system. The system call causes a kernel panic consequently file system content is
not synchronized with the hard drive and information that might help the honeypot operator to investigate the
attack is lost.
Virtual honeypots are often emulated with a VMware virtual machine [130]. Unlike UML, VMware allows
to emulate arbitrary Operating Systems. A simple test an attacker can make allows to query the serial numbers
of the hardware used. This information is the same for all virtual machines. Early VMware versions also
had implemented a back door, which could be detected by attackers [70]. To do this, an attacker needed to
implement a small assembler routine.
Honeypots are sometimes operated in conjunction with a debugger in order to trace all function calls ex-
ecuted by the emulated operating system. Holz et al. [70] describe techniques to detect debuggers. The
previously discussed detection techniques for detecting User Mode Linux and VMware virtual machines prove
only that a virtual machine is running. The detected virtual machine might also have a legitimate production
purpose. Balas [9] proposes Sebek, a kernel monitoring technique. He detours commonly used system calls
resulting in address-range changes in the system call table. Bill McCarty [101] reports attacks which can detect
these changes. The author also describes a methodology to recover the original address and a technique to
dynamically update the system call table. If this is done, the monitoring techniques can be disabled by attack-
ers. The out-of-the box monitoring techniques proposed by Dunlap et al. [45] and Xuxian et al. [194], make
a major assumptions about memory structure and system call order [68]. If an attacker interferes with these
assumptions, the external analysis results may be corrupted.
3.5 Summary
This chapter summarizes the evolution of honeypots. The breakthrough on attacker monitoring came with
the honeypot terminology proposed by Spitzner [154]. A honeypot is a resource designed to be attacked in
contrast to classical intrusion detection systems no distinction has to be made between legitimate and malicious
activities. All activity on a honeypot is by definition suspicious because the honeypot has no production purpose
and the activity is certainly not legitimate.
Spitzner [154] also proposed a classification for honeypots, which has been adopted by the honeypot com-
munity dividing honeypots into low-, mid- and high-interaction honeypots. However, in academic communities
mid-interaction honeypots are uncommon. A low-interaction honeypot emulates pseudo services without sup-
porting infrastructure. The most widely-used low-interaction honeypot is Honeyd [128]. It allows conclusions
to be drawn about attacker presence and attack trends. A high-interaction honeypot is a real resource having
a full-blown operating system that is exposed to attackers. Obviously, these operating systems must have ad-
ditional covert monitoring features in order to monitor attackers. There is an arms race between attackers and
honeypot operators. Once honeypot operators have developed a new monitoring techniques, attackers try to
evade it. This has resulted in a trend to make observations at progressively lower levels of a system. The host
intrusion detection system has faced a similar downward spiral [59]. However, the honeypot community does
not aim at simply detecting intrusions but also tracking attacker activities after a successful exploit.
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DTK [31] low R0 Unix Yes Yes No low L1
Honeyd [128] low R0 PI Yes Yes Yes low L1
Labrea [95] low R0 PI Yes Yes Yes low L2
Honey@home [5] mixed R0−3 Linux No No No low L4
Kojoney [34] low R0−2 PI Yes Yes Yes low L3
Nepenthes [7] low R0−1 Linux Yes Yes Yes low L1
Amun [60] low R0−1 Linux Yes Yes Yes low L1
ReVirt [45] high R0−3 Linux Yes Yes No high L5 + L7
Sebek [9] high R0−3 Linux+ Yes Yes No high L5
Argos [125] high R0−3 Linux Yes Yes No high L5
VMScope [195] high R0−3 VT No No No high L6
Dionaea [6] low R0−1 Linux Yes Yes Yes low L1
Table 3.1: Honeypot Evaluation Grid
Spitzner [154] divides honeypots into production and research honeypots. A production honeypot is a
counterfeit resource deployed in operational infrastructure with simply to detect the presence of attackers.
For this application, low-interaction honeypots are particularly interesting due to their low operational risk.
Research honeypots are used to study attackers’ behaviors. Research honeypots have been used to detect zero-
day exploits [125], which are known only to the attacker community, and to generate signatures for intrusion
detection systems [89]. They are also used to study post-attack behaviors. Most high-interaction honeypot
publications summarize specific observations, [3], [135] or propose novel monitoring techniques [9], [45].
Table 3.1 summarizes the proposed honeypots that have been previously discussed and that are frequently
used by security researchers. The first column gives the name of the honeypot. On the second column is denoted
if it is high-interaction or low-interaction honeypot. Some authors have proposed mitigation and management
techniques for honeypots [5], [193]. The key concept is to combine low-interaction honeypots with high-
interaction honeypots. In this case, the term mixed is used. The capabilities column indicates the information
that can be gathered with the given honeypot by reference to the ring hierarchy set out in chapter 2. The
fourth column shows the technology used. If it is a program that uses generic programming interfaces, the
term PI (Platform Independence) is used. If hardware virtualization technology is used the term VT appears.
Otherwise, the operating system’s family is used. Columns five to seven describe aspects of the source code.
Available source code is extremely useful for making an accurate evaluation. It permits researchers to reproduce
experiments, to analyze implementation details and to extend the approach without reinventing the wheel. We
show whether the source code is available and functional from an external point of view. If the source code
is not available we assume that it is not functional. We define a functional program as a program that does
exactly do what is described in the related publication. The last column includes a codification about the limits
of a given honeypot. These are explained in table 3.2. In the context of distributed architectures, a honeypot is
distributed in two parts. A front-end with a minimalistic design aiming to expose a service that is then relayed
to the back-end. Sometimes the software of the front-end is available but the the back-end unreachable. In such
a case it is likely that the community abandoned their infrastructure.
Operating systems constantly evolve and source code needs to be maintained. For instance, function names
change or disappear in updates of shared libraries. Well-maintained code, means that people still are working on
the project and that the program can be used on modern systems. Two criteria have been used for determining
if a project is maintained. A honeypot such as Honeyd, Labrea and Nepenthes are included in standard Linux
distributions which are maintained. Other honeypots, like Kojoney Argos or Dionaea are maintained by the
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Code Description
L1 Considerable development efforts required for each service or vulnerability
L2 Attacker is only slowed down
L3 Root privileges are required to run the honeypot
L4 Back-end service is not available
L5 Honeypot can be taken over by attackers
L6 Honeypot is not available. Hence the experiments cannot be reproduced
L7 Source code is obsolete and not maintained
+ A Microsoft Windows version is available
PI Platform independent
Table 3.2: Codifications
main developers. The eighth column describes operational costs. The term low is used when a honeypot can
be operated without much human monitoring. This is frequently the case for low-interaction honeypots, which
usually run with limited user privileges on protected machines. Even when an attacker manages to take over
the honeypot, she has still only limited access.
In contrast, the operation of a high-interaction honeypot usually needs a lot of human effort. Attackers
have full access to the machine. Despite mitigation techniques attackers could find unconventional methods
of bypassing them. If they are able to cause damage to other parties, the honeypot operator is legally reliable.
Furthermore, data is collected at a low level of the honeypot and additional efforts is needed to reconstruct
the overall activity of the honeypot. For instance, when all network traffic is recorded from the honeypot, it
must be reassembled and the communication protocol need to be analyzed. Using the knowledge ring model
introduced in chapter 2 and following a generic attack scheme, attackers usually attempt to discover potential
victims (ring R0). When they have found a victim they exploit it (ring R1). After a successful exploit, they
usually start to investigate the system (ring R2) and start abusing it (ring R3 − R∗). This knowledge is assessed
with the previously described honeypots.
3.6 Limitations
The initial purpose of research honeypots is to study attackers and determine their tactics and tools [154]. As
summarized in table 3.1, low-interaction honeypots are particularly well-suited for collecting data at the infor-
mation rings R0 to R2. By setting up pseudo-services, attackers can be identified and exploits can be collected
and inspected. Their advantage is their low management. A high-interaction honeypot exposes an entire vulner-
able system to attackers. An attacker can execute arbitrary commands on a high-interaction honeypot because
all commands are permitted. On high-interaction honeypots attackers can customize the system by using their
own tools. Usually, attackers manage to penetrate the system and install malicious programs. According to
Spitzner [154] on page 2 “Have the enemy teach us its own tools, tactics, and motivations”. Cheswick [26]
and Bellovin [20] pioneered the idea of interacting with attackers and described their encounters. Spitzner
[154] and Raynal et al. [139] explicitly set up a high-interaction honeypot and described their observations.
Ramsbrock et al. [135] went a step further and modeled attacker behavior on a high-interaction honeypot as
a state machine derived from observations made during the earlier operation of high-interaction honeypots.
Their model describes typical attacker actions following the compromise of a system, and tells a honeypot op-
erator what he should expect while operating a high-interaction honeypot. However, this model assumes that
all commands are allowed for an attacker, and the honeypot does nothing to resist an attack. They follow the
paradigm of exposing an infrastructure to an enemy without any protection or resistance. The enemy assaults
the infrastructure and her actions are observed. Following such an approach only a limited set of strategies and
tactics of an attacker is likely to be observed because attackers face no resistance during the attack, and may
react differently in such a case.
3.6. LIMITATIONS 45
Most of the research related to high-interaction honeypots has focused on the arms race between attackers
and honeypot operators. The publication of a new attacker monitoring technique is followed by another one
describing how to detect or evade this novel approach. To a certain extent such research activities are necessary
in order to ensure that attackers continue to be lured and to avoid any suspicion of counterfeit infrastructures.
When an attacker detects an obviously fake infrastructure, she may not attack it, or if she has attacked it may
backtrack quickly. Cohen [31] discusses deception techniques in the context of confronting attackers. His idea
is mix real services with fake services such that an attacker has to discover the services that are useful to her.
This approach has been formally described using game theory [98], [108] such that an attacker has to decide
how to attack a real or a fake system with each decision being associated with a price. However, little effort
have been made to make honeypots themselves more intelligent and adaptive with in order to automated and
augment information retrieval from attackers. Current high-interaction honeypots have static behavior and can
be only operated with a predefined configuration. Such an approach allows malicious programs to be collected.
The skills of attackers or their tactics and strategies when facing resistance are not assessed. Attackers are
not challenged on the path to reaching their goal because all operations are permitted, with the result that the
honeypot operator gains little idea of their skills. If they have encountered resistance or additional constraints,
they might reveal more information about themselves. Some attackers may give up, and leave the honeypot.
Other attackers may look for alternative paths to their goal. The choice of an attacker is particularly interesting
for a honeypot operator because it would allow him to classify attackers according their skills. Furthermore,
after system identification, some attackers expect a particularly behavior from the compromised system. In
order to optimize information retrieval from attackers, a honeypot’s strategies should not be predictable by
an attacker. If an attacker is able to correctly predict the behavior of a honeypot, this must mean that it is
behaving statically like a classical high-interaction honeypot. Adaptive honeypots use deception techniques in
order apply increasing resistance against attackers. Adaptive honeypots may reveal more information about
attackers, such as their strategies regarding their final goal or their ethnological background. From a high-level
perspective, attackers and honeypot operators are opponents in a competitive environment. Attackers want
to reach their goal without being discovered. Honeypot operators want to reveal information about attackers.
Therefore, we explore game and learning theories in the context of high-interaction honeypots in order to model
interactions with attackers and to optimize information retrieval from attackers.
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Chapter 4
Learning in Games
4.1 Game Theory
In 1928, von Neumann [171] introduced Game Theory in his article “Zur Theory der Gesellschaftsspiele”.
He formalized the case of n players who play a game. Each player’s result is influenced by his own and his
opponents’ actions. Each player wants to achieve a good result at the end of the game. In 1944, von Neumann
with the economist Morgenstern formalized this concept in economics [172]. The breakthrough in game theory
came in 1950, when Nash published his thesis ”Non-Cooperative Games” [109]. He introduced and proved
the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and received the Nobel prize for this achievement. Informally, every time people
have to deal with one another, a game is played [21]. Each player is able to perform a variety of actions, and
each action results in a payoff. A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies among several players in a game if and
only if each strategy is the best reply to the other [21]. The prisoner’s dilemma is a famous problem analyzed
in game theory [169]. In this thought experiment, the police arrest two people. Both are suspected of having
jointly committed a crime. The police lack sufficient evidence to convict them. The suspects are put in separate
cells such they cannot communicate with each other. Each suspect is offered the following deal: If a suspect
defects against the other, and if the other does not defect, he will be released (0 years of prison), while the other
will go to prison for 12 years. If neither suspect testifies, both have to go to prison for 1 year due to the lack of
evidence. If both testify, both will go to prison for 10 years and this situation is called Nash Equilibrium. In
this situation the players act selfishly and want to be better off independent of the other player’s decision. Game
theory is particularly useful for modeling the interactions among several players having different interests. It
allows reasoning about rational players’ strategic interactions. The theory is popular in economics and politics
[115].
A game may be formalized as either a strategic form or an extensive form game [55]. The strategic form is
less complete than the extensive form, but it is better suited for identifying dominant strategies and to computing
Nash equilibria. A strategic form game [55] is composed of a finite set of players N = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}. Player 0
represents ”Nature” and is exogenous to the game [169]. Each player i has either a finite set of pure strategies
S i or a mixed strategy set. A pure strategy set is a discrete set of actions or strategies a player can perform, and
a mixed strategy set for a player i is defined in eq. 4.1 and represents the probability distribution, denoted ∆(S i)
over a finite strategy set S i [64]. For a mixed strategy set, a strategy profile is
∏
i Qi and is abbreviated (qi, q−i),
where −i denotes the other players. A mixed strategy profile is more generic than a pure strategy profile. For
a pure strategy profile, the probability of selecting a given strategy is always 1. Therefore, the mixed strategy
profile is considered in the following.
Qi = ∆(S i) =
qi : S i → [0, 1] |
∑
si∈S i
qi(si) = 1
 (4.1)
Each player i also has a payoff or utility function ri : S → R, where S = S 1 × · · · × S n. The expected
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1\2 D C
D -10,-10 0,-12
C -12,0 -1,-1
Table 4.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma - Payoffs
payoff for a player i, who is playing strategy s according the probability q is defined in eq. 4.2, where q(s) =∏N
j=1 q j(s j).
Es∼q[ri(s)] =
∑
s∈S
q(s)ri(s) (4.2)
The prisoner’s dilemma can be formalized as a strategic game [169]. The set of players N = {1, 2} is
composed of the two players. Each player has two strategies: to defect D or to confess C. Hence, both players
have the same set of strategies S 1 = S 2 = {D,C}. In some cases the suspects go to prison. The police offers
a special deal, which is presented in the payoff matrix 4.1 [169]. If both players defect they both go to prison
for 10 years. Going to prison is a negative payoff (-10) for the players. If one player defects and the other does
not, the second goes to prison (payoff -12) and the first is freed. If neither player testies, both go to prison for 1
year (payoff = -1).
In strategic form games, the choices of the players are made simultaneously in one round. In an extensive
form game [169] each player can make more moves in a game. Hence, interaction among players can be
modeled. Strategic form games are represented with a decision tree K. Each node in this tree is a decision node
and represents a player.
A game represented by the extensive form includes the following components [169]:
Set of players. This set contains n players and is denoted N = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}. External events result in actions
by player 0 and are usually caused by nature. The extensive form game shown in figure 4.1 has two
players N = {1, 2}.
Available actions. In particular situations a player i ∈ N can perform k actions or strategies sik. An example
decision tree presented in figure 4.1 and is read from left to right. The first node is first player’s decision.
Two actions are available: s11 and s
1
2. If player 1 chooses the strategy s
1
1, player 2 has to make a decision,
choosing between actions s21 or s
2
2.
Order of moves. The extensive game form permits successive strategies or actions to be modeled. One player
can trigger an event before another one does. Each node in the decision tree represents a player and each
edge corresponds to an action by that player. The order of the moves is represented by a branch in the
decision tree. If player 1 makes the decision s11 and player 2 then decides to perform the action s
2
2, the
order of moves is s11, s
2
2.
Information sets. An information set is a partition of the history of moves for a given player. It is used to
model incomplete information for a player.
Payoffs. Each action results in a payoff. The payoff is usually distributed at terminal nodes and is represented
by a real number. In the case where a player’s gain is exactly equal to the other player’s loss, the term,
zero-sum game is used; otherwise the term general sum game is used [169].
Formalization permits the modeling of a game among n players and subsequently analysis. Looking at the
prisoner’s dilemma presented in table 4.1, the strategy to defect D is a dominant strategy [169]. In any situation,
it gives a better payoff than the alternative. For instance, if one player defects and the other does not it gives
0 payoff to the player that defects. In the prisoner’s dilemma, the players act selfishly: they want to get the
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Player 2
Player 1
s22
s21
s12
s22
s21
s11
Figure 4.1: Extensive Form Game
best payoff for themselves. If both defect both get a negative payoff. If the players had had the opportunity
to agree to not defect they would both have been better off. According to Fudenberg et al. [55] one player’s
selection strategy can hurt other players. For instance, in a zero-sum game one player’s profit is the other’s loss
[55]. The strategy of defecting is also a Nash Equilibrium. It is valid for players to try to maximize their own
payoff while ignoring the other players’ goals. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. A formal
definition is presented in [52]. Pareto efficiency comes from the Pareto improvement. If a parameter in a model
can be improved without deteriorating another one, a Pareto improvement has occurred.
A Nash equilibrium shows the strategies that maximize a player’s payoff. If such a strategy exists, the
notion of pure Nash equilibrium is used. Sometimes a pure Nash equilibrium does not exist. However, Nash
[109] proved in his theorem 1 that every finite game has an equilibrium point. A Nash equilibrium is defined as
a strategy profile such that all players of the game select strategies that are the best responses to the strategies
of the other players [64]. The best strategy q∗i for a player facing other players q−i is defined in eq. 4.31.
∀qi ∈ Qi,E[ri(q∗i , q−i)] ≥ E[ri(qi, q−i)] (4.3)
There are pure or mixed equilibria. A mixed equilibrium is a probability distribution over strategies. A pure
equilibrium is a special case of a mixed equilibrium, where the probability of selecting a particular strategy is
1. A strategic game permits straightforwardly computation of the Nash Equilibria because there is only a single
interaction among the players. A decision tree of such a game has only a depth of one. Games formalized as an
extensive form game permit to model more interactions among players. Repeated games [55] are games having
more than one interaction. In order to compute a Nash equilibrium, all the selected strategies with their payoffs
have to be known. A repeated game is divided into sub-games, where Nash equilibria can be computed in each
sub-game [55]. The computation of Nash equilibria addresses the question of which action pair for each player
maximize the payoff for each player. Because, the exact algorithmic complexity of computing Nash equilibria
is unknown [123], this computation is a trade-off between execution speed and completeness. Although some
algorithms do not identify all the Nash equilibria meaning that these algorithms are not complete, they are fast
[123]. Other algorithms, are more exhaustive and require unrealistic amount of processing power. A good
starting point is to clearly identify the type of game. On one hand, generic algorithms for strategic games have
been proposed and are ready to use. On the other, when dealing with an extensive game, its particular sub-
games needs to be identified because every extensive game is different. For each sub-game, Nash equilibria can
be computed. If the game is a strategic game, then ready-to-use algorithms can be applied. The next step is to
establish whether the game is zero-sum or general sum. A large family of algorithms have been proposed to
search for Nash equilibria. These can be organized into two categories: Those in the first category can solve
strategic games and those in the second can solve games in the extensive form. The category of strategic games
can be further diveded into two classes: algorithms addressing the first class are solve zero-sum games, while
those in the second solve general-sum games.
1
E is the expected value.
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Due to the fact that the exact algorithmic complexity of finding Nash equilibria is unknown, a trade-off
has to be made between completeness, meaning to find all possible Nash equilibria, and execution time. The
oldest but still frequently-used, algorithm was set out by Lemke [92]. An algebraic proof was proposed for the
existence of equilibrium points for a two-person, non zero-sum games. The authors also propose an approach
for searching at least one equilibrium point, which is identified via linear complementarity. The algorithm uses
combinatorial search to find a Nash equilibrium, resulting in a exponential runtime. Shapley [149] showed that
this algorithm does not necessarily find all equilibrium points. Mangasarian [100] showed the enumeration of
all Nash equilibria is a polytope problem extending Lemke’s approach to find all the Nash equilibria. Porter et
al. [123] described an algorithm that is capable of solving both zero-sum and general-sum games. The authors
try to increase the execution speed by minimizing the time taken to find the first Nash Equilibrium point. In
practice players sometimes do not know their exact payoff. These errors may impact the equilibria and when
this impact is analyzed, is called Quantal response equilibrium [61]. Errors are incrementally introduced in the
payoffs and the Nash equilibria are recomputed in order to see how stable the equilibria are.
Game theory permits to formalize the interaction between players having different interests. Players can
perform various actions, each of which is related to a cost or a reward. Recently, this theory has been applied in
the context of information security. Often, two parties are modeled: an defender and an omnipresent attacker.
For instance, Schmidt et al. [144] formalized a game between an attacker and a defender in the context of
intrusion detection systems. A defender can deploy intrusion detection systems in a communication network,
but each deployment involves a cost. The authors describe four games differing in network characteristics, and
the number of accuracy of intrusion detection systems. They concluded that the accuracy of detecting attackers
is significantly reduced when attackers can find a way to exploit defects in intrusion detection systems even
when the defender uses an optimal placement strategy.
O’Donnell [115] formally explains the reason that most malicious programs are targeted for Microsoft
Windows platforms. He states that Macintosh users believe their platform is more secure than those of by
Microsoft, but argues that the reason for their being fewer malicious programs on Macintosh than on Microsoft
platforms is that of economic motivation. He created a formal game between attackers and users. Attackers
can attack a Windows system or a Macintosh system. In his reward model he included the market share of the
system, the value of the system and the probability of successfully defending a system. He discovered that, for
some systems the market share factor makes a strategy dominant. This means that an attacker will always get
a higher payoff when attacking a more widespread system. Even the worst-case reward for attacking such a
system is better than attacking a less popular system.
As discussed in chapter 3, Cohen described the idea of mixing real systems with fakes ones. In shadow
honeynets, production machines and honeypots are intermixed [4]. With such an approach attacks can be
partially observed. When attackers discover the infrastructure, they leave traces on honeypots as well as on
production systems.
Garg et et al. [108] formalize an equivalent game involving two players, an attacker and a defender. The
authors create a formal framework for modeling deception in honeynets. Attackers prefer to assault regular
hosts rather than honeypots, while defenders want to lead intruders to attack honeypots. Hence, an attacker can
probe a regular host or a honeypot. If she hits a regular host, a positive reward is given to the attacker and a
negative reward to the defender. If the attacker probes a honeypot, the rewards reversed. Hence, each player
has different interests. The authors’ game is in the extensive form. This means that each player has information
sets modeling imperfect information. The game between attackers and defenders is played sequentially, taking
into account the opponent’s moves. The game has four stages. The defender has to decide whether host at a
particular address is to be a regular host or a honeypot. When an attacker probes a host he does not necessarily
know a priori it is a honeypot or a legitimate machine. The defender also uses deception techniques. A host
having the role of a honeypot could respond to an attacker as it were a legitimate host, and a legitimate host
could respond in a way that suggests it is a honeypot. The defender could also utilize disclosure strategies
meaning that neither a regular host nor a honeypot would lie about its role. Garg et et al. [108] focus on a game
theoretical framework for honeynets using deception techniques. They give an example of manually defined
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payoffs and information sets for each player, then show how to compute Nash equilibria by partitioning the
extensive-form game into sub-games having the strategic game form. However, the authors do not explain how
deception techniques are used in this context.
Carrol et al. [46] formalize a similar game between defenders and attackers. The authors model a signaling
game in a network composed of honeypots and regular machines. The defender has to decide which machines
should be honeypots and which should be regular machines. In addition, a defender can use camouflage tech-
niques to make a honeypot look like a regular host and a regular host like a honeypot. An attacker can assault
either a honeypot or a regular machine. Attacking a honeypot yields a loss for the attacker. A honeypot is
monitored, and when an attacker assaults such a machine, she reveals her attacking techniques to the defender.
The authors derived four strategies for the defender according to her capabilities, and nine strategies for the
attacker. The defender strategies are based on the decision as to whether a host should reveal its true nature
or not. Based on received signals from the defender, the attacker can attack without determining the system
type, or after first determining the system type. Alternatively, she could retain from attacking the system. She
could also disbelieve the system of its true nature. The authors define a payoff structure for each action, giving
the gains and losses for each player. The authors then established equations that must hold for computing the
expected payoffs in the context of Bayesian equilibria. A formal definition of a Bayesian equilibrium is shown
in [56]. Using these equations, the authors discover ten equilibria. The authors made two case studies in order
to determine which equilibria is the most appropriate. In the first, they discuss a network where 10% of the
systems are honeypots. In this scenario the authors concluded that the defender should disguise all hosts as
honeypots. In the second study, scenario the authors considered automated attacks such as botnets, and deter-
mined that the defender should always either reveal the true nature of a system, or always claim the opposite
one.
Lye et al. [98] formalized a game between administrators and attackers. Their input was data by a network
manager employed at their university. The authors identified three attack scenarios: firstly, an attacker could
deface the main web site on their public web server. Secondly, an attacker could launch internally a denial of
service attack. Finally, an attacker could steal confidential data. The authors are not interested in an individual
attacker, and therefore assume an omnipresent attacker. The authors consider a general-sum game between
attacker and administrator, because an attacker’s gains does not necessarily have the same magnitude as the
administrator’s costs. Their infrastructure is modeled as graph representing a network. A node in this graph
is a device like a workstation or a router. The external world is modeled as a single node. Each edge in the
graph corresponds to a physical or virtual communication channel. On this graph, the authors introduce super
states which represent the state of the network and are composed of the individual states of each physical node
together with a traffic state. Each node state corresponds to a dedicated software configuration. The authors
define eleven attacker actions derived from their survey, an administrator can perform eight actions. The authors
give a high-level description of these actions. For instance, an attacker can install a virus or a sniffer program
and an administrator can remove compromised accounts or remove sniffers. Both players can also do nothing.
For the super states, the authors assign probabilities for transitions among their super states. Formally, they
model the game as a stochastic game2 game with a set of super states, a set of actions for each player, a set of
transition probabilities, and a set of rewards for each player. They also introduce a discount factor and model
time using discrete steps. The authors examine several attack scenarios and show how Nash equilibria can be
computed in this stochastic game. They used MATLAB to compute the equilibria and report that the execution
time was between 30 and 45 minutes. Hence, this implementation cannot be applied on real-time systems.
Grossklags et al. [80] formally analyzed the situations involving attackers and defenders on a shared infras-
tructure. They developed five security games: They investigated the case of total protection, best shot game,
weakest link game, the weakest target with mitigation techniques, and the weakest target without mitigation
techniques. Each player in each game has its own parameterized utility function. The authors used parameter-
ized utility functions. The most relevant parameters are the protection level and the self-insurance level. Due to
their generic approach with parameterized utility functions, the authors were able to compute Nash equilibria
2A definition of a stochastic is presented at page 58.
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Step 1 Environment You are in state 23. You have 3 possible actions.
Step 2 Agent I go for action 3.
Step 3 Environment You received a reward of 4. You are in state 12. You have 2 possible actions.
Step 4 Agent I go for action 1.
Step 5 Environment You received a reward of -5. You are in state 34. You have 5 possible actions.
Step 6 Agent I go for action 2.
Table 4.2: Reinforcement Learning - Operation Example
and then discuss the parameters, searching for best and worst cases in each type of game. The upper and lower
bounds also permit the authors to investigate the impacts of having more players in each type of game.
Kantzavelou et al. [83] focused on a special type of attacker, namely the insider. An insider may have
different objectives than those of the organization that she is working for. Insiders are divided into two cate-
gories: traitors and masqueraders. Traitors have been granted extra privileges and exploit them to work against
their own organization. Masqueraders pretend to be someone else in order to gain privileges. The activities of
insider are different from those of an external attacker. The authors define four actions for an insider. Firstly,
an insider can work normally by performing permitted tasks. Secondly, an insider can do unintentional damage
as result of making mistakes. Thirdly, an insider can embark on a pre-attack phase. Finally, an insider make
her attack. The authors define the payoffs via preferences. A further preference defines which strategies are
preferred by a player. For instance, an insider prefers a commendation from her manager to a warning. The
authors used a repeated game model. The authors manually define payoffs for each scenario, and solved the
game by computing Nash equilibria. The authors also carried out a quantal response equilibrium analysis [61].
In such an analysis, the rationality of players and erroneous payoffs are inspected.
In contrast to the situations presented so far, there are cases where the payoffs are not known in advance
at all. Hence, a contribution of this thesis explores reinforcement learning where a player can learn her payoff
during her interactions. A primer of reinforcement learning is presented in the next section followed with a
combination of reinforcement learning in stochastic games where learning approaches are combined with game
theoretical paradigms.
4.2 Reinforcement Learning
Kaelbling et al. [82] give a broad overview of reinforcement learning. A typical reinforcement learning problem
is shown in figure 4.2 and a reinforcement learning scenario [82] is shown in table 4.2. An agent interacts with
its environment and has a set of sensors to perceive its environment through which it receives a reward signal
rt [161]. Each action performed by the agent is rewarded or punished. The agent tries throughout its life to
optimize this reward signal. The environment is defined as discrete set of states S , and the agent has a discrete
set of actions A and a set of rewards R. The agent interacts with its environment only at series of discrete time
steps3.
At each instant t, the agent identifies its state st in its environment. The agent then decides to perform an
action at, and as consequently makes a state change to the state st+1. The agent’s action is rewarded or punished
with a reward rt. In order to maximize its long-term rewards, the agent must learn a policy pi , mapping states
to actions.
4.2.1 Markov Decision Process
This section presents a short primer on Markov decision processes (MDP), which provides a theoretical basis
for reinforcement learning [161]. An agent acting in an environment takes decisions, which result in state
3Kenji [86] discusses reinforcement learning in continuous time and action space, but this topic is not relevant for the further
understanding of our contributions.
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Figure 4.2: Reinforcement Learning Problem
changes. In the most generic way the probability of reaching state s′ ∈ S and receiving reward r ∈ R depends
on the agent’s previous actions and its previous state changes, defined in eq. 4.4 [161]. However, if the next
state s′ depends only on the previous state st and the agent’s action at ∈ A, the environment conforms to the
Markov property, which is defined in eq. 4.5 [161].
Pr
{
st+1 = s
′, rt+1 = r | st, at, rt, st−1, at−1, rt−1, . . . , r1, s0, a0
} (4.4)
Pr
{
st+1 = s
′, rt+1 = r | st, at
} (4.5)
Each environment conforming to the Markov property can be formally modeled as a Markov decision
process [161]. Here we consider the case of finite Markov processes, because we are discussing the formal roots
of reinforcement learning. A finite Markov decision process, simply denoted as a Markov decision process4, is
composed of
• A finite set of states S .
• A finite set of an agent’s actions A.
• A transition function T : S × A → PD(S ), where PD(S ) is the probability distribution over the set S .
• The reward function R : S × A → R defining the distributed rewards.
According to Stutton et al. [161], a Markov decision process defines the one-step dynamics of the environ-
ment as shown in eq. 4.6.
Pass′ = Pr
{
st+1 = s
′ | st = s, at = a
} (4.6)
The expected rewards are defined in eq. 4.7 and depend on the current state, the previous state and the
action performed [161]. The expected value is denoted E.
Rass′ = E
{
rt+1 | st = s, at = a, st+1 = s′
} (4.7)
An agent must find a policy pi that maximizes its received reward in the long run. Two kinds of policies
have been defined:
Stationary policy An agent learns a mapping from the state space to the action space pi : S → A.
Non-stationary policy An agent learns a probability to be in state s and taking action at, pi(st, at).
4Infinite Markov decision processes are described in [148] and are not mandatory to conceive our contributions.
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A fundamental problem of an agent in an environment is that it has to learn the value of being in a state s,
and how profitable it is to perform an action a in a given state s. The quality of the states and the state-action
pairs are defined with respect to the expected future rewards [161]. An agent is follows a policy pi defining the
actions it should take. During this evaluation, an agent estimates the value of a state, denoted Vpi, in order to
see if it is worth visiting in this state. In addition, it evaluates a the value of a state-action pair under a policy pi,
denoted Qpi(s, a). An agent can maintain Vpi and Qpi as parameterized functions. If these functions are recursive,
they are called Bellman equations [161]. The Bellman equation defining the value of a state s under the policy
pi is shown in eq. 4.8. A detailed derivation can be found at [161] page 91. The optimal value of V∗ can then
be calculated according eq. 4.9 [161]. Similarly, an agent can optimize a state-action pair Q∗ by applying eq.
4.10.
Vpi(s) = Epi
{ ∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1 | st = s
}
=
∑
a
pi(s, a)∑
s′
Pa
ss′
[
Ra
ss′ + γV
pi(s′)
] (4.8)
V∗(s) = max
a
E {rt+1 + γV∗(st+1) | st = s, at = a}
= max
a
∑
s′
Pass′
[
Rass′ + γV∗(s′)
] (4.9)
Q∗(s, a) = E
{
rt+1 + γmax
a′
Q∗(st+1, a′) | st = s, at = a
}
(4.10)
The value V∗(s) is the unique solution of the Bellman equation, and defines the optimal value of a state. The
variable γ is a discounting parameter used for handling indefinitely interactions. If an agent’s interaction with
the environment can be broken down into episodes, meaning that the start time and the end time are known, γ
is set to 1 such that no discounting is done. However, if either the start time or end time is unknown, future
rewards are usually decayed by setting γ < 1 so as to reduce future rewards. The act of breaking down an
agent’s interaction into episodes are is sometimes defined as the agent’s horizon [98].
finite horizon A finite horizon is used when the lifetime of an agent is known in advance. This means that an
agent has to optimize its behavior within a finite number of steps. In this case, the discounting factor γ
can be set to 1.
infinite horizon If an agent’s lifetime is unknown in advance, the term infinite horizon is used. In this case, a
discounted reward accumulation or an average reward model can be used.
discounted rewards Rewards are geometrically discounted according a discount factor [82]. This dis-
count factor defines if the agent optimizes its reward signal over the long or the short run. The
discount factor is usually a number between 0 and 1 and is multiplied by the received rewards. On
one hand, a low discount factor reduces the received reward and targets long-term operation. On
the other, if the highest discount factor (1) is used, the agent focuses a short-term operation.
averaged rewards The average rewards in a delimited operation window are used for reward accumula-
tion. The operation window does not necessarily correspond to an episode but the concept is quite
similar. It consists of a successive lists of rewards established in a continuous process.
As alternative to the algebraic computation, the optimal policies they can be determined by dynamic pro-
gramming approaches [161]. Agents’ decisions are often represented with backup diagrams like that shown
in figure 4.3. Looking at the left tree in figure 4.3, an agent is optimizing the value of a state V∗ according to
equation 4.9. The agent is in a state s and performs an action a. The agent gets a reward r and a transition to the
state s′ is made. Each such interaction corresponds to a branch of the backup tree, and the number of potential
transitions resulting from all potential actions increases is quickly. Hence, the term full-backup is used, because
all possibilities are taken into account. The right tree in figure 4.3 shows the case where an agents optimizes a
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Figure 4.3: Full Backup Representation
state-action pair Q∗ defined in eq. 4.10. The term of full-backups is also used for eq. 4.10. Each policy has an
associated value function that either optimizes the value of a state V(s) or the value of a state-action pair Q(s, a).
When the optimal value-functions are known, the optimal policy pi∗ leading to this optimal value-function can
be discovered. This is due to the fact that the optimal value functions for a state s, or for a state-action pair, can
be expressed as V∗(s) = maxpiVpi(s) and Q∗(s, a) = maxpiQpi respectively. In order to find an optimal policy,
policy iterations have been proposed with an algorithmic complexity is O(|A||S |2+ |S |3) per iteration [82], taking
into account that there are at most |A||S | distinct policies [82]. Furthermore, the discounting factor γ can increase
the algorithmic complexity [82]. Despite the fact that optimal policies can be mathematically formulated and
algebraically solved, it is expensive in terms of memory usage and computational power to determine them
[161].
4.2.2 Learning Agents
Although Markov decision processes allow the formal modeling of agents operating in an environment and
the algebraic computation of optimal policies, some parameters of Markov decision processes are unknown in
practice. Frequently unknown parameters are the reward function or the transition probabilities. An agent must
interact with the environment to discover the optimal values for a state or a state-action pair through learning
algorithms. When not all parameters are known, the term model-free learning is used [82]. However, when
following a model-free approach, the fundamental exploration-exploitation trade-off emerges. An agent has to
discover its environment. Having explored the environment, the agent could exploit its knowledge or continue
its exploration. There might be some hidden states yielding higher rewards. An agent may take an action
yielding a high reward but which may result in low rewards in the future. Hence, the far-reaching effects of
actions are unknown. An agent usually has two components: an explorer, a learning rule.
Explorers
When discounted rewards are used, an allocation index can be used. An agent remembers the number of times
an action has been chosen and the number of times that positive rewards were received for this action. An
agent has thus a history of rewards for a given action in a given state. This technique is known as Gitten’s
allocation indices. In addition, Bayesian reasoning approaches have been proposed to tackle the exploration-
exploitation problem [82]. Alternative explorer families include randomized strategies. In this case an action
is chosen according a probability 1 − , and a random action is selected according the probability . The -
greedy explorer follows this scheme [161]. The Bolzmann explorer [82] has a temperature parameter. If this
parameter is high, an agent is more willing to explore and if this parameter is low, the agent exploits its acquired
knowledge. The temperature parameter is decayed over time, with the result that an agent stops exploring in
the long run. In addition Kaelbling et al. [82] record the number of successes and the number of trials in order
to improve the exploration-exploitation trade-off. When the explorer is tightly coupled with the exploitation the
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term on-policy is used; otherwise the term off-policy is used.
on-policy An agent learns a policy pi while following it. The value of a policy is estimated while it is being
used for control [161].
off-policy An agent learns a policy while following another.
Learning rules
Monte Carlo methods provide one way of tackling a partially unknown environment in order to compute the
optimal values. These methods require sequences of states, actions and rewards [161]. These sequences are
recovered either from on-line methods or from simulations. Monte Carlo methods exist for episodic tasks, as
demonstrated in eq 4.11, where Rt is the actual return at time t [161]. The optimal policies are discovered via
general policy iteration methods [161]. An advantage of Monte Carlo methods is that the estimate of a state s
does not depend on estimates of the other states [161]. This means that Monte Carlo methods are even suited
to non-Markovian tasks [161]. A major drawback of Monte Carlo techniques is that some states may never be
visited.
V(st) ← V(st) + α [Rt − V(st)] (4.11)
In many application fields [161], an agent’s interactions with an environment cannot be divided into episodes,
because the start or end times are not known. Hence, temporal difference (TD) learning methods which are also
model-free methods have been proposed. TD learning leverages iterations over the estimated value of a state
using immediate rewards as input. Estimated values are updated at each time step instead at the end of an
episode. A basic TD learning method is shown in eq. 4.12, where α is a constant step size parameter [161]. As
shown in eq. 4.12, the estimated value of a state depends on estimates of other states. Consequently, estimation
errors may be propagated.
V(st) ← V(st) + α [rt+1 + γV(st+1) − V(st)] (4.12)
In order to mitigate these error propagations, a new component, called an adaptive heuristic critic (AHC)
is introduced [161]. An example, taken from [161], is shown in figure 4.4. The AHC is a separate memory
structure for an agent, which represents its policy structure. This component criticizes the actions of an agent.
A formal definition of an AHC is given in eq. 4.13. The TD error is computed from the new state, the previous
state and the received reward. This error can then be included in an agent’s policy selection method. An
example is the Gibbs softmax method is presented in [161] page 189. AHC methods are only applicable for
on-policy algorithms [161]. Another approach to reducing these propagated errors is to use T D(λ), which is a
combination of Monte Carlo methods and TD methods. The λ parameter defines eligible traces and consists
of a temporary record of the frequencies of an event, such as a visit to a state or the performing of an action
[161]. The case where λ is set to 0 results into T D(0). It has been shown that T D(λ) methods converge faster
to optimal values than the simple T D(0) method [161].
δt = Rt+1 + γV(st+1) − V(st) (4.13)
Q-learning [188] is easier to implement than AHC because only one component has to be considered [82].
The basic Q-learning form is presented in eq. 4.14.
Q(st, at) ← Q(st, at) + α
[
rt + γmax
a
Q(st+1, a) − Q(st, at)
]
(4.14)
According to Kaelbling et al. [82], a major advantage of Q-learning is that it is exploration-insensitive. The
Q values converge to the optimal values independent of the agent’s explorer while the data is being collected.
The agent has still to explore, but the details of how the exploration is done do not impact convergence [161].
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Figure 4.4: Adaptive Heuristic Critic
Q-learning is designed for discounted infinite-horizon Markov decision processes [82]. Undiscounted rewards
can also be handled with such an approach if a reward-free state is reached and if this state is regularly reset
[82]. Q-learning is a model-free approach [188], and allows an agent’s environment to be partially unknown.
A disadvantage of Q-learning is that each state has to be visited an infinity of times in order for the Q-values to
converge to the optimal Q-values. The Q(λ)-learning approach [119] combines the approach of using a adaptive
heuristic critic and reinforcement learning.
Q-learning is an off-policy algorithm and SARSA, an alternative model-free approach, is an on-policy
algorithm. It takes the next state into account, the next action and the next reward [161], explaining the name
of the algorithm: State - Action - Reward - State-Action. The general form of SARSA learning is presented in
eq. 4.15. SARSA has also be extended with eligible traces SARSA(λ) [161].
Q(st, at) ← Q(st, at) + α [rt+1 + γQ(st+1, at) − Q(st, at)] (4.15)
Sutton et al. [161] show numerous application examples, mainly in the area of robotics. A classic example
is a robot that needs to find the exit of a maze. Different reward models exist to parameterize the behavior
of the robot. Examples include punishment induced by energy constraints; others do not punish, and simply
give a positive reward when the robot finds the exit. In other examples, the agent can even be punished for
bumping into walls. Reinforcement learning often considers an agent operating in an environment and receiving
positive or negative rewards in response to actions taken. Among the more spectacular autonomous agents are
helicopters which are able to perform aerobatic flight manoeuvres controlled by reinforcement learning [1].
Reinforcement learning has been explored and extended for collaborating agents [163]. Hierarchical learning
among agents has been studied by Barto et al. [13]. Gambardella et al. [58] tackle the well-known traveling
salesman problem using an experimental reinforcement-based approach. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no literature concerning the use of reinforcement learning in the context of high-interaction honeypots.
4.3 Multi-Agent Learning Founded on Game Theory
Markov decision processes (MDP) are frequently used to model an agent in a dynamic environment. An agent
must learn a policy that maps states to actions by optimizing its reward signal. Often some parameters of the
MDP, especially the probabilistic transition function, are unknown and a learning approach must be used. In
some cases, the successive states should also be taken into account by an agent instead of just maximizing a
reward signal. However, the previously discussed reinforcement learning techniques only consider an agent
in an environment make the assumption that the environment is stationary. When there are more than two
agents, a simplistic approach is to consider opponents as the environment [90]. However, an environment
containing additional agents is constantly changing [74]. The environment may not be stationary anymore
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being is influenced by the other agents rather than generated by a stochastic process [74]. In this section we
consider reinforcement learning where more than one agent is present, and the agents are opponents. The
learning approaches should be feasible in close to real time. Stochastic games are introduced that handle the
uncertainty of agents dealing with other agents better than traditional Markov decision processes.
Stochastic Games
Shapley [150] introduced stochastic games. A stochastic game is composed of a finite number of players who
may occupy a finite number of positions. A position corresponds to a state in a traditional Markov decision
process. At each state a player chooses an action from a finite action set. Each action results in a reward.
The transitions from state to state are described by transition probabilities, which are jointly controlled by
the players. The interesting aspect is that these two players could have different objectives. Zachrisson [198]
extends such games to Markov games. The theoretical foundations providing a bridge between game theory and
stochastic games are provided by Fink [50] who investigated the existence of equilibrium points. Littman [90]
described a reinforcement learning approach in order to solve a two player zero-sum game modeled as Markov
game. He defines a Markov game with a set of states, denoted S , and a collection of action sets A1 . . .Ak where
k denotes the number of players. The state transitions are described by the transition function T of the current
state and the actions of each player. T : S ×A1 · · ·×Ak → PD(S ), where PD(S ) is a probability distribution over
the state space. In addition a reward function R is associated with each player. Ri∈{1,...,k} : S ×A1×· · ·×Ak → R.
In this game the author uses a single reward function, where one agent tries to maximize its reward signal and
another player tries to minimize it.
The major difference between a Markov decision process and a Markov game is the definition of the policy
that an agent has to discover. In a traditional Markov decision process, a policy is a mapping from the state
space to the action space [90]. However, in Markov games, a policy is a mapping from the state space to a
probability distribution of an action space [90]. The author gives the example of the rock-paper-scissors game,
where a deterministic policy by an agent can be easily defeated. Such games are better modeled by a Markov
game. The advantage of a Markov game is that the uncertainty of the opponent’s moves can be included in the
probabilistic choice of a player’s actions. In a traditional Markov decision process, the optimal deterministic
policy pi : S → A can be used to determine the quality of a state action-pair, denoted Q(s, a). In addition, the
reward of each player depends on the actions of each player, the current state and the state transitions controlled
by the Markov property [74]. Littman [90] modified this statement by introducing an opponent’s action, denoted
o, and estimates the quality of the state-action-action triple, denoted Q(s, a, o). Instead of formally computing
the optimal policy, Littman [90] uses the previously described Q-learning algorithm. A formal convergence
proof was later published in [96].
Hu et al. [74] also model a stochastic game with more than one agent. The authors propose a combination
of Q-learning and Nash equilibria and create a bridge between reinforcement learning and game theory. They
adapt Q-learning in general-sum games. The authors work on the stationary property of the environment. An
environment containing more agents is constantly changing, and the formal guarantees of Markov decision
processes do not always hold. In addition each agent might have different interests, as is usually the case for
noncooperative zero-sum and general-sum games. General-sum games have the advantage that arbitrary reward
models can be established [74]. Therefore, the authors propose Nash-Q, which is a variant of the Q-learning
algorithm [188] that takes Nash equilibria into account. Their algorithm is applicable in a stochastic game,
and its goal is to optimize a reward signal. Each agent estimates the Q-values for each state and for each
other agent. Obviously, the exact Q-values of opponents are unknown to an agent, so each agent has to learn
them and thus reveal each opponent’s strategy. After having revealed these strategies, a Nash equilibrium is
computed. A Nash equilibrium is computed for each stage of the game. This means that when the game is
in a given state, each player performs an action and a state transition is made. At each such moment each
agent seeks a Nash equilibrium. The authors noticed that the algorithmic complexity of their algorithm is
dominated by the computation of Nash Equilibrium, for which they use the Lemke-Howardson method [35]. A
part from, the Nash equilibrium computation, the space complexity of their algorithm is linear in the number
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of states, polynomial in the number of actions and exponential in the number of agents. The authors use
an infinite sampling technique and decay their learning rate. Under these conditions, they prove convergence
towards optimal Q-values. However, three additional assumptions must hold: Firstly, each state has to be visited
infinitely often; Secondly, each agent has to update its Q-values according to the current state and the actions
of each player; and thirdly, each stage game has an optimal point or a saddle point. Hu et al. also performed
some experiments in the context of multiple agents acting in a shared environment. Firstly, they study learning
convergence. The authors achieved nearly optimal Q values when each state-action tuple is visited just 95
times on average, despite their formal proof indicating that each state has to be visited infinitely often. The
authors then studied the phenomenon of malfunctioning agents. When some agents behaved randomly, instead
of following the computed Nash equilibrium, the impact of optimal Q-values for the other agents was found to
be low. Another phenomenon that the authors studied is the presence of multiple Nash equilibria. As evaluation
criterion that use agents that reach optimal Q-values by always selecting a given Nash equilibrium. This method
is possible due to the usage of the Lemke-Howson algorithm which always returns Nash equilibria in a fixed
order.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we have presented a short primer on game theory and reinforcement learning based on Markov
decision processes. These theories have been linked in order to model multiple agents having different interests
in a shared environment. The normal-form representation of a game consists of a set of players with a defined
set of actions and a payoff structure. The extended form can be used if a game is repeated multiple times. Nash
equilibria of a normal form game can be computed in order to find the optimal strategies for each player. These
optimal strategies are not necessarily Paretto optimal. In game theory, the major assumption is that players
are rational, and aim to optimize their payoff. In practice, this is not always the case. Therefore, the quantal
response equilibrium is introduced in order to study how stable a Nash equilibrium is. The irrationality of a
player is reduced to erroneous payoffs.
Game theory has already been applied in the context of honeypots. However, the majority of contributions
define games at the level of infrastructure composed of production machines and honeypots. Moreover, the
payoff structures have been manually defined [108] or derived from a survey [98]. Such approaches are only
suited to static models. However, an attacker’s interests cannot always be known in advance, and may change.
Therefore this thesis considers reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learning is founded on Markov Decision
Processes (MDPs). In an MDP, an agent interacts with its environment by performing actions. Each action re-
sults in a reward or a punishment. An agent must find a policy that maps states to actions. If all the parameters
of an MDP are known, the optimal values for a state or a state-action pair can be algebraically computed ac-
cording Bellman’s equations. The optimal value can then be used to determine the optimal policy that leads to
these optimal values. However, some parameters such as the reward distributions or the transition probabilities
are often unknown. These cases can use a model-free learning approach, where an agent tries to achieve the
optimal values by following a trial-an-error approach. A model-free learning agent is composed of an explorer
and a learning rule. The explorer handles the trade-off between exploration and exploitation, and the learning
rules define how the optimal values are updated. The learning rules described require a stationary environment
where the probabilities of receiving a reward or making state transitions do not change over time. When an en-
vironment is shared among multiple agents having different interests, this assumption is often violated. MDPs
have been extended to stochastic games (Markov games) where multiple agents are formally modeled. Fink
[50] formally showed the existence of equilibrium points in such games. This statement shows the existence of
Nash equilibria in stochastic games and the combination learning approaches with game theory. Game theory
and reinforcement learning enable to formally model the interactions with attackers including incomplete infor-
mation. The models are used to improve interactions with attackers in order to reveal a maximum information
about them in an automated fashion.
60 CHAPTER 4. LEARNING IN GAMES
Part II
Contributions
61

Chapter 5
Modeling Adaptive Honeypots
Simulating failures in order to lure attackers was reported for the first time in the classical paper ”An Evening
with Berferd” [26], where manual interactions from a human system administrator lured an attacker into re-
vealing many of his tactics and tools. During the operation of a high-interaction honeypot, we had a similar
experience. We observed an attacker who installed a bandwidth-greedy attack tool. The attacker launched this
tool, which had the effect of allowing no further attackers could attack the honeypot, so that nothing interesting
could be observed. We manually injected some code into the attacker’s tool such that it failed. After a while,
we saw that the attacker reconnected to our honeypot and investigated the records of her tool noticing that the
tool crashed. The attacker retried her command, restarted the program which failed again. After a few minutes
the attacker tried to debug the program and still was not able to determine why it failed. After another couple
of minutes, the attacker acquired an additional tool having similar features to the first. We observed that at-
tackers try to achieve their own goal. We manually interfered with the tools installed and operated by attackers
and noticed that some attackers reconnected to the honeypot and tried to solve the issues we created. Some
attackers even tried to harden the system aiming to lock out other attackers. Thus, we assume that attackers
are rational and each attack has a purpose. We address in this chapter an automated failure injecting honeypot
aiming to reveal as much information about an attacker as possible. The challenge addressed in this work is
to elaborate an adaptive high-interaction honeypot that attempts to optimize the retrieval of knowledge from
an attacker. The level of interaction is a consequence of the capabilities of a honeypot. The more features are
implemented in a honeypot, the more interactions between intruders and the honeypot are possible. One way
to obtain more interactions is to partially allow attackers to execute some programs, leading them to explore
alternative execution paths and reveal more information about themselves such as tools, skills and repositories
used in attacks. Similarly, an adaptive honeypot can abnormally prevent the execution of programs initiated by
an attacker and lead the attacker to perform other activities, which can provide insightful information for the
security community. The case of high-interaction honeypots operating a Linux operating system exposing a
SSH server to attackers is considered. SSH is usually available on servers having large amounts of processing
power and bandwidth. These servers are usually highly available and have only a few numbers of downtimes
and once the systems are accessed a full command line is available such that nearly any arbitrary command can
be executed. Hence, SSH is a popular attack vector for attackers [3], [112], [135], [181].
Table 5.1 shows a typical attack scenario on a SSH server, compatible with the observations of Nicomette et
al. [112]. An attacker discovered the SSH server and managed to hijack an account. She connects to the server
with the credentials (step 0) and obtains a shell. Due to the fact that the system is unknown to the attacker, a
system identification is done. The attacker first needs to know which privileges she has. For instance, this is
done with the command id (step 2). Another useful piece of information is the kernel version which can be
queried with the command uname (step 4). Furthermore, the attacker might be interested to see which programs
are currently running on the system (step 6). The attacker, then decides to download a malicious tool (step 8).
The attacker then uses the tool on the compromised system (step 10). On traditional high-interaction honeypots,
an attacker has reached her goal and the honeypot operator has collected one program and its origin.
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The attack sequence without any riposte from the honeypot is sshd → id → uname → ps→ wget →
custom. Attackers may also enter empty commands, typographic errors or insults. Attackers provide inputs as
sequences of strings. An input is a system command if and only if it is a bash command [111] or if it is related
to a program installed during the setup of the system. Attacker frequently install their own tools, like SSH brute
force scanners, rootkits, local root exploits or phishing server software. This means that all valid programs
on the honeypot not previously known are installed by attackers. After having successfully transferred them
to the honeypot, they are valid programs on the honeypot and can be executed. Each input that is neither a
program nor an ENTER keystroke typed by an attacker is considered to be an insult. An adaptive honeypot
interferes with the commands entered by attackers with the purpose to learn more about them. The attacker is
challenged an some resistance faced her attack and she has to react. For instance, she could simply retry the
program execution. Another option is to determine why the program execution failed by debugging the system.
Attackers could also decide to simply download another tool or desperate attackers give simply up. In the
example presented in table 5.1 the honeypot decided to return the error Permission denied (step 11). The
attacker decided to get more permissions with a local root exploit which she retrieves from another location.
Due to this strategical interference of the honeypot facing the attacker, the honeypot operator retrieved more
information about her. First, the honeypot operator learned that this particularly attacker did neither give up, nor
retried the command. However, this attacker looked for an alternative way to achieve her attack goal. Second,
the honeypot operator collected an additional program related to an attacker which may be interesting for anti-
virus industry. Third, the honeypot operator discovered another repository under the control of an attacker.
Fourth, the honeypot operator could measure the attacker’s reaction time. If it is very small it is likely that
the honeypot faced an automated attack. A larger delay among successive commands means that an attacker
needed more time to choose the next step. Within this time frame, an attacker could simply looked up the error
code in a public search engine or she could have interacted with other attackers to choose the next steps.
A naive idea would be to block all the programs installed by an attacker. However, following such an
approach, an attacker would immediately find out that she cannot execute her own programs and the observation
of a honeypot operator stops when a tool is downloaded. Therefore, the challenge that we addressed was to
frame this kind of interactions among a honeypot operator and an attacker in theoretical frameworks which is
exploited the honeypot to take the right decision aiming to maximize information retrieval from attackers. An
overview of the model of adaptive honeypots is shown in figure 5.1. In the context of high-interaction honeypots
the behaviors of attackers and the behaviors of the honeypots are defined in the next two sections. An attacker
has usually an attack goal and enters successive commands to reach this goal. This kind of behavior we define
as advances of an attacker. The purpose of this work is to elaborate adaptive honeypots that interfere with
an attacker advances and as consequence an attacker has to respond to the strategical actions of the honeypot.
An attacker can leave the honeypot, retry the executed command, select an alternative command, insult the
honeypot or leave the honeypot. As behaviors for the honeypot we defined four actions. The honeypot can
allow advances of an attacker, it can block the advance, substitute the command of an attacker or insult her.
5.1 Modeling Attacker Behavior
On high-interaction honeypots nearly arbitrary programs can be executed. Ramsbrock et al. [135] modeled an
attacker behavior on a high- interaction as state machine with seven generic states:
CheckHW Attackers check the hardware configuration of the compromised system in order to determine
whether it is worth to continue the attack or to stop it.
CheckSW Attackers check the current software on the honeypot in order to prepare it for further attacks.
Password Attackers often change the password of a stolen account aiming to lock out system administrators
and other attackers.
ChangeConf Attackers change the configuration of the system.
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Attacker Behavior
Advances
Command Sequences
Hierarchical Probabilistic Automaton
Responses
Retry
Alternative
Quit
Insult
Honeypot Behavior
Allow Program Execution
Block Program Execution
Substitute Program Execution
Insult Attacker
Figure 5.1: Overview of the Model Structure of Adaptive Honeypots
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Step Attacker Honypot Comment
0 SSH connect Attacker penetration
1 Returns shell Full access
2 id System identification
3 Execute id
4 uname System identification
5 Execute uname
6 ps aux System identification
7 Execute ps
8 wget URL0 Acquire tool
9 Execute wget
10 ./ssh − brute Misuse the system
11 Return error Strategical block
12 wget URL1 Additional tool
13 Execute wget
14 ./local-exploit
15 Execute local-exploit Make attacker happy
Table 5.1: Attack Scenario on a High-Interaction Honeypot
Download Attackers often acquire additional software in order to continue their attack.
Install Attackers often install malicious software on compromised machines.
Run Attackers run and operated their malicious programs on the stolen account.
This behavior gives a high-level overview of attacker behavior and is coarse grained. However, it enables
to abstract from individual attackers which is already a good starting point for modeling an adaptive honeypot
which objective is to be capable of interacting with a variety of attackers rather than with a particular class
of attackers. Therefore, an omnipresent attacker is modeled able to perform generic actions. However, in the
previously discussed attacker behaviors, the details on how attacker reach their goals are abstracted too. In
addition, it is difficult to automatically map observed system commands to these states. The semantic richness
of a full operating systems permits a nearly infinity of alternatives to reach a given state. Therefore, we aim to
elaborate a more generic model, where attackers enter sequences of strings as inputs on an adaptive honeypot.
The states for a hierarchical probabilistic automaton are derived from these inputs. Hence, attackers entering
inputs perform transition in this automaton. An attacker can advance in her attack by performing the next
transitions. However, if she is detoured from her attack she can respond. Therefore, we define two abstract
behaviors for an attacker: the advance operation and the response operation. We define that attackers do their
advance operations in a hierarchical probabilistic automaton and that they can select among four choices as
response when they have derived from their attack sequence.
5.1.1 Hierarchical Probabilistic Automaton
Once attackers have compromised a system, they start to enter sequences of commands. Usually, they start to
investigate the system, prepare the system and abuse the system [135]. In essence, they enter commands on
the system until they reach their goal. If they are not disturbed we define this behavior as advance operation.
We extended the model of Ramsbrock et al. [135] with an hierarchical probabilistic automaton in order that
it can be induced with observed program execution from attackers. Probabilistic automata are often used in
the field of pattern recognition and computational linguistics [170]. They are particularly interesting to add
probabilities to a given structure [170]. An attacker who is attacking a honeypot is such a structure. He or she
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can connect to a high-interaction honeypot and can execute programs. Downloads can be performed with tools
like wget, curl, ftp, archives can be extracted with programs like tar and gzip etc. These sequences of
program executions are then considered as transitions in an automaton. We define the states of the automaton
as the programs that can be executed on the honeypot. Moreover, three additional states are added. First,
the state custom describes valid programs on the honeypot that are installed by attackers. Second, the state
empty describes the behavior of the command line shell when an attacker entered an empty command and hit
the ENTER key on her keyboard. Third, the state insult is added because attackers sometimes enter invalid
commands that are either typographic errors or insults. Each program has some program arguments which
are passed as an array to the main function upon execution. If no command line arguments are explicitly
passed to the program, the first command line argument corresponds to the program name [104]. Moreover,
different programs may have the same command line arguments, differing only in semantic. Thus, a hierarchy
between programs and command line arguments is introduced. Each program is formalized as automaton
where each state represents a command line argument. The states in an automaton representing a program
are called macro states and each macro state contains micro states (i.e. the command line arguments). Some
transitions between programs or command line arguments are more likely than others. For instance, the program
wget is often executed previously to the program tar. Therefore, each transition can be modeled using a
transition probability. The same notation as proposed by Thollard et al. [170] is used. Let the tuple A =
(QA,Σ, δA, IA, FA, PA) be the automaton where:
• QA is a set of states
• Σ is the alphabet
• IA: QA → [0, 1] (initial state probabilities)
• δA ⊆ QA × Σ × QA (set of transitions)
• PA : δA → [0, 1] (transition probabilities)
• FA : QA → [0, 1] (final state probabilities)
The set QA contains the programs installed on the honeypot including an unknown state and the set of states
for a given program is denoted Q′A. Attackers penetrate the honeypot through the SSH server. Thus, the initial
probability1 for the state /usr/sbin/sshd is 1 and 0 for all the other states. Moreover the alphabet consists of
the commands executed by the attacker. An example of such a hierarchical probabilistic automaton is shown
in figure 5.2. An attacker connects to the honeypot via SSH and stays in the sshd state. Next he or she can
execute the program ps with the probability of 0.3, the program ls with the probability of 0.5 or the program
wget with a probability 0.2. After the execution of the program ps, the programs ls can be executed with a
probability of 0.8 and the program tar with a likelihood of 0.2. From the state ls and tar the attacker can
reach other states with the respective probabilities. For the sake of readability, the first command line argument
for each program and the command line arguments for the programs ls, wget and tar are omitted.
During the operation of a high-interaction honeypot executed programs can be observed and two questions
have to be answered
• Which program executions are related to an attacker and which ones to the system itself?
• What are the relationships among the program executions?
1The probability that an attacker owing credentials of the system is performing a login on the honeypot.
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Figure 5.2: Honeypot Hierarchical Probabilistic Automaton
~A1 =< sshd, bash, uname >
~A2 =< sshd, bash, ps >
~A3 =< sshd, bash, uname, wget >
Transition matrix
sshd bash uname ps wget
sshd 3
bash 2 1
uname 1
ps
wget
Figure 5.3: Recovering Transition Frequencies
Process Vectors
Transitions between programs are described by conditional probabilities, capturing the likelihood of one pro-
gram being executed after a previous one. Sequences of program executions from a deployed high-interaction
honeypot are used to determine these probabilities. Such a sequence of programs is considered as a process
vector which is observed from one attack and where each element is a program that is executed during an
attack. An attacker who executes the programs /bin/bash, /usr/bin/wget and /usr/bin/tar, generates
the process vector < / bin/bash , /usr/bin/wget , /usr/bin/tar >. An example of transition probabilities is
shown in figure 5.3. Three process vectors are shown ~A1..3. In the transition matrix each column and each
row corresponds to a state. The content of the cell contains the transition probability for the state written in
the column to the state representing a row. Each process vector starts with the state sshd. The first observed
program that is executed is bash. Hence, the transition sshd→ bash has been observed three times. The third
executed program of the process vectors ~A1 and ~A3 is the state uname and has been observed 2 times. The
transitions bash→ ps and the transition uname→ wget appeared only once. These numbers of transitions are
then normalized such that probabilities emerge. Unknown transitions are in a first step tackled with a smoothing
approach which described on page 71 resulting in a fully interconnected automaton. The created unobserved
transitions have low probabilities in order to not influence the later payoff computations. The fact of including
only the last command respects the Markov property defined in chapter 4 which is a requirement for the next
interaction model.
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Attacker Process Trees
In order to obtain the process vectors, the Linux kernel data structure, which resides on the honeypot and holds
the process tree information has to be inspected. Attackers usually execute programs, as soon as they manage to
compromise a honeypot. That in turn, triggers a clone2or sys execve system call which has to be monitored.
As multiple attackers can be concurrently connected to the honeypot, and also, as the system itself is using
sys execve and clone system calls, a distinction needs to be introduced. The system calls that are related to a
given attack can be identified as follows: In a Linux operating system each process has a process identifier (PID)
and a parent process identifier (PPID) [97]. An attack usually starts with a privilege separated process of the
SSH server [129], denoted p0. The process p0 then forks, resulting in a clone system call or directly executes
a program via the sys execve system call. It is considered that the process p0 executes a program and creates
another copy of the process, denoted p1. The parent process of p1 is thus p0 and the result of the execution
of a sequence of programs is a process tree of an attack which is a subtree of the Unix process tree on the
honeypot. A process tree is defined as a tree structure where each node can contain a process id, a timestamp3,
a program name or a command line argument resulting from a sys execve or clone system call. An edge links
two process identifiers with each other. This represents the parent child relationship. Furthermore, in a process
tree, each parent of a leaf represents a program name and each leaf represents command line argument (at least
the program name). Let T ci be a tree induced by clone and sys execve system calls. Thus, T ci is an ordered
pair (V, E) such that V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. V contains the tuples (pi, ti,mi, ci). In fact
a node consists of a process identifier (pi), a timestamp (ti), a program name (mi) or a command line argument
resulting from the execution of a sys execve or clone system call. An edge e ∈ E, denoted as xix j, links two
process identifiers with each other, representing the parent child relationship in a Unix process tree context.
Each clone or sys execvemessage contains the parent process identifier which enables to recover each edge.
Program names and command line arguments are extracted from the sys execve system call. Furthermore the
map δ : E → N links edges with time differences between successive nodes as it is defined in eq. 5.1.
nin j 7→ d
δ((pi, ti,mi, ci)︸         ︷︷         ︸
=ni
(p j, t j,m j, c j)︸          ︷︷          ︸
=n j
) = t j − ti (5.1)
One process tree is shown in figure 5.4. The privileged separated process of the SSH server has the process
identifier 4121 and is the root of the tree. Two clone system calls are made; one results in a process with
the process identifier 4127 and another one in the process identifier 4129. The process with the identifier
4127 is created after one second (δ(4121 4127) = 1) and the process with the identifier 4129 is created after 3
seconds. Then the process with the identifier 4127 executes a program called /bin/bash after one second and
the process with the identifier 4129 starts the program /bin/uname after 5 seconds. The program /bin/uname
is started with the argument -au and the command line arguments bash and uname represent the respective
program names.
Assembly of a Honeypot Hierarchical Probabilistic Automaton
We model the honeypot capabilities as a hierarchical probabilistic automaton where each state represents a
program. Each state is furthermore an automaton on its own, where combinations of command line arguments
build the states of the sub-automaton.
Process trees related to attacks are extracted from a live high-interaction honeypot. A process tree can be
composed of PID nodes, nodes containing the programs that were executed and nodes modeling command line
arguments. Due to the fact that the process identifiers change from one attack to another, we are interested
2The traditional term for creating a new process is called fork [104]. However, we use the term clone as it is used in the Linux
kernel’s source code.
3A timestamp includes the seconds elapsed since the Unix epoch (First January 1970) and the milliseconds concatenated with the
number of CPU instructions queried by the instruction RDTSC.
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Figure 5.4: Process Tree
in transforming these process trees to process vectors which describe the sequences of programs that were
executed during an attack. H is the set of paths from the root x0 to a leaf xk and such path is is denoted
x0x1x1x2 . . . xk−1xk. The map λ : H → N describes the sum of the edge weights of the paths as shown in eq.
5.2. In the example sketched in figure 5.4, λ of the path 4121 4127 /bin/bash becomes 2 and λ of the path 4121
4129 /bin/uname becomes 8.
λ(x0 . . . xixi+1 . . . xk) =
∑
(xi xi+1,d)∈δ
d (5.2)
The order of program execution is important. A good example would be a tool that is first downloaded from
a remote location and then extracted from an archive and finally executed. The program names represent the
macro states of the hierarchical probabilistic automaton and are included in the set QA. To recover the order
we use the timestamps in the process trees. This can be described by a map ¯λ : H → QA × N shown in eq. 5.3
which associates programs with their execution order.
(x0x1 . . . xk−1xk︸            ︷︷            ︸
=z
) 7→ (xk−1, λ(z)) (5.3)
A process vector, denoted as −→v , represents the program sequence executed by an attacker and is defined in
eq. 5.4 (d denotes the position in the vector). A process vector has a minimal length of 1 and always starts with
the program /usr/sbin/sshd. In order to avoid program position conflicts in a process vector, the unique
number of executed CPU cycles needs to be included in the time stamp. In the example shown in figure 5.4
the process vector −→v is < /bin/bash, /bin/uname > because the program /bin/bash was executed before the
program /bin/uname.
∀(x, d) ∈ ¯λ(H),−→v d = x (5.4)
Figure 5.5 illustrate an example how process vectors are recovered from process trees. At the top of the
figure is shown a duplicated process tree. On the left side, the left branch is selected. The branch starts with
the state sshd and ends with the state bash. The sum of the edges (eq. 5.2) for this branch is 2. According
to eq. 5.3 bash is at position two of the generated process vector. The sum of the edges of the right branch is
5. This means that the program uname is at position 5 of the process vector. The resulting process vector is <
sshd, bash, uname >.
Each attacker generates a process tree that is converted to a process vector. All these vectors are then
inserted in a two dimensional matrix transition called transition matrix shown in figure 5.3. The observed
programs are used as labels for the columns and rows respectively. Each cell contains the frequency of how
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Figure 5.5: Process Vectors Recovery
often a pair of programs was observed. The transition probability PA is computed from the transition matrix.
Each cell is divided by the sum of the row. The automaton containing the macro states is created from the
transition matrix. In figure 5.2, each state is represented by a rectangle and the edges are labeled with the
transition probability. For instance, a transition from the macro state sshd can be done to the macro state ls
with a probability of 0.5. Another transition can then be done to the macro state ps. The program ps can
operated in different modes by accepting different command line arguments. In this example the states denoted
by ”-x” and ”-a” are micro states, presented with rounded rectangles, and belong to the automaton ps.
First, the hierarchical probabilistic automaton may be incomplete because it is constructed from honeypot
observations. Therefore, we integrate a state in the automaton which is called ”unknown”. Second, rare tran-
sitions may be unobserved. To counteract this phenomenon we smooth the probabilities that we derived from
honeypot observations, where the smoothing factor is denoted . In this case each probability > 0 is multiplied
by (1 − ) and from a given state, transitions are created to all other remaining states. If we assume that our
automaton has N states and the number of transitions for a given state is n, then N − n transitions are created
having the probability N−n . The automaton has now N
2 transitions and is able to capture all possible transitions.
The recovered transition frequencies shown in figure 5.3 are smoothed in table 5.2. Attackers executed three
times bash immediately after the SSH login. This program execution is done automatically when an attacker
logs in the system instead of directly executing remote commands. Hence, the transitions probability from the
state sshd to the state bash is one. The SSH service also permits to directly execute commands on the remote
system. For instance, an administrator can execute one her local machine the command ssh user@host tar
-cO /home > local backup.tar. In this case no shell is opened on the remote host. The program tar is
remotely executed and the standard output, retrieved on the local machine and is redirected to a file denoted
local backup.tar. This technique has the advantage that no temporary archive needs to be created on the
remote server which is not always possible to disk constraints. Obviously, arbitrary commands like this can
be remotely executed. The smoothing of the probabilities takes these scenarios into account. A predefined
constant  is removed from the transition sshd to bash and equally distributed for the other transitions. Each
transition from sshd to the other states than bash gets then 5−1 .
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sshd bash uname ps wget
sshd 4 1 (1 − ) 4 4 4
bash 3

3
2(1−)
3
(1−)
3

3
uname 4

4

4

4 1 (1 − )
ps 4 1(1 − ) 4 4 4
wget 4

4 1(1 − ) 4 4
Table 5.2: Smoothed Transition Probabilities
Automaton Properties
The exit state is an absorbing state. When attackers are in this state they have left the honeypot. Due to
the fact, that all attackers penetrate the system through the sshd state, all attacks pass through the same node.
Hence, it can be deduced that this graph modeling the automaton cannot have distinct partitions. An attacker
can execute a command multiple times, resulting in a loop in the automaton. Due to common transitions among
different attackers, the same state can lead towards several other states.
5.1.2 Attacker Responses
Four actions are defined for an attacker when they do not reach their estimated macro state:
Retry of a command If executing a command fails, attackers may try executing it again. A failure might occur
due to a syntax error or a timeout during the program execution. For instance, an attacker may download
a file and a network timeout may occur. An attacker may choose another URL and another repository
might be disclosed. The execution of a program can also produce an undesired effect if a wrong command
line argument has been used. The program will then be executed again, with a different command line
argument resulting in a different micro state but remaining in the same macro state.
Select an alternative solution The execution of a program may fail. Some attackers try to debug the problem
on the honeypot. They can check the configuration file of the program or run an inspection tool like
strace on the program. They also might try to download another program or to download the source
code of the program in order to compile it on the honeypot. No matter which path they choose, their
behavior can be classified in a category describing the actions of choosing an alternative solution so that
they can reach their goal.
Insult An attacker could enter an unknown command in the terminal that is either an insult or a typographic
error. As response to an insult in the attacker’s terminal she could insult the honeypot or the other
attackers.
Quit Some attackers check the capabilities of the honeypot and if they suspect a trap or a worthless system,
then they will leave.
5.2 Honeypot Behaviors
An adaptive honeypot is capable of adapting to attackers such that it can change its behavior such that it
interferes with an attackers advances. The adaptation is done at the level of executing programs on the honeypot
in kernel space. For each program execution of an attacker, an adaptive honeypot can take four different actions:
allow If an adaptive honeypot allows the execution of a program, it behaves like a regular high-interaction
honeypot, because it does not interfere with the execution flow.
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block An adaptive honeypot can also strategically block the execution of a program, encouraging the attacker
to retry the command, to debug the process or to choose a different command. For instance, an attacker
installed a buggy ssh brute force scanner. If an attacker launches the tool with a given command line
switch s1 and if the adaptive honeypot decides to simulate a segmentation fault, the attacker might believe
that a feature of the tool is not working. The attacker may then choose another feature of the tool by
choosing the command line s2. An alternative scenario is where an attacker downloads an additional tool
which may reveal another malicious software repository.
substitute An adaptive honeypot is also capable to substitute a command. Attackers often download programs
for there malicious activities. Examples are IRC bouncing tools, ssh brute force scanners, phishing server
software, bots or rootkits. Let’s assume an attacker downloaded an IRC bouncing tool. If an adaptive
honeypot substitutes this tool with an with an SSH brute force scanner, the attacker might believe that
he downloaded the wrong tool and downloads another IRC bouncing tool and he may disclose another
malicious code repository.
insult An adaptive honeypot is also capable to insult an attacker. At the beginning of our early development
of an adaptive honeypot it was questionable whether insults make sense. At first glance we believed that
an attacker will immediately leave when an insult is displayed in his terminal. However, on a standard
high-interaction honeypot based on a Linux operating system, connected users can communicate with
each other using the command wall. Rudy administrators could also change error messages including
insults. For instance the command sudo can be configured to display arbitrary messages. Attackers also
sometimes do not know all possible behaviors about the used malicious programs. Nevertheless, we
believe that an insult in the attacker’s terminal induces a surprise effect for the attacker. When an attacker
responds with an insult, a honeypot operator has revealed two important pieces of information. First it is
highly probable that this attack was performed rather by a human being than an automated script. In this
case the insult of an adaptive honeypot served as Reverse Turing test aiming to differentiate humans from
machines [30]. Second, the attacker’s origin can be identified. For instance, when adaptive honeypot
is attacked from a German IP address and the attacker is swearing in Romanian it might be probable
that this attacker compromised a German machine serving as rebound for further attacks and connection
laundering.
5.3 Summary
This chapter has described the generic attacker behavior first set out in [181]. The context in which attackers
penetrate a SSH server is described. Once attackers have obtained a command line shell, they enter commands
in order to reach their attack goal. We define this kind of behavior as the advancing operation of an attacker.
Having entered the system, attackers execute sequences of inputs. Each input usually corresponds to a command
to execute a program on the system. We consider a honeypot to be a collection of programs and represent it with
a hierarchical probabilistic automaton. A macro state in this automaton corresponds to an installed program.
Each program is also an automaton, where each state corresponds to a command line argument. However,
not all inputs can be associated with the execution of system commands: attackers often install programs for
their own use. Attackers sometimes make typographical errors or type insults on the terminal. We therefore,
added three special states denoted insult, custom and empty to the automaton in order to address such inputs.
Inputs are classified into four types. Attackers can enter a valid command that corresponds to a system program
installed during the setup of the honeypot. If the command is related to valid program that is not a system
program, the attacker is executing a customized program. Attackers may also enter invalid commands. An
invalid command is either a profanity or a typographic error. We describe a methodology for collecting these
inputs on a high-interaction honeypot.
In the operating system kernel running the honeypot, process trees are extracted and are transformed into
process vectors. In addition, a distinction is made between processes related to the system itself and those re-
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lated to individual attackers. A process vector corresponds to a sequence of inputs from an attacker. We focused
on Linux like operating systems because their source code is often freely available. However, the same infor-
mation can be collected in a proprietary Microsoft operation system by using appropriate API functions [22]
resulting in a nearly identical process tree structure. We formally describe how process trees can transformed
into process vectors. An example showed that an adaptive honeypot interferes strategically with the execution
of attackers’ commands related to attackers in order to capture more information from them. An adaptive hon-
eypot can allow program execution in which case it behaves like a normal high-interaction honeypot. It can
also strategically block the execution of a program, substitute the program or insult the attackers, with the aim
of revealing more information about them. In response to these actions an attacker can retry a command, select
an alternative, type an insult or leave the honeypot. In the next chapter the interactions between attackers and
the honeypots are modeled with three formal frameworks.
Chapter 6
Learning in Honeypot Games
We argue in this chapter that a new paradigm of adaptive honeypots can provide more intelligence than the
established architectures. The major challenge was to define the context and automatically learn the best strate-
gies for each contextual state. The organization of this chapter is shown in figure 6.1. The interactions with
attackers are modeled with three formal frameworks and learning is done in these frameworks accordingly. The
choice of learning a behavior is mainly due to the high algorithmic complexity required by these framework
or unknown parameters which can be handled with learning approaches. The interactions between an adaptive
honeypot and attackers are first modeled with game theory. We define games between an adaptive honeypot
and an omnipresent attacker where each player has an own interest. For instance, an attacker want to reach her
attack goal and a honeypot operator wants to reveal information from the attacker. In addition we assume no
co-operation between attackers and adaptive honeypots. In these games payoffs for each player are computed
with Monte Carlo simulations. These payoffs are then used to compute the optimal strategies for each player.
A minor drawback of such an approach is that the payoffs have to be computed off-line and the payoffs may
be out dated for a future operation. In a second step, we model an adaptive honeypot as an agent who is op-
timizing a reward signal. These kinds of interactions are formally modeled as a Markov Decision Processes.
This approach enables us to abstract from the transition probabilities, previously learned in an off-line manner,
but ignores the competitive nature off the players. In addition, a learning approach is used to approximate the
optimal behavior because in practice not all of the parameters of the model are known in advance. In a third
step, we model the interactions between attackers and the honeypot as a stochastic game because it permits to
abstract from the attacker’s transitions and in the meantime to include the competitive nature between attackers
and the honeypot. As a learning approach, fast concurrent learning was selected due to its low algorithmic
complexity which permits an implementation of an on-line adaptive honeypot.
Modeling interactions with attackers
Game theory
Markov decision process
Stochastic games
Interacting with attackers
General sum game
Reinforcement learning
Fast concurrent learning
Figure 6.1: Learning in Games - Structure
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6.1 Game Theory and High-Interaction Honeypots
In information security, game theory became applied [98], [144], [108] because it permits to model interactions
among competitive players. However, neither game has been defined at system level directly facing attack-
ers resulting in autonomous systems capable of interacting with attackers. Attackers penetrate the honeypot,
modeled with a hierarchical probabilistic automaton, and enter commands which results into transitions in the
automaton. Each command is associated with a reward or a cost. Similarly to Grossklags et al. [80] we assume
that attackers want to achieve their goal as fast as possible and want to use as less effort as possible to reach
their attack goal. Hence, they want to minimize the number of interactions with the honeypot. The honeypot
aims to maximize the number of interactions or to learn as much as possible from attackers or to distract them
from real assets as long as possible. Similarly to Lye et al. [98], we consider attackers as one player because
we are not interested to model individual attackers but an omnipresent attacker1. In this section we define two
possible actions for the honeypot and three different actions for an attacker. We determine Nash equilibria [64],
providing the optimal strategies for both the attacker and the honeypot.
We reuse the definitions and notations proposed by Amy Greenwald [64] in order to formally describe our
games between attackers and the honeypot.
Let a 3-tuple Γ = (N, (Ai,Ri)1≤i≤n) be the game between the honeypot and the attacker, where
• N is a set of n players
• Ai is a finite strategy set (ai ∈ An)
• Ri : A → R is a payoff function, where A = A1 × · · · × An
The game between the attacker and the honeypot has two players. Thus, N = {honeypot, attacker}. The
honeypot can block sys execve system calls with different probabilities. The set Ah corresponds to the set of
blocking probabilities the honeypot can choose. An attacker can choose to retry a command, to search for an al-
ternative command or to leave. We define an attacker’s strategy with a 3-tuple (Pr(Retry),Pr(Alternative),Pr(Quit))
and the set Aa contains all these strategies. The notation Pr(x) denotes the probability that a player is perform-
ing the action x described in chapter 5. The relation 6.1 holds for the attacker strategies. One purpose of game
theory is to compute the optimal strategy profiles for the players which results in the computation of Nash
Equilibrium. A Nash Equilibrium in the context of honeypot games means that neither the honeypot nor the
attacker can increase their expected payoffs assuming that neither player does not changes his strategy during
the game.
Pr(Quit) + Pr(Retry) + Pr(Alternative) = 1 (6.1)
Examples of attackers and honeypot strategies are depicted in figure 6.2. We observe that an attacker tries
to invoke the command nmap (a popular network scanner). The honeypot might allow its execution (with
the probability 1 − Pr(Block)) and in this case the attacker continues and executes the program wget (with a
probability of 0.95). If the tool nmap is not allowed by the honeypot, the attacker can decide to either quit (with
a probability of Pr(Quit)) or to retry the execution of nmap or to execute another command (for instance uname
- with a probability of 0.3). The execution of nmap was blocked and its probability was equally distributed
among the transitions to the states wget and uname. Probabilities of attackers choosing the next command
to be executed can be estimated from an operational high-interaction honeypot. Probabilities used by the
honeypot to block the execution of a command is a configuration setting and reflects the strategy played by the
honeypot. Similarly, the probabilities used by the attacker to either quit the session, or retry a command (and
consequently to choose another command) compose the strategy played by the attacker. The main question
is related to what are the optimal settings for both the honeypot (Pr(Block)) as well as the attacker (Pr(Quit),
Pr(Retry),Pr(Alternative)).
1Detailed description is shown on page 66.
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Figure 6.2: Honeypot Game
6.1.1 Defining Payoffs
Respectively to attacker and honeypot strategies, two honeypot games are proposed. The games are different
with respect to the payoff computation.
Number of Transitions Similarly to Grossklags et al. [80], we assume that attackers are rational and that they
want to achieve their goal as fast as possible. Thus, an attacker tries to minimize the number of transitions
in the hierarchical probabilistic automaton. The honeypot tries to learn as much as possible from the
attacker. Information, that is potentially useful for the honeypot will include tools used by attackers
as well as their download sources. Hence, the honeypot tries to maximize the number of transitions
performed by an attacker. The payoff for the honeypot Rth returns the number of transitions performed
by an attacker. The more transitions an attacker does, the better it is for the honeypot. Attackers try to
minimize their transitions and their payoff function, denoted Rth returns −1 multiplied by the number of
transitions. The less transitions attackers do, the less they are punished in terms of payoff. This game
seems unfair at first glance regarding attackers. If we assume that attackers do not want to be discovered
while they are performing their attack, they have already lost because they connected to a monitored
honeypot instead to real assets. The only chance they have is to divulge as little information as possible.
Therefore, they try to minimize the number of transitions while still advancing in the attack.
Path Probability Payoff The payoff computations purely based on the state transitions ignores the fact whether
attackers reached their goal or not. Moreover, the payoff should take into account how likely a path is
regarding observations from a deployed honeypot. We are looking for a payoff computation that rewards
the honeypot for blocking and that penalizes the attacker when being blocked.
The payoff for the honeypot is shown in definition 6.2 and the payoff for the attacker is presented in defini-
tion 6.3.
Rpa =
Pr(path)
Pr∗(path) (6.2)
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Rph = 1 −
Pr(path)
Pr∗(path) (6.3)
The more the attacker path probability (Pr(path)) gets closer to the most probable path probability (Pr∗(path)),
the payoff for the attacker (Rpa) is likely to converge to 1. That is, if the attacker follows the most probable path,
then the payoff for the attacker results in 1. In this case, the payoff of the honeypot (Rph ) gets close to 0 which
is the minimum payoff for the honeypot. If the path of the attacker is diverted due to blocked programs, the
path probability chosen by the attacker diverges from the most probable path probability and gets lower than
the most probable path probability. Hence, the payoff gets minimized for the attacker and maximized for the
honeypot.
6.1.2 Computing Payoffs with Simulations
In order to compute the payoff values for all possible combination of strategies, a Monte Carlo simulation
will be used. We have developed a simulator that uses bootstrap data obtained from an operational honeypot
deployed over a period of 3 months. Due to computation and deployment constraints, simulations were neces-
sary since, performing real life experiments for all possible behaviors would require 2684 different honeypots
setups.
Attackers as well as the honeypot select their strategies according to a given probability. These probabil-
ities are fixed and an attack is simulated. The simulation provides the number of transitions an attacker did,
the optimal path probability, the path probability for the attacker, the fact that the attacker left and the fact that
the maximum number of transitions was reached. The main simulator algorithm is presented in algorithm 1.
In order to make the pseudo code more readable the probability Pr(block) is denoted Pblock, the probability
Pr(quit) is denoted Pquit, the probability Pr(retry) is denoted Pretry and the probability Pr(alternative) is de-
noted Palternative . The variable src specifies the initial state and the variable dst stands for the destination state
in the hierarchical probabilistic automaton. Hence, the final state probability (FA), required by the probabilistic
automaton is 1 for the state dst and 0 for all the other states. During a simulation, the transitions performed
by an attacker are recorded. The states, that an attacker passed through are kept in a list denoted steps. When
the simulation starts, the attacker enters the initial state shown in line 2. She is assumed to choose the next
transitions on the most probable path. Due to the fact that the attacker was not blocked, she follows the same
path. An attacker has a fixed goal. If this goal is reached, the simulation ends. Moreover, the number of
transitions during a simulation is recorded and if this number exceeds a defined threshold the simulation ends.
The rationale behind this is to avoid endless transitions. The attacker can retry a command or compute the next
state and the step is recorded (line 15). The honeypot decides to block this step or to allow this step accord-
ing the probability Pr(Block). The attacker then decides whether to quit or continue the game according the
probability Pr(quit) (line 17). If the attacker quits, the simulation ends. If the attacker decides to choose an
alternative command, the hierarchical probabilistic automaton is modified due to implementation issues. The
probability for the blocked transition is set to 0 and the probability for this transition is equally distributed for
all outgoing transitions. Due to the fact that an attacker always computes the most probable path, the same path
could not be selected due to the 0 probability transition. Of course this effect is undone for the next simulation
round by loading the initial automaton. If the attacker decides to retry a command the state alternative is set to
False, the loop ends and the next round starts. The decision to trigger an event is a function that takes as input
a probability pi then generates a random number x (0 ≤ x ≤ 1) according a uniform distribution. If x is below
pi then the value true is returned, false is returned otherwise.
The recovered payoffs enable to compute Nash Equilibria aiming to identify the best strategies profiles
for each player. In a profile the honeypot can allow or block a program execution of an attacker according
to a given probability. Hence, the action set of the honeypot is a set of tuples describing a blocking and
allowing probabilities. As response an attacker can retry the program execution, look for an alternative solu-
tion or leave the honeypot according a probability. Therefore, the action set of an attacker contains 3-tuples
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Algorithm 1 High-Interaction Honeypot Simulator
1: procedure Simulate(src, dst, Pblock , Pquit, Pretry, Palternative)
2: steps ← [ src ]
3: Alternative ← True
4: while src , dst do
5: LoadAutomaton()
6: if currentRound > maxRound then
7: maxRoundReached ← True
8: return
9: end if
10: currentRound ← currentRound + 1
11: if alternative then
12: nextS tate ← GetNextS tate(src, dst)
13: alternative ← False
14: end if
15: steps.add(nextState)
16: if TriggerEvent(Pblock ) then
17: if TriggerEvent(Pquit) then
18: quit ← True
19: return
20: end if
21: if TriggerEvent(Palternative ) then
22: alternative ← True
23: AdjustWeight(src, dst)
24: else
25: alternative ← False
26: end if
27: else
28: src ← nextS tate
29: end if
30: end while
31: end procedure
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(Pr(Retry), Pr(Alternative), Pr(quit)). The payoffs were computed via simulation. Among, the honeypot’s and
attacker’s actions, strategy profiles can be generated which are combinations of all actions.
6.1.3 Leveraging Optimal Strategy Profiles
The key question is now which blocking probability leads to the highest expected payoff. After having re-
covered numerical values for the payoffs for each player, we determine Nash equilibria with state of the art
algorithms. We have defined two games: a zero-sum game and a general sum game. In the zero sum game
with the payoffs Rth and R
t
a, the honeypot’s loss is the attacker’s gain. While using the payoffs R
p
h and R
p
a the
magnitude of the honeypot’s gain is different than those from the attacker and we have a general sum game.
As discussed in section 4.1, the algorithmic complexity is not entirely known for the determination of Nash
equilibria. We address this problem with an experimental approach presented in section 8.3. Nash equilibria
are divided into two categories: pure equilibria and mixed equilibria. The simpler case is a pure equilibrium.
This means that a player should always select a given strategy, e.g. block the execution of programs with a
probability β0. However, in case of a mixed equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium points towards a probability
of choosing a given strategy. For instance, the honeypot should use a blocking probability of β0 according
a probability of α0. The blocking probability β0 is a given strategy of the honeypot that has been defined in
advance. The probability α0 results from the Nash equilibrium computation. This probability can be either 1
for a pure equilibrium or between 0 and 1 for a mixed equilibrium.
The reason for defining strategy sets with probabilities is arguable. One could imagine to define the strategy
set for the honeypot with two elements, namely allow or block the execution of programs instead of defining
discrete blocking probabilities. A mixed Nash equilibrium would result into a probability of allowing or block-
ing the execution of programs. The reason for using probability sets is that there is an uncertainty for attackers
and on the observed transition probabilities. For instance, when the honeypot blocks the command wget, some
attackers give up because they do not see a way to acquire their customized tools; other attackers simply retry
the command and clever attackers seek an alternative program for getting their tool. Therefore, we compose a
strategy profile as set of tuples containing probabilities of performing various actions. Furthermore, the risk of
taking a bad decision using fixed actions is higher than choosing blocking probabilities.
In order to have a more precise idea about the impact of erroneous transition probabilities, a quantal equi-
librium can be computed as defined in [61]. The idea is that players are assumed to make errors and, in our
case the payoffs may be faulty due to uncertain transition probabilities. Quantal response equilibrium analysis
describes a function taking as input payoffs and a rationality parameter and outputting the Nash equilibrium for
this setting. By iterating this function and by having similar consecutive Nash equilibria the selected strategy is
robust against noisy payoffs (independent of the rationality parameter). However, when using high-interaction
honeypots the quantal equilibria shows that the Nash equilibria are not perfectly robust against errors. The pay-
offs and transition probabilities may also change over time. In order to address these issues, the payoffs and the
transition probabilities need to be periodically reestimated. Therefore we aim to abstract from this problem in
the next section by choosing an approach to handle partially unknown parameters like these uncertain transition
probabilities and payoffs.
6.2 Learning Honeypots Operated by Reinforcement Learning
Attackers who are executing commands on the honeypot are formally modeled with transitions in an hierarchi-
cal probabilistic automaton as it is defined in chapter 5. An adaptive honeypot can interfere with the attackers’
actions by blocking the execution of strategical important programs. Transitions in the automaton are simu-
lated and payoffs are derived. These payoffs are then used to compute the optimal strategy profiles founded
with game theory. It is assumed that the attacker wants to stay on the path with the highest probability which
is also included in a reward model. However, in practice it is difficult to get meaningful transition probabili-
ties. A straightforward approach is to recover them from traces of a deployed high-interaction honeypot as it
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is shown in chapter 8. However, there are no guarantees whether these probabilities are stationary. Another
phenomenon is the diversity of attackers who are attacking the honeypot. Firstly, some attacks are fully auto-
mated. Secondly, attacks are performed by script kiddies, which are novice attackers, who do not understand
all the details. Thirdly, some attackers are more experienced and understand all the details. All these kinds
of attackers are considered as one collective player. A first step towards these uncertainties is the introduction
of probabilities in the actions of each player. For instance, the probability 0.3 to block an attacker’s program
means that 30 program executions out of 100 should be blocked. Assuming, that a well balanced set of traces is
present to bootstrap the automaton, the honeypot takes the right decisions on average. However, the uncertainty
on the transition probabilities introduce erroneous payoffs for both players. This problem is tackled with a
quantal response equilibrium. In this case a parameter λ is introduced which is the inverse of errors introduced
on the payoffs. The parameter λ is echeloned in each quantal response equilibrium analysis.
The results of this analysis show how robust the Nash equilibria are facing faulty payoffs. In this section,
a model is proposed to abstract from these uncertainties and to extract more information of an attacker rather
than keeping him busy. This section describes an adaptive honeypot, denoted Heliza which allows information
retrieval from attackers to be optimized by leveraging reinforcement learning algorithms.
According to Sutton [161], reinforcement learning is an automated method for goal-directed learning and
decision making that works to maximize a numerical reward. An agent must discover which actions provide the
most reward by trying them out. Rewards can be positive or negative and an agent by default tries to optimize
its reward in the long run. A general overview of reinforcement learning is presented in [161] and is shown in
figure 6.3. An agent operates in a specific environment and can perform various actions (at) at discrete time
steps, denoted by the variable t. Each action results in a state change st and a reward is given for the selected
action (rt). A classical example is an agent that needs to find the exit of a maze. The agent can move north,
south, east and west. Each position in the maze results in a distinct state. When the agent bumps to the wall
or wants to make an impossible transition, the agent is punished. When the agent makes a valid movement no
reward is given. However, if the agent finds the exit of the maze, it gets a positive reward.
Agent
Environment
action
at
reward
rt
state
st
Figure 6.3: Reinforcement Learning Overview
In this section we consider an adaptive honeypot denoted Heliza which is dedicated to be attacked, and
behaves like a learning agent which is continuously under attack. As described in chapter 5 attackers want to
execute commands. Heliza has to take decisions as to allow or block these commands. Heliza is also able to
forge outputs or insult an attacker. Following a decision, an attacker can enter another command, which results
into a state change. Each state change is also linked with a reward. Attackers are constantly attacking Heliza
resulting in sequence of inputs including program executions, typographic errors and insults.
6.2.1 Environment
Attackers compromising the system are modeled as its environment. The behavior of attackers is defined in
chapter 5. They penetrate the system via SSH and provide input strings that are usually commands. For
instance, they may inspect the system and then try to make it ready for their malicious purpose. A typical
attack sequence is for instance sshd → uname → wget → tar → custom. Attackers may also enter empty
commands, typographic errors or insults. As described in chapter 5 attackers enter sequences of strings denoted
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i0i1i2 . . . in where in ∈ S ∗. The underlying finite state space is S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} is similar to the hierarchical
probabilistic automaton presented in section 5. An input in is a system command if and only if it belongs to the
set L = {s1, s2, s3, . . . , sn} which contains all bash commands [111] including system programs installed during
the setup of the system. In addition we add three special states. S = L
⋃{insult, custom, empty}. A transition to
the empty state is made when an attacker hits the ENTER key on the system. Attackers sometimes do this to test
whether the remote connection is still working. Attackers often install customized tools, which we designate
the set C, like SSH brute force scanners, rootkits, local root exploits or phishing server software. Hence,
C ⊆ S ∗. This means that all valid programs on the honeypot not previously known are installed by attackers.
After having successfully transferred them to the honeypot, they are valid programs on the honeypot and can
be executed. Each input that is neither a program nor an ENTER keystroke typed by an attacker is considered
to be an insult. Hence, the set of insults is I = S ∗ − L − {empty} − C. When an attacker wants to execute a
custom installed program, a transition to the custom state is made. We define a relation z1 ⊆ C × {custom}. A
string that is entered by an attacker and that is neither a program nor an ENTER keystroke is mapped into the
state called insult, which is formally defined by the mapping z2 ⊆ I × {insult}.
6.2.2 Honeypot Actions
The added value of honeypots lies in their ability to learn from attackers or to reveal information about them.
Heliza is adaptive and capable of taking actions in response to attacker actions. Heliza aims to collect attacker
tools and to detect whether the attack is automated or manually performed. Heliza can also be tuned to keep
attacker busy. Four actions a1...4 ∈ A are possible for Heliza: It can behave like a standard high-interaction
honeypot by allowing (a1) command executions. When Heliza decides to block (a2) a command entered by
an attacker, it is not executed, but an error code is returned. Heliza can also substitute (a3) commands. For
instance, when the command w is executed, aiming to see how many users are logged in, Heliza lies and shows
a previously generated content. Another, example is where an attacker executes the tool wgetwith the intention
of downloading a customized tool. In this case, Heliza could lie and display a ”page not found” error, which
may lead an attacker to reveal another malicious repository. An alternative possibility is to swap a few bytes
in the downloaded payload. Provos et al. [132] showed that the lifetime of malicious code repositories can be
very small (1 hour) and if an attacker is connecting to such a site we assume that it is not suspicious if we return
a ”page not found” error. Heliza can also insult (a4) attackers. This action mainly serves as Reverse Turing
Test [30]. The purpose of such a test is to discover whether an action is being performed by a human being or
an automated tool. The insult decision leads to a display of an insult in the terminal of an attacker. An attacker
can respond with an insult. By doing so, it is highly likely that the attacker is a human being. Suppose that an
attacker has downloaded a customized tool and wants to execute it. Heliza then replies: Is this all what
you want to do? Some attackers immediately leave when they see a message like this. Obviously, in this
case we cannot determine whether this attacker is a human or not. However, some attackers get overwhelmed
by emotion and type insults on the terminal. In this case, Heliza can discover that the attacker is a human and
can sometimes determine the native language of the attacker. Some attacks are automated and their reaction to
insults depends on the capabilities of the script. Some scripts check error codes and the output of the executed
command and take appropriate actions. Other scripts have no error handling and just continue the attack.
6.2.3 Rewards
In the reinforcement learning domain, a learning agent tries to optimize a reward signal. Heliza can use two
reward functions depending on the desired behaviors.
Collecting Attacker Related Information
Alata et al. [3] described that attackers often install customized tools on high-interaction honeypots designed
for their malicious purpose. Hence, the goal of our reward function is to collect as many attacker tools as
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t it st action reward
0 sshd sshd allow 0
1 ssudo insult allow 18
2 sudo sudo block 0
3 wget wget substitute 0
4 wget wget allow 0
5 ./exploit custom insult 1
6 I am ... insult insult 47145
Table 6.1: Sample Attacker Session
possible. The more we are interested to discern the linguistic features of an attacker. However, the main focus
is on customized tools installed by an attacker. The reward function with this purpose is defined in eq. 6.4 where
i is the input string used by an attacker. Each input i of an attacker sequence of strings i0i1 . . . in is mapped with
the states in the state space as it is described in section 6.2.1 si ∈ S . The normalized Levenshtein distance [62]
is denoted ld and the action taken by Heliza is denoted a j. The merged set of custom commands and system
commands is Y = C⋃ L. If an attacker does a transition to a customized tool, Heliza gets the highest reward
(1) and if an attacker executes a system related command the reward 0 is distributed. However, if an insult is
entered, the Levenshtein distance between this string and all other programs (x) is computed and the minimal
normalized distance is returned as reward.
rt(si, a j) =

1 if i ∈ C
min
x∈Y
(ld(i, x)) if i ∈ I
0 otherwise
(6.4)
If the attacker just made a typographic error, the minimum normalized Levenshtein distance is low. Not
much information about the attacker has been revealed except it is highly probable that this attacker is a human
being. However, if the distance is close to 1, an attacker has entered a completely unknown input, which may
be valuable for Heliza. The reason for normalizing the Levenshtein distance between 0 and 1, is that Heliza
should focus on collecting tools than rather collecting attacker insults. The highest reward is still granted when
a transition to a customized tool is made.
An example of an attacker session is presented in table 6.1 where the variable t represents discrete time
steps. The column labeled with it shows the input provided by an attacker which is mapped to a state st in the
state space. For a given transition made by an attacker, Heliza can take an action and get a reward. In this
example, an attacker connected to the honeypot at time 0 and wants to get to the sshd state. Heliza allows this
transition and gets a reward of 0. The attacker then wants to execute the command ssudo, which is classified as
an insult. However, the attacker simply made a typographic error. For this simplified example, the Levenshtein
distances are computed between the input ssudo and all the installed programs {sshd, sudo, wget}. The
resulting set of Levenshtein distances is {1, 2, 5}. The minimal Levenshtein distance is 1, which means that
only one character needs to be edited to get to the string sudo. Hence, the normalized Levenshtein distance
becomes 18 . In step 2, the attacker notices the typographic error and enters the correct command. This time,
Heliza blocks the command. The attacker decides in step 3 to download a local root exploit. Heliza decides to
return a forged output stating that the requested page was not found. The attacker then selects another malicious
repository and this download is allowed. The attacker wants to execute the local root exploit. A transition to the
state custom is made because the program was not known during the honeypot setup. The reward 1 is returned
because Heliza has collected a customized tool from an attacker. Heliza decides to print the text Are you
stupid enough to execute this crappy tool.... For the attacker this is usually a surprise, because
she has to determine how this text emerged in her terminal. Is it simply an output of a compromised tool or
coming someone else who is monitoring her? This could either be another attacker or a system administrator.
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Sometimes, an attacker is overwhelmed by emotion in such a stress situation and types I am not stupid
dude, it is time for revenge .... This time, the normalized Levenshtein distance becomes 47145 which
rewards the honeypot of having revealed an entire sentence from the attacker.
Keeping Attackers Busy
Cohen et al. [31] already discussed techniques aiming at increasing an attacker’s workload. Thus, a straight-
forward reward is to take into account the delay between two successive commands expressed in seconds.
A higher delay means a longer reaction time of the attacker in handling partial attack failures. We cannot
determine what the attacker was doing in this reaction time. It could be that the attacker was looking up a
solution in available information sources or she was busy with something else. Nevertheless, the delay between
two successive commands is measurable for the honeypot. Hence, we define a function δ : S × S × A×N→ R.
The reward function defined in eq. 6.5 returns the temporal difference needed to transit from the previous state
to the current state by taking the action a j at the time i.
rd(si, a j) = δ(si−1, si, a j, i) (6.5)
6.2.4 Learning Agents
Formally, the interaction of the honeypot with attackers is described with a Markov Decision Process [161]
which is composed of:
• A finite set of states S .
• A finite set of an agent’s actions A.
• A transition function T : S × A → PD(S ), where PD(S ) is the probability distribution over the set S .
• The reward function R : S × A → R defining the distributed rewards.
The set of states has already be defined in section 6.2.1 and is mainly derived from the hierarchical proba-
bilistic automaton defined in chapter 5. It consists of installed programs on the honeypot including the special
states custom, insult and empty. The modeled adaptive honeypot is an agent and has a set of actions A composed
of the actions presented in chapter 5. An adaptive honeypot can allow or block the execution of a program. It
can also substitute the execution of a program or insult an attacker. Hence A = { allow, block, substitute, insult}.
An adaptive honeypot is in a given state and takes an action which results in another state according to the
probability distribution over the set S . Each action is also related to positive or negative reward according a
reward function. Although this model permits to describe a transition function and a reward function, these
parameters are often unknown and have to be learned.
Heliza is a learning agent, and attackers act as its environment. According to Sutton [161], an agent has
the ability to perform a set of actions in various situations (states). Each action is awarded with a positive
or negative reward. The purpose of reinforcement learning is to find the optimal policy to select the most
promising actions in given states. Formally, a policy pi is defined as a stochastic rule used by an agent to select
actions [161]. Reinforcement learning is divided into two categories: off-line learning and on-line learning
[161]. Monte Carlo methods are frequently used for off-line learning methods and time difference learning
methods are used for on-line learning. Either method requires complete knowledge about the environment and
both try to optimize received rewards. The purpose of a policy evaluation is to estimate the value of a given state
s under a policy pi [161]. However, in the context of adaptive honeypots, we are interested in evaluating state
action pairs rather than states. An attacker whose rootkit execution has been blocked may chose another path
in the hope to achieve the initial attack goal. The objective of Heliza is to incrementally discover the policy for
choosing actions in given states, which is usual for on-policy methods [161]. Attackers connect to Heliza and
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perform some malicious activity resulting in state transitions. In the state exit, they leave the honeypot which
means that they have reached an absorbing state. This phenomenon gives the possibility of breaking down the
learning method into episodes. The policy is being evaluated at the end of an episode. The State Action Reward
State Action (SARSA) method is a straightforward method of on-policy learning method [161]. The general
form is presented in eq. 6.6. The goal is to estimate the reward Q according to a policy, for a given state st and
a given action at. Due to the fact that an environment is unknown for an agent, an explorer has to decide to
explore or to exploit the learned knowledge. This is a fundamental problem in reinforcement learning. We used
the -greedy explorer, shown in algorithm 2 because convergence to optimal Q values has been proved with
such an explorer [152]. The environment is explored according to a random component  and the environment
is exploited according the learning rule shown in eq. 6.6. An estimation of Q at time t is augmented by the
received reward rt plus a discounted (γ) estimated future reward, taking into account a step size parameter (α).
In practice, the rewards are set retroactively and in the adaptive honeypot scenario no discounting (γ = 1) is
done because the beginning and the end of an episode are known. An episode begins when an attacker connects
and ends when an attacker leaves. A default value of 0.05 is used as step size parameter (α) [143].
Q(st, at) ← Q(st, at) + α[rt+1 + γQ(st+1, at+1) − Q(st, at)] (6.6)
Algorithm 2 Honeypot - Greedy Explorer
1: function honeypotGreedyExplorer(state,actionSet,lastAttackerAction)
2: action ← 0
3: x ← random(0,1)
4: if x <  then . Explore
5: i ← random(0,| actionSet |)
6: action ← actionSet[i]
7: else . Greedy behavior
8: mx ← 0
9: for i ∈ actionSet do
10: j ← StateMatrices[honeypot][state][lastAttackerAction][i]
11: if j > mx then
12: mx ← j
13: action ← i
14: end if
15: end for
16: end if
17:  ←  × λ
18: return action
19: end function
In order to avoid the problem of uncertain transition probabilities reinforcement learning can be used as an
alternative to Monte Carlo simulations and static payoff computations. The advantage of reinforcement learning
is that it embodies model-free approaches [82]. In this case a model does not have to be known in advance,
meaning that the transition functions or reward functions do not have to be completely known. This means that
the decisions about attacker actions are independent of the observed transition probabilities. An agent operates
in an environment by performing several actions. Each action results in a reward. The objective of an agent is to
optimize its received reward. An agent in the context of high-interaction honeypots is the honeypot itself. The
agent operates in an environment, defined as a hierarchical probabilistic automaton providing rewards to the
honeypot. If an attacker connects to the honeypot and he or she wants to execute a program, then the honeypot
needs to decide whether this program execution should be allowed or blocked. After the decision, a reward is
distributed to the honeypot. The received reward is then cumulated for each state. When the honeypot reaches
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a previously seen state, it needs to take a decision. This decision depends on the honeypot’s explorer. The
choice of the explorer is one parameter to ensure convergence of the learning process. The -greedy explorer
is frequently used. This means that the honeypot almost always takes the action yielding in the highest reward
with some random behavior parameter  [161].
Hence, the probability of blocking the program execution does not depend on the transition frequencies in
the honeypot automaton. The previously discussed automaton induction problem (discussed in section 5.1.1)
can be avoided because a closed loop is used to estimate rewards. Reinforcement learning can be more fine-
grained than just determining the optimal probability to select a blocking probability. In reinforcement learning,
expected rewards are estimated for each individual state. If an attacker executes the command wget and if the
objective of the honeypot is to collect programs acquired by attackers, then this program should be allowed,
because the allow action yields the highest reward. However, a problem of such an approach is that attackers
are considered as part of the environment despite their competitive nature. According to Banerjee et al. [11]
considering competitors in a learning scenario as aspects of the environment may mean the environment is no
longer stationary and convergence results may be impacted.
6.3 Fast Concurrent Learning Honeypot
For single learning agents, Markov decision processes are popular for modeling the environment with an agent
[73], [161]. However, this modeling framework is not suited when multiple players are taken into account.
Stochastic games were proposed as extension to traditional Markov decision processes. According to Hu et al.
[73], a 2-player stochastic game Γ is a 6 tuple < S , A1, A2, r1, r2, p >, where S is the discrete state space, Ak
is the discrete action space of player k, k = 1, 2, rk : S × A1 × A2 → R is the payoff function for player k,
p : S × A1 × A2 → ∆ is the transition probability map, where ∆ is the set of probability distributions over state
space S . Such a model can be derived from our honeypot automaton presented in chapter 5. The state space S
remains the same, containing the programs installed on the honeypot and the game is played among an adaptive
honeypot and an omnipresent attacker. The actions of each player are the same than those for Heliza. The
action set A2 for the adaptive honeypot is {allow,block, substitute, insult} and the action set A1 for the attacker
is {continue, retry, alternative, insult, quit}.
At any point the operation of a stochastic game, the game is in a given state. In the context of our adaptive
honeypot, this is the last program that was executed. Each player takes an action. The attacker wants to execute
a next program by entering a command and the honeypot decides whether this command should be allowed,
blocked, substituted or lead to an insult. Although the reward function rk takes all these inputs and is capable
of returning a reward, the reward function is often unknown to the players. The transition function is also often
not known [73]. In this context this means that the next command entered by an attacker is unknown. In such a
situation, agents need to explore the environment and their objective is to find an optimal policy that maximizes
their expected rewards. According, to Bikramjit Banerjee et al. [11] the distributed reward may depend on the
behaviors of the opponents, which makes reward computation challenging, because each opponent has his or
her own self-interests.
6.3.1 Attacker and Honeypot Rewards
In a stochastic game each player has his own reward function. For the attacker we consider a similar reward
function than the payoff model, defined for an attacker in section 6.1.1 concerning the general-sum game.
We assume that an attacker has a dedicated goal, denoted s∗, while penetrating the system. We also suppose
that attackers use the easiest and quickest method for achieving this. In the honeypot automaton there is a
shortest path, denoted P∗ leading from the sshd to this goal (state s∗). The attacker knows that he can reach
s∗ passing on average though |P∗| states. On a standard high-interaction honeypot, the attacker can execute
arbitrary commands. Hence, the attacker stays on the shortest path by simply executing the needed commands.
However, if the honeypot is interfering with the attacker by strategically blocking commands, substituting his
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or her commands or writing insult to his or her terminal, the attacker gets distracted. He or she could give up, or
accept the challenge by choosing alternative commands or retrying the failed command. When the attacker is
disturbed, conceptually she is detoured from the shortest path targeting s∗ and followed another path, denoted
P′. In addition to the payoff model defined in section 6.1.1, we assume that attackers are not always enthusiasts
and naively try to achieve their goal with an infinitely large effort. When the attacker believes of getting closer
to his or her goal, a higher reward is distributed. If the attacker has not reached the goal within |P∗| transitions,
she tries a little bit more. If she is disturbed too much, we believe that the attacker’s interest decreases until she
gives up.
r1 =
|P∗|
|P′| (6.7)
In section 6.2, two reward models have been suggested for calibrating a honeypot agent. The function
defined in eq. 6.5 focuses on the delay involved in a transition and the function defined in eq. 6.4 on the
inputs provided by an attacker. In this section we combine these two functions in a single function. This has
as advantage that only a single agent needs to be operated. Assume an attacker provides an input c, intending
to execute a command or to insult the honeypot. Let δ be the delay between two successive commands si and
si−1, measuring the attacker’s response time. The reward for the honeypot is defined in eq. 6.8 where l is the
minimal Levenshtein distance [62] between the provided input c and all the known states (see eq 6.9). If an
attacker makes a typographical error, e.g. uanme instead of uname (l=1), is a good indication that this attacker
is a human being rather than an automated script [3]. On the one hand, if the response time is 0 seconds it is
probable that a defective attack script has been launched against the honeypot and the honeypot gets a reward
of 0. On the other hand, if the delay was larger than 0 seconds it is highly likely that a human intruder is
attacking, which is more interesting than automated attack script. When an attacker enters a regular command,
the minimal Levenshtein distance becomes 0, which is incremented by 1, in order to avoid an overall reward
of zero. Even in this case, for delays larger than 0, the honeypot manages to keep the attacker busy, which is
positively rewarded. The Levenshtein distance increases when the attacker enters a new input which is probably
a new tool or an insult from the attacker yielding a high reward. In this case, the honeypot has learned something
new from the attacker.
r2 = δ × (l + 1) (6.8)
∀s ∈ S l = min Levenshtein(c, s) (6.9)
6.3.2 Learning Honeypot and Attackers
Having defined the two agents, the environment and the rewards, the learning method for each agent is pre-
sented in this section. A straightforward method is to integrate Nash equilibrium computations into the expected
reward computations of a traditional reinforcement learning. Hence, Hu et al. proposed Nash-Q [73]. However,
there are some open issues concerning such a solution. According to Junling Hu et al. the algorithmic complex-
ity of finding an equilibrium in matrix games is unknown. Bikramjit et al. [11] prove that the minmax-Q and
Nash-Q are equivalent in the purely competitive domains. However, the advantage of the minmax-Q algorithm
that it is more resource-efficient.
Similarly to traditional reinforcement learning, the purpose of an adaptive honeypot is to incrementally
learn the optimal policy for choosing actions in given states. The major difference, here is that the opponents
actions are taken into account. In the context of adaptive honeypots we use the minmax learning proposed by
Bikramjit et al. [11] and define a stochastic game between an attacker and a honeypot. As we have two agents,
lets denote a player k and ¯k the competitor. The parameter γ comes from traditional reinforcement learning
and represents the discounting rate while α represents the learning rate [161]. In a given state at a given time
t, st, each player performs an action ak. For each player k at time t a reward rkt is distributed and the estimated
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values are updated according to eq. 6.10. The estimated rewards and the greedy explorer already presented
in 6.2 serve for the self-configuration of the honeypot. If a player is greedy and if positive rewards have been
observed for a given state and action, the player decides to take this action.
Qt+1k (st, akt , a
¯k
t ) = (1 − αt)Qtk(st, akt , a
¯k
t ) + αt[rkt + γQtk(st, akt+1, a
¯k
t+1)] (6.10)
In practice each player maintains a reward table per state which contains the estimated Q values. The actions
of a player are identified with a natural number. The actions of the honeypot are Ahoneypot = {0, 1, . . . , N} and
the actions of an attacker are Aattacker = {0, 1, . . . , M}. A row is identified with the numerical representation of
a honeypot’s action. A column is identified with the numerical representation of an attacker’s action. When
an attacker performs an action, the honeypot has to react regarding this action. This decision to exploit the
acquired knowledge or to explore new choices is taken according an explorer. In this work the  greedy explorer
is considered and is shown in algorithm 2. An attacker is in a given state and enters a command. The honeypot
can take an action defined in the action set for this state, which is a subset of the overall actions a honeypot
is capable. For instance, when an attacker left the honeypot by closing her terminal, the honeypot can only
allow this action. The  -greedy explorer is called greedy explorer, because it emulates a greedy behavior. The
explorer is parameterized with a parameter called . This parameter defines the exploring will of an agent. If
this parameter is 0, then no exploration is done. If this parameter is 1 the explorer always tries new behaviors.
The explorer generates a number between 0 and 1 according to a uniform random distribution. This number
corresponds to the exploring probability. If the number is below , the explorer randomly selects an action.
However, if this number exceeds , the explorer first checks the estimated reward table, then considers the
attacker’s desired action and performs a look-up of an action yielding the highest reward. This action is then
returned. At the end the exploring parameter  is decayed in order to ensure learning convergence. After having
taken the action a reward is distributed and the corresponding reward table is updated respecting the learning
rule defined in eq. 6.10.
6.4 Summary
This chapter proposes a new paradigm for adaptive high-interaction honeypots. The behavior of attackers who
are attacking an adaptive high-interaction honeypot is modeled with a hierarchical probabilistic automaton
presented in chapter 5. To this automaton, we added a special state empty. An attacker makes a transition to
this state if she enters an empty command. The unknown state presented in chapter 5 is partitioned into the
custom state and insult state. Every time an attacker executes a program that was installed by herself or another
attacker, a transition is made to the state custom. An input corresponding to a profanity entered by an attacker
or a typographical error, is mapped to the state insult. An attacker enters inputs to the automaton resulting
into transitions in the automaton. The interaction between the honeypot and an attacker is modeled as a game
where appropriate payoff functions model the behavior goals observed in the real world and from the literature.
The best strategy profiles are derived from the Nash Equilibrium. We make the assumption that hackers are
always rational although this might not be the case for all attackers. The results obtained provide practical
solutions for designing adaptive high-interaction honeypots. The adaptability results from blocking one system
call according to the calculated optimal blocking probabilities.
We first consider a Monte Carlo simulation which uses captured inputs by a previously-deployed high-
interaction honeypot to parametrize our model. Our results have been published in [181]. However, transition
probabilities remain uncertain and this method uses off-line computations. These problems were addressed by
using a model-free learning approach, which applied reinforcement learning in the context of high-interaction
honeypots.
The Heliza honeypot described in our paper in [182], optimizes a reward signal and defines attacking
intruders as the environment. The behavior of Heliza has also be extended in order to reveal more information
about an attacker rather than keeping her busy. Its behavior is defined in terms of several actions that may
be taken: blocking, executing the command, returning errors, or insulting. The applicability of each action is
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dependent on the context, which includes the command to be executed command and the history of commands.
An on-line reinforcement algorithm was leveraged to map the context of actions to the action to be taken. This
work can be used to develop a new generation of honeypots that exhibit learning capabilities and adaptability
which reduces the risks involved in honeypot operation. Heliza could be used as information source for studies
of the social backgrounds of attackers.
Considering attackers as the environment resolves the problem of transition probabilities, but ignores the
competitive nature of the relationship between attackers and honeypots. Therefore, fast competitive learning in
a stochastic game is considered equivalent to learning strategic decisions while facing attackers. The interaction
of a honeypot with attackers is framed as a stochastic game, where the honeypot learns state-specific reactions.
A reaction is a choice from a set of possible actions which can be allowing, blocking or substituting a command
or insulting the attacker. We have also assessed learning what an attacker can do in order to accommodate a
broader model in which an attacker can also be adaptive. This approach is to be published in [177].
6.5 Limitations
Even with an adaptive honeypot, the risk of losing control during a high-interaction session still exists, attack-
ers could also make profiling attacks on the honeypot, suggesting that further work on machine learning and
self stabilization approaches in the context of adaptive honeypots would be desirable. An adaptive honeypot
may interfere with some commands in command block in which all commands are normally successful or all
fail. The case where only one fails appears suspicious to some attackers. Attackers could perform indirect
attacks. To do this, they would install an attacking script and reconfigure the honeypot such that the system
itself performs the attack. In this case only the process tree corresponding to the deployment can be observed.
To counter such attacks, the process tree should be extended with additional information like file system knowl-
edge. In addition, attackers could misuse commands to achieve their goals. For instance, an attacker could for
instance use perl to list programs instead of using the command ls. Experienced attackers could replace pro-
grams on the honeypot and poison the learning process. The honeypot model could also be extended by system
command semantics. More complex competitive learning algorithms could be explored, taking into account
multiple, possibly colluding, attackers. Further research should be done concerning attackers that know how
Heliza works and who try to poison its learning process.
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Chapter 7
Honeypot Operation
As discussed in chapter 3, the exposure of an adaptive high-interaction honeypot is a risky operation. A short
recapitulation of these risks including their mitigation techniques is presented in order to suggest additional
mitigation or evaluation techniques needed for the experiments presented in chapter 8. In addition, we aim at
the identification of additional information sources for enhancing the previous suggested adaptive honeypots.
Honeypots face real attackers and real damage may be the result. An overview of operation state-of-
the art virtual high-interaction honeypot is presented in figure 7.1. On a given operating system, a virtual
machine is installed to expose a vulnerable service to the Internet. Spitzner [154] recommended using redundant
observation points to monitor the activities of attackers. The figure 7.1 identifies four layers of data capture.
Firstly, all the network traffic directed and originated from the honeypot is captured and stored as network traffic
captures with the aim of keeping all the network traces. Secondly, on the honeypot itself, all executed processes
are monitored, and the information being stored in an external observation database in order to determine
the executed commands. Thirdly, all the system calls executed in the virtual honeypot are recorded so as to
determine the actions of individual programs executed by attackers. Finally, all the system calls related to
the virtual machine are monitored, (see circle (4) in figure 7.1) in order to detect misbehavior of the virtual
honeypot. An adaptive honeypot is a system that is exposed to attackers and should interact with attackers.
The decision on whether to allow or deny an action is taken by the decision maker, represented by a star in
figure 7.1. Each adaptive honeypot is operated in an isolated laboratory environment with an an exposed on the
Internet. As discussed in this chapter, the collected data should be stored in a tamper-proof environment such
that attackers cannot amend or delete it which is analyzed in this chapter. The honeypot is operated on a public
IP address such that attackers can access it. Usually, a firewall is set up to protect third parties from collateral
damage in which the honeypot is involved. In addition, the traffic is queued to ensure that a given bandwidth
is not exceeded. However, as we show in the next section, these mitigation techniques are not sufficient. Due
to the legal constraints on the honeypot operator, attackers should not be able to inflict damage on third parties.
Despite the previously described autonomous behaviors, the system should also be monitored by a human
honeypot operator. Thus, we propose two new visualization techniques. The first gives a broad overview of the
network activity and the scope is labeled (1). The second (2) allows the nature of attacks against third parties
to be determined. Therefore, prior the operation of adaptive honeypots additional contributions are proposed in
order to guarantee monitoring.
The data collected from attackers is a valuable asset. The data has to be stored in a reliable way such that an
attacker cannot alter or delete previously collected data. An attacker who manages to delete this data could wipe
the traces of the actions she carried out on the adaptive honeypot. The assets of an adaptive honeypot are system
resources like CPU power and memory. If an attacker manages to make an adaptive honeypot so busy that it
can no longer operate correctly. The exhaustion of resources may result in data loss or in services becoming
unavailable. An adaptive high-interaction honeypot suffering from resource exhaustion caused by one attacker
cannot collect data on others. The most valuable asset of an adaptive high-interaction honeypot is its public IP
address: it is needed to let attackers in, but it can also abused by attackers to attack third parties. Such abuse
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Figure 7.1: Overview of Honeypot Operation
would result in legal liabilities for the honeypot operator. Therefore, it is essential to have correct and usable
traces. Hence, we focus on an evaluation of monitoring techniques, followed by technical recommendations
for the implementation of adaptive honeypots.
7.1 Netflow Analysis
As shown in figure 7.1 a well-known dilemma for honeypot operators that of the Internet connectivity for a
honeypot [154]: Should an attacker be capable of connecting to other hosts when she has entered the system?
A honeypot operator is usually legally responsible for his IP addresses. An intruder who attacks third parties
using the honeypot brings legal consequences for the honeypot operator. A honeypot becomes unattractive if
attackers cannot connect to the Internet. On such a honeypot attackers quickly leave and nothing interesting
can be observed. If all connections are are allowed, attackers quickly attack third parties, resulting in collateral
damage and legal liabilities for the honeypot operator. All traffic incoming and outgoing from on a honeypot
is considered suspicious by default[154]. Having compromised a honeypot, attackers often install customized
and protected1 tools which do not generate log information. Hence, network monitoring and, in particular,
early pattern recognition of this kind of traffic is crucial. Besides state of the art mitigation techniques, like
the use of network intrusion detection systems, firewalls, connection throttling and bandwidth reduction, visual
aggregation helps the honeypot operator to get a wide overview of the networks involved in the attacks.
We have used Aguri [87] a flow-monitoring tool supporting IPv4 and IPv6 traffic. IP flows are monitored in
near real time and are spatially aggregated. Aggregation is particularly useful to give an overview at the subnet
layer rather than considering each individual flow. Spatial aggregation is realized by a special process which
aggregates small flow entities into larger prefix-based trees. From these temporal and spatial aggregations of
1Using obfuscation and anti-reverse engineering techniques [183].
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Figure 7.2: Aguri Profile Representation
network traffic, the tool generates four different profiles providing summaries for incoming and outgoing net-
work traffic in a tree-like structure. The first profile shows the source addresses, the second the destination
addresses, while the third profile captures the source protocols and the last gives destination protocols. Tempo-
ral and spatial aggregations have a differing purposes. Temporal aggregation is more coarse-grained and similar
to a summary of profiles, whereas spatial aggregation performs better for real-time monitoring.
A traffic profile generated by Aguri can be seen in Figure 7.2. It shows an extract of an Aguri profile for
source traffic, summarizing traffic over 5 seconds. The profile is composed of a four-line header followed by
the monitored network traffic in a tree-like structure that contains IP addresses, prefix lengths, the total number
of bytes transferred and the volume compared to its sub-tree as percentage. The structures of the other profiles
are similar. Aguri defines aggregation thresholds for each kind of profile. These present a dilemma. One the
one hand, using a high-aggregation threshold results in a very high level overview. On the other, using a low
aggregation threshold results in a large number of profiles. We preferred to use low aggregation thresholds,
then look for similarities in these profiles.
The similarity metric for comparing two profiles is taken from [184]. The metric takes into account the
layout of the tree and the aggregate traffic volume. The purpose of the comparison is to detect structural
similarities that indicate activity such as brute-force attacks on third parties or the scanning of uncontrolled
machines. We compute similarities on successive aggregated Aguri profiles and visualize these. To do this,
we refer to the values of the kernel function, K, for Aguri trees presented in [184] which are assembled as a
vector v that describes evolution of traffic using sliding window. This vector v is then mapped to a rectangle
that is sequentially put into an image. The rectangle is then filled with a color derived from the kernel value
K itself. The color of the rectangle describes the intensity of the evolution. We define an image as a two-
dimensional space having an x- and y-axis. The discrete time is defined by t = (t0, t1, t2, . . . , tn). The time step,
α, corresponds to an interval of α seconds between the export of successive Aguri trees, such that from time ti
to ti+1, α seconds have elapsed. The first rectangle at the top left in our image, represents the kernel value K
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for the first time period and is defined by the coordinate (x0, y0). The next kernel value at time step t1 has the
coordinates (xi + r, y j), with r being the rectangle width. On reaching the end of a line, we force a line break
by resetting xi to 0 and incrementing y j by the rectangle height r. The freshness Γ of a picture is defined in
eq. 7.1. The size of the data window has an impact on the freshness of the images. A short window means a
smaller and thus a fresher image, whereas a larger one means that the visualized traffic is more out of date, but
at the same time gives a better overview. In our tool the freshness parameter can be specified by the honeypot
operator. The graphical representation used in our work is somewhat similar to a Self Organizing Map [162]
with the difference that no learning process and no training set is needed for the network traffic analysis.
Γ = α × width × height (7.1)
We use the similarities of our Aguri input obtained from the kernel function (defined in [184]) and map
them to a color space defined by the Red – Green – Blue model (RGB) [36] (in eq. 7.2). Intuitively “black”
represents the network traffic noise, while interesting patterns are shown with more intensive colors. We are
particularly interested in detecting whether a given host is scanning other systems, and in tracking dominant
and long-lasting TCP sessions. A dominant TCP session is a high bandwidth consuming one initiated by SSH
brute-force attacks or IRC bouncing. Another interesting indicator is the amount of traffic targeting a given host.
By focusing on a sequence of successively observed kernels we can normalize the kernel values between 0 and
1. We then multiply each Ki value by 224 which has the effect of exploring the RGB colour space (represented
in eq. 7.2). This adds a brightness factor B, considering a higher decimal precision of the kernel values2 an
intensity factor I, was added to linearly shift kernel values in the RGB space.
K′i =
K j × B∑
Ki × B
× 224 + I (7.2)
A RGB color is composed of 3 bytes. Each byte is used to represent the colors red, green and blue respec-
tively and can be obtained by using a logical AND operation with respective bit masks. The lower eight bits
of K′i represent the color “blue”, the next eight model the “green” and the high eight bits “red”. This means
when traffic fluctuates rapidly the similarity between two successive trees is quite low, meaning all bits are
low resulting in a black color. Small similarities are displayed in bluish colors and high similarities in reddish
colours. When all the bits are high (very high similarities) the color tends to “white”. An observation of a white
rectangle means that there is a persistent attack going on aimed at a particular target which has to be manually
stopped in order to avoid real damage. Such an observation usually results in a shutdown of the honeypot
experiment.
PeekKernelFlow is the outcome of our early prototyping. An overview is presented in figure 7.3. The
current network topology of the honeypot is discovered by the Aguri. In the same time, all network traffic
is captured with the tool tcpdump [79]. If no full-packet capture is available, we use nfdump [66] to provide
Netflow records as input for the NetflowToAguri module. The honeypot operator configures the Aguri-tool to
periodically export Aguri trees, which are then processed with the AguriProcessor module.
The components of the architecture are as follows:
Tcpdump Tcpdump is a popular network forensic tool implemented by van Jacobson et al. [79]. It is able to
put a network interface into promiscuous mode resulting in the interception of all packets even those not
addressed to the machine running tcpdump. The captured packets are buffered and can be summarized in
text form or stored in a file. Tcpdump can also read previously captured traffic. Tcpdump is based on the
library libpcap which implements the reception of packets in a binary form.
Nfdump Nfdump, developed by Haag [66] that reads Netflow records captured by a Netflow collector and
displays them in a human-readable form that can be easily parsed.
2The parameter B could be canceled out. However, each value is multiplied and then casted to an integer. Thus, we can mitigate the
casting error.
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Figure 7.3: PeekKernelFlow - Architecture
Aguri Aguri [87], also uses the library libpcap to acquire network packets. From these packets, TCP flows are
reconstructed and then stored in Patricia trees that take their network prefixes into account.
NetflowToAguri In this module, we implemented an adapter that converts captured Netflows into Aguri format
such that the Aguri tool can process them.
AguriProcessor The AguriProcessor computes the kernel value K of two successive trees. The AguriViz-
module then reads these kernels and presents them in a two-dimensional space, taking responsibility
for the correct visualisation of the Aguri tree kernel functions. The honeypot operator uses the PeekKer-
nelFlows User Interface, AguriUI. If an interesting pattern is observed in the display, the relevant network
traffic can be extracted with tcpslice and piped to the tcpdump, which in this context is used to transform
the captured network packets into a human readable form. We created a script, AguriProcessor which
takes the output trees of Aguri as input, waits for at least two successive Aguri trees and then com-
putes the kernel-value K, defined in [184], between these trees. The computed K-values are then used in
AguriViz for further processing.
AguriViz We implemented a module AguriViz, which processes kernel values for visualisation and maps them
into RGB format using the equations presented in 7.2.
AguriUI The AguriUI module is our implementation of a visual user interface for the honeypot operator. With
this interface, he can adjust the monitoring setting and the parameters (image height, width, rectangle
size, freshness parameter, brightness, intensity) of the generated images.
Tcpslice Tcpslice [118], developed by Paxson, is a program for extracting portions of packet-trace files ac-
cording to records’ time stamps.
Traces from a deployed high-interaction honeypot exposing a vulnerable SSH server on a public IP address,
are used for this evaluation. The capture contains 24 hours of network traffic. All traffic related to this host is
by definition suspicious and was recorded. The honeypot interacted with 47 523 different external addresses.
We used Aguri’s default time parameter (α = 5 seconds) which we call freshness parameter for the experiments
and represented the visualization in a 24-bit color space. Choosing a larger freshness parameter α results in less
timely observations. Table 7.1 summarizes statistical information for the data sets used.
In figure 7.4(a) and figure 7.4(b) we present the pictures generated by applying PeekKernelFlows to a 24-
hour honeypot traffic capture. Figure 7.4(a) presents the analysis of the source profile, while figure 7.4(b)
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Operation time 24 hours
Number of observed addresses 47523
Used bandwidth 64Kbit/s
Exchanged TCP packets 1183419
α (seconds) 5
Colors (bit) 24
Table 7.1: Aguri Visualization Data Set
(a) Source Profiles (b) Destination Profiles
Figure 7.4: Visualization of Aguri Profile Similarities
presents the destination profiles. The figures have a resolution of 1 200 x 1 000 pixels. This means that with a
rectangle size of r = 20 and a freshness parameter α = 5 seconds, we have represented 3 000 Aguri trees in one
picture, corresponding to approximately four hours of traffic.
We manually investigated some interesting patterns and noticed a minor design problem in Aguri. Accord-
ing to its user manual, the s-switch is used to output a summary every α seconds. However, by analyzing the
Aguri trees we realized that the interval is not constant. After an investigation of the Aguri source code, we
noticed that the start and end time are taking from the captured packets. This has as consequence that moments
of silence, where no packets are transmitted, are not been taken into consideration, and so we detected that the
time intervals varied by3 α+τ. An active honeypot is continuously under a wide variety of attacks. Some attack-
ers launch brute-force attacks against the honeypot, while others having already compromised the system, scan
or control other targets. Both kinds of attackers generate a lot of network traffic-noise that is hard to investigate
manually. In both images the background network traffic noise is represented by the “black”, which means that
successive Aguri trees are completely different. The more the color tends to “white”, the more similar the suc-
cessive Aguri trees. In Figure 7.4(a), four relevant patterns can be observed. Three successive green lines which
have been framed by the rectangles can be seen. After a manual investigation of the recorded network traffic,
we observed that these “green” lines represents SSH brute-force attacks, whereas the “colored” line (framed by
the dashed ellipse) in the right bottom of the image represents scanning activities from our honeypot directed
towards other victims. In the observed scanning activities, the attackers nearly used the entire bandwidth of
the honeypot and continuously scanned entire sub-networks. This results in similar successive Aguri trees.
3If we assume that the packet p1 has the time stamp t1 and that the next packet p2 has the time stamp t2. The variable τ is defined as
t2 − t1 − α. Ideally, τ should be 0.
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The colors of scanning activities are more light in color than dominant TCP sessions, which consist mostly of
“dark” colors. This can be explained by the kernel function K, where the topological part has a greater weight
than the volume part. The source profile does not focus on the exact target of the honeypot attacks. To obtain
more fine-grained information about the targets, the destination profile represented in figure 7.4(b) can be used.
In the destination profile analysis we can observe further patterns that are represented as segments due to the
focus on destinations. We can observe how long attackers concentrated on a particular target and how much
traffic was exchanged.
In this section, we also describe a visualization tool for temporal and spatially aggregated flows. The main
idea is to track changes in the topology and volume on a network between successive time intervals in order
to detect anomalous behaviors by which we mean harmful attacks directed towards third parties. Flows are
captured for a given time interval in a special tree like structure (Aguri tree). We have introduced a similar-
ity metric that leverages kernel functions defined over such tree structures and assessed its efficiency using a
scenario of traffic captured from a high-interaction honeypot. A limitation of our approach is that an experi-
enced attacker can poison our visualization technique by generating additional noise, so reducing the similarity
between successive samples, with the result that the display becomes blacker, and hence less noticeable. We
plan to improve the tool by increasing the Human Machine Interaction, by for example adding zoom features,
integrated analysis and decision-making components. Another future work possibility is the implementation of
“image transparency” for better tracking long-term evolution.
7.2 Network Activity Identification
The previously described visualization approach permits the identification of similarities in aggregated netflow
records generated by a full capture. The Peekkernelflows tool enables a honeypot operator to identify similari-
ties at sub net layer and to extract the related network packets. However, these network packets can easily have
a large volume and it is not necessarily known which type of attack has been spotted. Hence, we propose an
additional technique to identify patterns in a subset of captured packets. In essence, we use a polar representa-
tion in order to differentiate between attack patterns. Two typical attacks are presented in figure 7.5(a) and in
figure 7.5(b). Both figures show a circle similar to a plan position indicator (PPI) which allows enemy vehicles
to be located.
(a) Detecting a Scanning Attack (b) Detecting a Targeted Attack
Figure 7.5: Polar Attack Representation
The aim is to identify the manner and intensity with which attackers probe third parties’ services in order
to keep collateral damage as low as possible and to quickly identify attacks and select appropriate countermea-
sures. When attackers scan third party hosts by sending simple TCP SYN packets in order to discover running
services, not much damage is done. However, if an attacker manages to penetrate another host from our hon-
eypot severe damage could be done and these kind of attacks in particularly have to be avoided. The PPI is fed
with TCP and UDP packets. The time stamp, the source port and destination ports of each packets are used.
The source and destination port are normalized in the interval of [0, 2pi] and the result is an angle. Hence, the
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angle of a point on the PPI corresponds to the ports associating with a network packet. In a set of captured
packets the time stamp of each packet is analyzed. The time differences are used to determine the radius of a
point on the PPI. The time is then normalized into a discrete series of time windows or slots. In each slot, the
frequency fi of each packet is counted. The number fi is then normalized to 0 and 224 and a color is the output.
The slot number corresponds to the radius of a point. This kind of visualization allows three attacks families to
be identified:
Port-scanning activities Such an attack makes a kind of concentric rings appear on the PPI. It is usually
composed of dark points due to the low frequency of the use of individual ports. The rings result from
the fact that a large number of ports is probed in a short time.
Successful Penetrations A long-lasting TCP session from our honeypot to another machine generates a large
number of TCP packets having the same source port. This high frequency results in a light colored point.
Brute - force attacks Such an attack often involves a large number of connections to a given port in order to
abuse the associated service. The establishment of connection to another host results in the appearance
of a higher-numbered source ports. This produces a light colored spot in the first quadrant, assuming that
a service with a port number below 128 is being targeted, followed by a large number of dark points in
the third quadrant which represent the source ports.
The PPI visualization enables a honeypot operator to identify attack families directed towards third parties.
The simplicity of mapping network packets on the PPI avoids the need to implement per host counters which
quickly became exhausted when concurrent attacks are taking place on. A honeypot operator can also identify
ongoing concurrent attacks on the same PPI. For the sake of illustration, the network scanner nmapwas launched
against another machine from our honeypot and the resulting concentric rings can be seen in figure 7.5(a). In
figure 7.5(b), five successful TCP connections can be observed from a single source port. The major limitation
of the PPI visualization is that traffic data must be pre-filtered, for instance with the Peekkernelflows, to ensure
that there is no ambiguity on the target. Finally, a clever attacker could instrument the honeypot to use the same
source port while doing her brute-force attack; the honeypot operator observes a successful attack on his PPI
instead of observing a brute-force attack.
7.3 Full Network Capture Analysis
On a high-interaction honeypot, attackers can download tools and they can remove them after having used them.
When a complete packet capture is made on the inbound interface of the honeypot, these tools are accessible
in the network traces provided that the an attacker did not download them over an encrypted channel. The
correct reassembly of network flows is a prerequisite for network intrusion detection systems and network
forensic tools. The evasion of network intrusion detection systems was an active research topic in 1998 [133].
In our tests we discovered that some of the attacks outlined in the paper still evade network forensic tools,
even when the best practices for honeypot operation are respected. In addition to classical attacks based on
incomplete knowledge or unimplemented protocol features, we uncovered fundamental design flaws in popular
network forensic tools. In essence a flow identifier problem causes intermixed streams which result in corrupted
tools downloaded by attackers. Hence, it is not guaranteed that a honeypot operator can recover an attacker’s
tool despite it has been acquired over a clear text communication channel. Therefore, we start by formally
describing the problem followed by an evaluation of popular network forensic tools. The root of the problem is
the popular definition of a network flow, which assumes that an unidirectional IP flow is a set of IP packets that
are characterized by a 5-tuple [29, 37, 41] (Source IP address, Source port, Destination IP address, Destination
port, Protocol) ∈ I. The protocol parameter identifies the protocol is being used. Frequently used protocols are
TCP and UDP. We define a mathematical relationship F between captured packets and flow identifiers shown
in relation 7.3 where ˆP is the set of captured packets where I is the set of flow identifiers.
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(I,F , ˆP) ⊂ I × ˆP (7.3)
The 5-tuple identifier is extended in NetFlow [29] by the addition of N other parameters such as ingress
interface and type of service. Assuming that all parameters can be represented by numbers, the relationship F ′
between a general flow identifier and a set of captured packets is shown in relation 7.44.
(NN ,F ′, ˆP) ⊂ NN × ˆP (7.4)
In this section we focus on classical concept of TCP flows which are defined as a set of TCP packets
identified by a 4-tuple (Source IP address, Source port, Destination IP address, Destination Port). The main
purpose of TCP is to serve as a transport layer, which guarantees that a data stream is correctly transfered to
a given destination over an unreliable network. In an unreliable network packets may be lost, duplicated or
reordered [156]. The packets must be correctly reassembled in order to recover the sender’s stream. Due to the
diversity of TCP reassembly designs, let R be the set of reassembly functions. A reassembly function maps TCP
packets to streams. The purpose of such a function is to recover the initial stream as emitted by the sender, from
captured TCP packets. Let ˆP be the set of captured TCP packets. ˆP = {p1, . . . , pt, . . . , pT }. A packet that was
captured at time t is designated pt. A packet contains checksums in order to detect transmission errors. These
checksums are verified with the function ω, which returns the value 1 if the packet has a correct checksum and
0 otherwise. The set of TCP packets with a correct checksum is defined in equation 7.5. In a network capture
we only have the checksum information to see whether the packet is correct or corrupted, although it has been
shown that checksums are not always reliable [159].
P = {pi ∈ ˆP | ω(pi) = 1} (7.5)
For a given set of captured packets, P, and a reassembly function ρ ∈ R there is a set S that includes the data
streams, recovered from TCP packets. A reassembly function ρ ∈ R reassembles TCP packets and is defined
in equation 7.6 such that k, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , N}. The number j identifies the flow and the index k identifies the
offset in the stream.
ρ : P → S
ρ 7→ f jk
(7.6)
We also define a function σ, shown in equation 7.7, that maps TCP packets to TCP sessions. A TCP session
starts with connection establishment and finishes with connection close, as it is described in [156]. The variable
sk is the set of TCP packets belonging to a TCP session. sk = {pi|{(pi, k)} ⊂ F }. Thus the set E contains subsets
of TCP packets that belong to a TCP session.
σ : P → E
σ 7→ sk (7.7)
Each session is mapped to a data stream, defined in function 7.8. Ideally the reassembled data stream should
be identical to the data stream emitted by the sender.
η : E → S
x 7→ η(x) (7.8)
A reassembly function ρ is composed of the session function and the session mapping function, shown in
proposition 7.9.
P → S
ρ = σ ◦ η (7.9)
4
N is the set of natural numbers {0, 1, . . . }.
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TCP reassembly is a difficult task. Although a standard specification of the protocol, is given in RFC
793 [165], there are many implementations. Each reassembly tool has its own specification of a stream. The
tcptrace tool considers that a stream constitutes a session, while tcpflow treats all matching tuples as belonging
to a stream. Tcptrace and tcpflow put data sent from the sender to the receiver into one stream and data from
the receiver to the sender in another. A stream recovered by wireshark, the successor of Ethereal [17], puts data
sent by the sender and by the receiver in one stream.
High-interaction honeypots are frequently monitored by capturing incoming and outgoing the traffic. When
we apply the traditional flow relation, defined in equation 7.3, we notice that the source/destination IP address
and the destination port are constant for a given monitored resource. We are interested in the case where the
same source port is reused. The set of packets that belong to multiple sessions using the same source port is
described by equation 7.10.
pa, pb ∈ P
Mp = {(σ(pa) , σ(pb)) ∧ (ρ(pa) = ρ(pb))} (7.10)
The phenomenon of having multiple sessions per flow might be reducible to the birthday problem [102],
assuming that the source port distribution is uniform. It is the probability Pb of finding at least two streams,
belonging to same flow in a set of n streams. The applied birthday problem is formulated in equation 7.11,
where Pr = 216 − 1024 − 1 represents the TCP port range from which an operating system can choose a source
port.
Pb = 1 −
Pr!
Pnr (Pr − n)!
(7.11)
As we have defined in equation 7.6, the payloads of the TCP packets are put in a stream at an offset defined
in the TCP header. TCP headers indicate corrupted or duplicated packets and packets that have been received
out of order. We need a verification process for reassembly functions in order to detect wrongly reassembled
streams. This should meet two goals: it should estimate the accuracy of the reassembly of streams by comparing
reassembled streams with a variety of independent tools; and it should help us to understand why streams have
been reassembled differently by different functions. Therefore we aim to have methods to check streams. The
input of these methods is composed of a reassembled stream and the raw captured packets. We put the payload
of TCP packets in a vector −→b as shown in figure 7.6. This vector represents one TCP session. pi ∈ P,
−→b =
(σ(pi)). The packets are put in the vector in order of arrival. A TCP packet pi is a tuple (TCP header, and TCP
payload).
We then consider a reassembled stream −→d as a vector of bytes, again shown in figure 7.6. From the vectors−→b and −→d we generate a matrix c, which serves to check the reassembly function. The column τ contains the time
stamp attached during the capture. The variable ∆H is the difference of the real packet length and the effective
captured packet length. For packets that were completely captured, ∆H is 0. The variable λ quantifies the TCP
payload length. The number of occurrences of the packet’s payload in the stream is specified by the variable f .
The offset in the stream of the payload is described by the s′ variable, followed by the q variable which is the
sequence number given in the TCP packet. The column ω(pi) indicates correct or incorrect checksums. Finally,
the column g contains the TCP flags present in the TCP header. This matrix is sorted according to the sequence
numbers and a matrix c′ matrix is the result. Here we should mention that in the best case ρ(pi) = f jk , j = s′ for
a reassembly function. Two choices are possible if this statement does not hold: (i) the stream was not correctly
reassembled or (ii) the payload of the TCP packet pi appears more than once, i.e. f > 1. The computational
complexity for establishing the matrix c is O(n2) because the frequencies of the TCP payloads in the stream are
used.
Having presented the TCP reassembly model and TCP reassembly challenges, we wish to establish prob-
abilities to quantify TCP reassembly errors. There are two types of potential error are presented (i) potential
errors at the packet level and (ii) errors at the stream level. For a given reassembly tool it should first be checked
whether it is necessary to compute these probabilities or whether they can be ignored due to a probably correct
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Figure 7.6: Detecting Corrupted Streams
software design. A potential cause of error at the packet level is a the possibility that a defective packet resulted
in a wrongly reassembled stream. The probability of faulty checksums influencing stream reassembly is defined
in equation 7.12.
Pc =
|{pi ∈ ˆP | ω(pi) = 0}|
| ˆP| (7.12)
Some tools do not take into account IP fragmentation [156] and fragmented IP packets may impact the
accuracy of reassembly. The probability of observing fragmented IP packets during the reassembly process is
defined in equation 7.13 where φ is a function that returns 1 if a packet is fragmented and 0 otherwise.
P f =
|{pi ∈ P | φ(pi) = 1}|
|P| (7.13)
In order to avoid errors caused by fragmented IP packets or by faulty checksums it must be ensured that the
reassembly function correctly handles such packets.
Potential errors at the stream level are quantified by the probability that a particular stream is corrupted. We
have the set E containing TCP sessions and also the set of recovered streams. Ideally the number of reassembled
TCP sessions should be the same as the number of recovered streams. The number δ represents the difference
between the number of reassembled sessions and the number of recovered streams δ =| E | − | S |. If δ is zero,
no mismatch has been detected. If δ is negative, there must be TCP sessions that are present in the set but have
not been reassembled. We call these sessions invisible. The probability of having such streams is defined in
equation 7.14. If δ is positive, the cause is a spurious stream that was not generated from a session shown in
equation 7.15.
δ > 0 : Ip = 1 −
| S |
| E | (7.14)
δ < 0 : Ap = 1 −
| E |
| S | (7.15)
Equation 7.15 and 7.14 give an idea of the number of streams that does not match with the number of
sessions. However these equations might say that there is no error even in a situation where the two types of
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error cancel each other out. An example is an invisible stream that cancels out a spurious stream. Therefore it
is essential to check if the streams are consistent. The probability that multiple sessions are present in a TCP
flow is defined in equation 7.16.
Pspec =
|{σ(pi) | pi ∈ Mp}|
|I| (7.16)
The methodology proposed in figure 7.6 establishes a sorted matrix c′ which can be used to detect incorrect
reassembly in some cases. Cases where ambiguities are present can also be detected. Streams can be wrongly
reassembled due to incompletely collected payloads or mixed packet payloads which are due to a faulty offset
computation. the first step in the packet capturing process is to capture the complete packets in order to correctly
reassemble a stream. The libpcap [79] library, used by the tcpdump provides two packet lengths. The caplen is
the packet length as captured, and len is the length of the packet initially sent. The parameter ∆H = len−caplen
can be greater than zero, meaning that the packet was not completely captured. Incomplete packets that are
used by reassembly functions cause gaps in reassembled streams due to the lack of captured information, with
a probability show in equation 7.17.
P∆H =
| {p ∈ σ(pi)|∆H > 0} |
| P | (7.17)
Incorrect offsets can also be caused by software defects. In a correctly reassembled stream, no holes should
be present. This can be formulated if relation 7.18 holding where s′0 = 0.
i > 0 : s′i = λi−1 + s
′
i−1 (7.18)
In order to use the output of a network forensic tool as evidence against someone we believe that it is
mandatory to check firstly the captured input data and the capabilities of the tool. Secondly, output should
validated by other independent tools. Two families of errors can emerge. Firstly it could be that the capture tool
was not correctly calibrated, so that some packets are truncated. Streams might also be defectively reassembled
due to ambiguities that result in implementation flaws. An additional requirement is that all analysis tools
should have the same interpretation of flows, sessions and streams. We have proposed a TCP reassembly model
and a stream verification methodology that can be used to derive and compute reassembly errors. We discovered
that multiple sessions per flow cause problems in context where a resource is monitored over a long period of
time as in high-interactive honeypots. In the next section, we are provoking the enumerated TCP reassembly
errors aiming at an evaluation of popular network forensic tools.
7.3.1 Network Forensic Tool Analysis
The tools evaluated in this section are frequently used by the honeypot and security communities [17]. Many
of them are vulnerable to TCP flow identification flaw resulting from their use of the 5-tuple.
Valgrind [110] dynamic execution analyzer was applied to the tools under evaluation in order to identify
reports invalid pointer use and memory leaks as well as “use after frees”. Each tool was launched on a 512MB
packet capture (PCAP) and was configured to extract the initial streams from the capture. The outcome is
presented in table 7.2. It is a good sign that none of the tools made any invalid memory writes. These errors
are particularly dangerous because in some cases they allow attackers to execute arbitrary code and thus infect
the honeypot’s operator’s analysis machine. At first glance, the tools tcpflow and tcpick look clean. In tcpick,
16 bytes are not freed, but these 16 bytes are constant and do not depend on the capture. Tcpflow assumes
that the encoded packet length always corresponds to the actual captured length. However, this is not always
true. In some cases, the captured packet length is smaller than the expected packet length. The violation
of this assumption results in invalid pointer operations leading to buffer overruns. Tcptrace also generates a
large number of invalid file descriptors. This is mainly due to a lack of resource organization. Particularly
in honeypot traffic, attackers are constantly scanning the honeypot resulting in a large number of concurrent
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Error Tcptrace Tcpflow Tcpick
Invalid read s=4 5 0 0 occurrences
Invalid read s=1 2 11 0 occurrences
Definitely lost 345 0 16 bytes
Possibly lost 49152 0 0 bytes
Invalid file descriptors 36196 0 0 occurrences
Uninitialized 0 4 2 occurrences
Table 7.2: Valgrind Tests
Figure 7.7: Fragroute - Attacks - Setup
TCP flows. Keeping every flow in memory is not an option if network traces of several GB are to be analyzed.
Consequently, tcptrace opens a file descriptor per reassembled stream. The number of file descriptors is limited
by the system, and when they run out, tcptrace simply continues without notifying the user. The result is that
some sessions are not reassembled, allowing a clever attacker to wipe her traces by flooding the honeypot with
TCP sessions.
The table 7.3 summarizes the test results of fragroute which is designed to test network intrusion detection
systems [133]. The setup of the experiment is presented in figure 7.7. A stream is transmitted from an attacker
to the victim. The attacker and the victim are on different networks. Instead of using a standard router to
route the packets from one network to another, fragroute was used. All the network packets were captured by
tcpdump and the resulting files were used to test the network forensic tools. Fragroute was instrumented to
modify the packet streams to perform TCP man-in-the-middle attacks [133] (B1, T1, T5, F7). On the target
machine, denoted victim, the stream from the attacker was stored. Each time a stream was transmitted from the
attacker to the victim, the received stream was compared with the stored in order to ensure correct transmission
despite the TCP attacks. For each type of attack a PCAP file was stored, if the stream was correctly transmitted.
These PCAP files were analyzed with the network forensic tools. In addition, fragroute was disabled once, and
the stream was transmitted via IPv6. Each column of table 7.3 describes a preset fragroute attack than can be
enabled by the given command line switch. The symbol
√
is used if the attack was successful and the symbol
× is used if the attack failed. The versions of the forensic tools are summarized in table 7.4. Surprisingly, many
of the old attacks still work today against state-of-the-art network forensic tools despite fragroute is being more
than ten years old. Hence, network captures from high-interaction honeypots are not a reliable information
source.
The fundamental problem of flow identification can theoretically be exploited by an attacker. We propose
the PCAP bomb as proof of concept. A typical use case of the PCAP bomb is when an attacker suspects that all
the traffic is being recorded. The attacker deploys the PCAP bomb by generating specially designed flows to an
arbitrary host. Later analysis of the network traffic will trigger the PCAP bomb and destroy the analysis results.
The name “PCAP bomb” is used for historical reasons inspired from the 42.zip bomb or compression bomb,
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Attack Tcpflow Wireshark Tcptrace Tcpick
B1
√ √ √ √
T1 × × × ×
T5 × × × ×
F7 × √ × ×
IPv65 × √ √ ×
Table 7.3: Fragroute Tests
Tool Version
Tcpflow 0.21-11
Wireshark 0.99.6a
Tcptrace 6.6.1-1.3
Tcpick 0.2.1
Table 7.4: Forensic Tool Versions
which were frequently used by attackers to disable anti-virus software [121]. The advantage of the PCAP bomb
is that collateral damage is limited. An attacker does not require a lot of network bandwidth to deploy such
a bomb, and network equipment is not hit. The full damage is done on the machine carrying out the forensic
analysis.
An overview of the PCAP bomb is presented in figure 7.8. The idea is to create flow-tuple collisions.
Assume that the first tuple has the lowest ISN (Initial Sequence Number), IS N1, with the next flow having a
larger ISN, IS N2. The flow starting with IS N2 is put in the same stream as the flow IS N1 due to a stream
identification collision, and starts at a much higher offset IS N2 − IS N1. The fake stream between the end of the
first flow and the beginning of the next flow is filled either with random data or with zeros, depending on the
implementation of the forensic tool. The proof of concept shell script needed to create a PCAP bomb is shown
in figure 7.9. The bomb can be constructed using standard networking tools. The multi purpose relay tool
socat is configured to reuse the same source port, is started in a loop in order to generate multiple flow-tuple
collisions. The ISN difference is increased by using higher delays between successive flows: a time difference
of 1 second between successive flows and the generation of 5 flow-collisions results on average in a stream
length of 2GB. If an attacker generates 20 such collisions, meaning that she has generated 100 flows in total,
she has been able to generate 40GB of traces from just 48KB bytes of raw TCP packets. Tcpflow, version
0.21-11, is vulnerable to this attack6.
An attacker can also use a flow-tuple collision to hide a stream. A typical scenario involves an attacker who
wants to download a malicious programs from a public-visible repository. The malicious software is accessible
through an URL which the attacker wants to hide. To achieve this, the attacker establishes a dummy connection
to the root of the repository and then reuses the same source port to trigger a flow-tuple collision. A honeypot
operator using the “Follow stream” feature from the popular Wireshark tool, version 0.99.6a, sees an empty
window instead of the program from the URL7. These preliminary tests showed that the network layer is not a
perfectly reliable information source. Hence, the focus is put at the system layer in the next section.
7.4 User Mode Linux Tests
User Mode Linux (UML) is a customized Linux kernel that runs on top of a host kernel as a collection of
non-privileged processes [42] and is frequently used to set up high-interaction honeypots [45, 70, 193]. User
Mode Linux can be built from any recent Linux kernel (version >2.6). It is included in the default kernel as
6A proof is shown in the appendix chapter C.
7A proof is shown in the appendix chapter C.
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Figure 7.8: PCAP Bomb - Design
1 tcpdump -i lo -s0 -w pcap-bomb.cap &
2 i=1235
3 while [ 1 ]; do
4 j=0
5 while [ \$j -lt 5 ]; do
6 cat req.txt | socat - tcp:localhost:80, \
7 sourceport=$i,reuseaddr
8 sleep 1
9 let j=$j+1
10 done
11 let i=$i+1
12 done
Figure 7.9: PCAP Bomb - Proof of Concept in Bash
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1 #include <sys/mman.h>
2 void main() {
3 mmap((void*) 0x10000, 1048576, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED |
4 MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_NORESERVE, -1, 0);
5 }
Figure 7.10: System Call of Death - Proof-of-Concept
1 Eeek! page_mapcount(page) went negative! (-1)
2 page pfn = 175
3 page->flags = 400
4 page->count = 1
5 page->mapping = 00000000
6 vma->vm_ops = 0x8227ae8
7 vma->vm_ops->fault = special_mapping_fault+0x0/0x60
8 Kernel panic - not syncing: BUG!
Figure 7.11: Kernel Output
a separate architecture. The UML kernel loads a dedicated file system image. In order to start, a 4GB file is
filled with zeros, then this file is formated with an Ext3 file system. This file is then loop-back mounted on
a mount-point of the host operating system. Because of the availability of tools like debootstrap [12] which
automatically install all programs necessary for a Debian or Ubuntu operating system, we decided to install a
minimalistic Ubuntu operating system in the file system image.
UML supports Copy-On-Write images (COW) [42]. The UML kernel takes two file system images. The
first of these is static, including the operating system and fixed configuration files. During the operation of the
UML kernel, all file system changes are written to the second file, with the result that the original operating
system is not touched. Hence, heavily compromised systems can easily be restored. Another advantage of
User Mode Linux, compared to real virtual machines like Qemu [18], is that the CPU is not emulated: CPU
instructions triggered by an attacker are directly executed on the host hardware. User Mode Linux allows the
creation of virtual hosts and routers on a single physical machine with negligible performance overhead because
the hardware is used directly rather than being emulated. Despite these attractive advantages of UML, Holz et
al. [70] report numerous techniques for identifying UML systems, so we went a step further. Our purpose is to
determine whether, having detected a confining UML environment, an attacker could escape it or take control
it. Even though when he had disabled kernel modules and dev/kmem, we discovered a that an attacker could
execute the code presented in figure 7.10, which succeeds in destroying the honeypot by crashing the kernel
as shown in figure 7.11. The kernel is unable even to synchronize data any more. This means that unsaved
file system changes are not persisted. An attacker can take down the entire UML system as a non-privileged
user. After identifying the vulnerabilities, we incrementally downgraded the UML kernel using the official
Linux source code repository in order to determine scale of the impact of the proof of concept. Thirty kernels
are vulnerable (see table 7.5) to the proof of concept presented in figure 7.10, representing a large population
that could be taken down by attackers. As a mitigation technique, the system call can be patched such that
the invalid arguments are rejected in advance. In addition, SELinux [142] or Apparmor [103] can be used as
mitigation techniques. These components run in the kernel of the host operating system and are able to monitor
processes running in user space. A policy can be established for the User Mode Linux processes such that only
a limited set of system calls are allowed. Each policy violation results in process termination.
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v2.6.27-rc9 v2.6.27 v2.6.27-rc1 v2.6.25-rc9
v2.6.27-rc8 v2.6.26-rc9 v2.6.26-rc2 v2.6.25-rc8
v2.6.27-rc7 v2.6.26-rc8 v2.6.26-rc1 v2.6.25-rc7
v2.6.27-rc6 v2.6.26-rc7 v2.6.26 v2.6.25-rc6
v2.6.27-rc5 v2.6.26-rc6 v2.6.25-rc5 v2.6.25-rc2
v2.6.27-rc4 v2.6.26-rc5 v2.6.25-rc4 v2.6.25
v2.6.27-rc3 v2.6.26-rc4 v2.6.25-rc3 v2.6.25-rc1
v2.6.27-rc2 v2.6.26-rc3
Table 7.5: Vulnerable Linux Kernels
7.5 In vivo Malware Analysis
The states of the model presented in chapter 5 are identified with program names. However, attackers could
modify these names or replace them with customized programs. Moreover, attacker could infect existing pro-
grams by adding malicious code. Therefore, we are looking forward for a more robust state representation
based on system calls. In [185] we propose a unified approach for the analysis of both process-related informa-
tion and system calls executed. This topic is of interests for several reasons. From a conceptual point of view,
there is a need to represent two types of relevant information in the same model. Attack detection and analysis
would be improved if two disparate types of information could be represented on the same model. The first type
comprises relationships between processes, for instance the fact that one process launches another one. The
second concerns the low-level inter-working between a host system and executed software. One possible infor-
mation source can be provided by system calls performed during execution. There are at least two application
domains for our approach: online host-level intrusion detection and malware analysis. A good host-level intru-
sion detector should be able to identify in real time that some user sessions are suspicious when, for instance,
anomalies in user sessions occur. Such anomalies can be generated by sessions that launch processes that differ
from those expected. We argue in this section that process-related information that also comprises relationships
among processes can serve to build better host-level intrusion detectors. Malware analysis can also benefit from
our work. Additionally, the detection and classification of malware can be improved by a combined process
and system call mechanism. Obfuscated malware components might be revealed by exploring similarities in
the structure of the underlying processes and system calls.
In chapter 5, process trees are extracted from the kernel operating the honeypot in order to determine the
input sequences provided by an attacker. We enhance the process tree model, presented in chapter 5, and use
tree kernels and graph-based kernels in order to to compare these process trees and so determine common
behavior or anomalies with respect to legitimate SSH sessions.
7.5.1 Tree- and Graph-based kernels
Kernel methods are advanced mathematical tools for the classification (either supervised or unsupervised) of
high-dimensional data. Their potential lies in the computation performed by a kernel function, which reveals
the level of similarity between data sets. The input data is mapped into a higher dimensional space, such that the
mapped data categories become separable and the distance (derived from a scalar product and corresponding
to degree of similarity) in the mapped space can be directly derived from the original input space. In the recent
past, kernel methods [168] have been shown to be very useful in solving problems from disparate domains such
as bioinformatics or natural language processing.
The first contribution is a model that uses tree-based structures to evaluate process trees captured from live
systems. An extension is based on graph kernels. Our second contribution is a method for capturing complex
relationships among processes, executed system calls and other synthetic measures using the same objective.
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Tree-based kernel functions
The method described in [106, 107] defines a tree kernel function based on the decomposition of a tree into its
constituent substructures — subtrees or partial trees. In general, a kernel function is based on the inner product
of input objects, which have been mapped onto a higher — dimensional vector space. In a tree kernel function,
the similarity between two input trees T1 and T2 is measured by computing the number of common patterns
(subtrees) between the two trees. This can be done without needing an exhaustive computation over the entire
fragment space.
We have extended this kernel [32, 106] in order to capture host-related process information. For having a
fragment set F = { f1, f2,. . . }, the indicator function In is defined by [32] to be 1 if the target fragment fi has its
root in node n or 0 otherwise. The kernel function defined by [32, 106] is shown in eq. 7.19.
K(T1, T2) =
∑
n1∈NT1
∑
n2∈NT2
∆(n1, n2) (7.19)
where the sets of nodes of T1 and T2 are represented by NT1 and NT2 and the number of fragments common
to n1 and n2 by eq. 7.20.
∆(n1, n2) =
|F|∑
i=1
Ii(n1)Ii(n2) (7.20)
where ∆ has the following recursive rule set defined in eq. 7.21,
1. ∆(n1,n2) = 0 if productions at n1 and n2 are different
2. ∆(n1,n2) = 1 if productions at n1 and n2 are the same and have only leaf nodes
∆(n1, n2) =
nc(n1)∏
j=1
(σ + ∆(c jn1 , c jn2 ) (7.21)
where nc(n1) represents the number of n1 children, c jn the j-th child of node n and σ ∈ {0, 1} is the
parameter for evaluating subtrees and subset trees introduced by [106]. To include leaf nodes in the
fragment space, [106] adds a condition to the recursive rule set. ∆(n1,n2) = 1, if n1 and n2 are leaves and
their associated symbols are equal. The similarity score is normalized in the kernel space by applying eq.
7.22.
K′(T1, T2) = K(T1, T2)√K(T1, T1) × K(T2, T2)
(7.22)
Graph kernels
On compromised machines attackers often install server software which are programs that run as daemon.
Using the process tree model presented in chapter 5, only the deployment of the program and the program
execution can be observed. However, all the actions being performed by the program itself are not handled with
the process tree model. If an attacker installs a new server and reconnects to this server in order to continue his
attack, then these steps are not observed with the process tree model. To handle the case of generalized graphs
(Tree-based kernels can be applied only to connected acyclic graphs), we considered the more general functions
presented in [84, 85], which introduce a family of kernel functions that addresses labeled graphs. A labeled
graph is a directed graph G, a number of |G| vertices and a labeling function. In the graph, each vertex has a
unique index between 1 and |G|. The label of the vertex i is vi∈Σv and the edge label from i to j is ei j∈ΣE. A
kernel function K(G,G′) between two graphs G and G′ having both vertex and edge labels is introduced in [84].
The main building block for computing the kernel functions is the random walk. A random walk is given by
the hidden sequence h = (h1,...hl), where l is the length of h and has values between 1 and |G|. In the first step,
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h1 is established by the initial probability distribution ps(h). After the i-th step the next node hi is determined
by the transition probability pt(hi|hi−1), the random walk may end with probability pq(hi−1):
|G|∑
j=1
pt(h j|hi) + pq(hi−1) = 1 (7.23)
For the labeled path h the posterior probability can be described as follows, where l is the length of h.
p(h|G) = ps(h1)
l∏
i=2
pt(hi |hi−1)pq(hl) (7.24)
The joint kernel Kz can be defined from two graphs G and G′, using hidden sequences h and h′. During a
random walk the visited labels might be as follows, vh1 eh1 vh2eh2 vh3 eh3 . . .
Two kernel functions can be defined using vertex and edge labeling respectively, K(v,v′) and K(e,e′). Both
kernel functions are assumed to be nonnegative: K(v,v′), K(e,e′)≥0. An example of a vertex label kernel is the
identity kernel, where δ is a function returning value 1 if an argument holds, 0 otherwise.
K(v, v′) = δ(v = v′) (7.25)
If the labels used are defined in R8, the Gaussian kernel [146] is a good candidate:
K(v, v′) = exp(−‖v − v′‖2/2σ2) (7.26)
In general, the joint kernel is computed by the product of the label kernels. If the lengths of the two hidden
sequences are equal that is l=l′, the following equation can be applied:
Kz(z, z′) = K(vh1, v′h′1)
l∏
i=2
K(ehi−1h′i , e′h′i−1h′i ) × K(vhi , v
′
h′1
) (7.27)
If the lengths of the sequences are not equal (l,l′), then Kz(z,z′)=0.
7.5.2 The Process Tree Model
Process execution commands on a host can be monitored and processed. The results of the monitoring process
are process trees. A process tree, formally defined in chapter 5, is redefined as an ordered pair T = (V, E), where
V=(p1,...,pn) describes the set of nodes and E=(t1,...,t j) represents the set of labeled edges. We distinguish
between three different node types: PID, Process name and System call.
• A PID node refers to a process identifier in a Linux operating system
• A Process name (pn) refers to a the process name transmitted as argument to the system call sys execve
• The System call (sc) node refers to a system call number implemented in the Linux kernel
In order to compute the tree-based kernel function afterwards, the types of nodes have to be of the same type.
Nodes that have different types will have a similarity of 0. Further, we distinguish between three types of edges,
PID-to-PID, PID-to-pn and PID-to-sc.
• The PID-to-PID edge refers to one process that has created another and is labeled with a time difference
between the two nodes.
8
R is the set of real numbers.
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• The PID-to-pn represents a process has started a another program and is also labeled with the time
difference.
• The last type of edge, PID-to-sc, describes how many times the given system call is executed, and is
labeled with the number of executions. Such a link models the system calls (and their call pattern)
executed by a process.
A main advantage of this proposed model is that cycles in the data structure can be avoided, even if the
number of different nodes becomes very large.
An example of a process tree can be seen in figure 7.12. Its root is the initial process identifier (PID) 534,
the privileged separated process [129] of sshd. Process 534 has created two other processes, process 1038
after three seconds and process 1031 after zero seconds. Process 1038 immediately executes the command
uname. Process 1038 has also made a sys write (4), sys execve (11) and two sys read (3) system calls,
represented by boxes in the figure 7.12. On the other tree branch, process 1031 immediately executes the bash
command, then creates process 1041 after a delay of eight seconds. This new process executes wget at once
and ten seconds later creates a new process, which executes ssh brute and tar. To avoid clutter we have not
shown all system calls in the figure 7.12.
1
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Figure 7.12: Example of a Process Tree
7.5.3 The Process Graph Model
The second concept is based on a labeled graph. A graph G can be described as a pair T = (V, E), where
V=(p1(name proc, stat d),. . . , pi(name proc, stat d)).
The set of nodes p is composed of two parameters, the process name parameter name proc and the pa-
rameter for the corresponding probability distribution for system calls, stat d, where stat d = (x1,...,xn) is a set
of distinct variables. S tat d is another identifier for processes [187]. The inter-nodal differences, the distance
between the sets of the probability distribution of the system calls of two nodes, can be established. This takes
into account variants of the same malicious software or the cases where a malicious program tries to mimic
already installed software. For instance, an attacker uses a bot b, adds customized features, and gets bot b1.
If another attacker uses the same bot b, extends it with other minor features and gets bot b2, then the distance
between bot b1 and b2 is probably small. However, if a malicious program tries to mimic another program, for
example by executing out of a file named sshd, the distance between the legacy sshd and the fake sshd is
likely to be quite large.
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sshd
bash uname <(open,4); (read,6); (clone,2); (write,1);· · · >
wget
tar <(open,4); (read,11); (clone,0); (write,3);· · · > <(open,1); (read,1); (clone,1); (write,1);· · · ><(open,4); (read,11); (clone,0); (write,5);· · · >
ls <(open,4); (read,11); (clone,0); (write,3);· · · > sshbrute<(open,1); (read,2); (clone,0); (write,1);· · · >
<(open,4); (read,11); (clone,0); (write,3);· · · >
init
Figure 7.13: Example of a Graph Model
An example of a graph can be seen in figure 7.13. The privileged separated process sshd executes the
processes bash and uname. Next, the program wget and tar are executed by bash. After the execution of
tar, the command ls is executed, followed by the attacker tool ssh brute which is then daemonized9 . For
the clarity, pseudo-edges, represented by dotted lines, are introduced to associate the probability distribution of
system calls to each node.
In this section, published in [185], we have presented an extension to our process tree model initially intro-
duced in chapter 5. We base our approach on supervised classification methods that leverage native graph/tree
kernels. We propose two applicable kernel families: the first uses tree kernels and thus is easier to implement
and has a better operational performance. The second family uses more general graph kernels. Although, in the
latter case, the complexity of the method (algorithmic running times) increases, richer modeling capabilities are
very promising. Our future work will address several remaining issues. We will look at further graph kernels
and assess their applicability, especially with more complex and richer graph-related information, but we also
planned to evaluate our solutions against earlier ones and to study interactions between multiple concurrent
malicious programs. In the context of this PhD thesis we aimed with this contribution to explore potential en-
hancements of our process tree model. However, in the remaining we use the simplified version of the process
tree model presented in chapter 5.
7.6 Implementation of Adaptive Honeypots
Various, adaption mechanisms are described in chapter 6. However, implementing a new honeypot from scratch
for each of these is a tedious and error-prone task. Typically such implementations must be written in the
C programming language, often required code change in kernel space. To overcome these difficulties, we
have created a generic adaptation framework that provides building blocks for adaptive honeypots having the
following requirements:
Kernel control Total control of the kernel is needed, in order to take decisions on allowing or blocking
sys execve system calls. If an attacker with sufficient privilege has compromise a machine she could
potentially take control over the kernel – a worst-case scenario for the honeypot operator –.
Process monitoring Process execution must be tracked, so as to interfere only with system calls that are re-
lated to attackers. Preventing sys execve calls related to the operating system may render the system
unstable.
Opaque decisions An attacker should never be able to use measurements of process execution time to predict
the decisions made by the honeypot. The honeypot should be reactive at all times even when decision
9The parent process of ssh brute becomes the process init.
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making involves computational overhead. Honeypot functionality should not introduce code paths that
are overly complex and non-interruptible, as these may impact the stability of the entire operating system
[97].
Flexible Many different games between attackers and high-interaction honeypots can be imagined. A system
call can be blocked by returning different answers or error codes to an attacker. In the Linux kernel,
version, 33 different error codes can be returned, for instance, permission denied, input output error, out
of memory etc. Our games could be extended with a strategy to select appropriate return codes each
time an attacker-related action is blocked. Therefore, it is preferable to have a flexible architecture which
allows other games to be implemented without large development effort.
7.6.1 Adaptive Honeypot - Framework
An overview of our adaptive honeypot framework is shown in figure 7.14. We focus on a high-interaction hon-
eypot exposing a vulnerable SSH service operated in a customized User Mode Linux (UML) [191]. Attackers
are constantly scanning the Internet for new victims (step 0 in the figure). Once they have discovered the ser-
vice they start launching a brute force attacks against the server in the hope of compromising a user-account.
Nicomette et al. [112] figured out that specific attacker communities specialize in this task. The compromised
accounts are then shared among other attacker communities, which can then get, a shell on User Mode Linux
and can make their attack. In the background the SSH server on the User Mode Linux clones a privilege sepa-
rated process [129] and its information is put into an output queue by the modified UML kernel (step 2). The
AHA daemon, AHAD, fetches this message. For each message, the AHA daemon determines whether the
process belongs to the system itself or to an attacker. If it belongs to system it is allowed by default. However,
if it belongs to an attacker, AHAD passes the message to its intelligence routine for a decision. AHAD puts
its decision as a reply message into an input queue (step 4). In the meantime, the UML kernel waits for τ mil-
liseconds for a decision. After the pause, it polls for the reply message from the input queue (5). If it receives
the decision within the predefined time frame τ, it implements the decision, if not the error ENOMEM is returned
suggesting to the user that the system has run out of memory.
Execution performance is critical for AHAD and UML kernel. Therefore, a minimalistic design is used
for AHAD and for the additional UML kernel functions. They should only fetch a message from the comple-
mentary subsystem and make or implement a decision. Messages only temporarily stay in the queues. The
AHA worker program takes messages from the queues after a fixed time interval and writes them in a log
file. This program also cleans the queues. The Aha eye program takes the raw reassembled messages10 and
generates a report which allows a honeypot operator to observe what is happening.
A generic adaptation mechanism is defined in chapter 5 which is summarized as:
allow The usual control flow of sys execve is used.
block An error code is returned.
substitute The program arguments of the sys execve system call are changed and the regular control flow is
used.
insult The program arguments of the sys execve system call are exchanged with an insulting program.
The modified UML exchanges messages with the AHA daemon. For each sys execve, sys clone and
sys exit system call, UML puts an export message into the output queue. Two directories presented the input
and output queue. Each exported message has a simple key-value format, the fields are separated by the “=”
character. The reason for using this format is that many fields have a variable length, potentially requiring
additional memory management code in the Linux kernel. The alternative of copying everything to the stack is
10An example of a message is shown in the appendix in section D.3.
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Figure 7.14: AHA - Architecture
not a viable technique, because stack length in kernel space is limited. Simply allocating memory with kmalloc
is also tricky because page faults may occur during the creation of concurrent messages, possibly resulting in
deadlocks. In order to correctly associate the decisions to the requests, a unique message is generated containing
a unique filename in the output directory. The uniqueness of the file name avoids concurrency issues. Each
message has a type key which is used to determine the system call created the message. A value of 1 indicates
that sys execve created the message, 2 indicates a sys clone message and 3 indicates a sys exit message.
An export message has a variable length, which depends on the length of the file name of the program that is
executed, the total length of the environment variables and the length of the process identifiers. There is a risk
that the AHA daemon fetches incomplete messages. Therefore, the done key is used to mark the end of the
message. When the AHA daemon sees this key it knows that the message is complete. In appendix section D.3
we show a message created by the sys execve system call. Besides the type and done keys, it contains a file
key which corresponds to the absolute filename of the program that is scheduled to be executed. A program
always has a command line argument: even if the user gives none, the system provides the program name as
the first [97]. An argument key is set for each command line argument. The value for this key corresponds
to the command line argument. A similar technique is used for the environment variables: each environment
variable is identified with an env key denoted. Environment variables are particularly useful for identifying
attackers. For instance, we can see what kind of terminal the attacker is using, the attacker’s locale settings,
and the source IP address and port. Messages resulting from sys clone and sys exit include only process
identifier information. The process identifiers, represented by the keys pid, ppid and rppid, are essential in
determining whether the program execution belongs to an attacker or the system itself.
The reply message, shown in figure 7.15 is composed of three integers. A non-zero value in any field means
the corresponding action should be implemented. A value in the exit field represents the error that should
be returned to the user. Examples of such errors are EPERM=1 (Operation not permitted) and ENOSPC=28
(No space left on the device). A complete error code list is part of the default kernel development tree
(include/asm-generic/errno-base.h). If the field of insult is non-zero, it is passed as an argument to
the /sbin/insult program installed on the honeypot. The argument is used to index an array of insults in the
/sbin/insult program, which sends the corresponding message to an attacker’s terminal. A non-zero value
for the field substitute is used by the honeypot to index a hard-coded table of filenames for executable programs
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1 struct ReplyMessage{
2 int block;
3 int substitute;
4 int insult;
5 };
Figure 7.15: Reply Message Structure
File Function
arch/um/kernel/exec.c sys execve
arch/um/kernel/process.c exit thread
arch/um/sys-i386/syscalls.c sys clone
os-Linux/main.c init
Table 7.6: Modified Kernel Files
that can be run in place of that intended by the attacker.
When an export message is created, a unique message identifier generated in the user mode kernel is at-
tached to it. This identifier is needed to correctly correlate match requests with decisions. To generate such
a unique identifier in the UML kernel without adding large dependencies on other libraries, we exploited the
traditional x86 architecture. With the RDTSC instruction in an inline assembly routine, we queried the time
stamp counter on the CPU processor. The value of this counter changes with every instruction. Hence, these
numbers are unique for code executed on a particular core of the CPU. The 64 bit value returned by RDTSC is
converted to a hexadecimal string which is appended to the output directory path to create a full pathname.
7.6.2 Component Description
UML
Our modified UML can be built with a default UML configuration. We added a new header and C files in
the directories, arch/um/include/ and arch/um/kernel to the Linux kernel development tree, containing
the adoption functions. Obviously, small changes also had to be made to the Linux kernel. The sys execve
wrapper for UML is hooked to export the executed program arguments, along with associated process identifier
and environment variables. Besides these additional monitoring capabilities, the kernel polls replies from the
AHA daemon and implements its decisions. The files that have been modified are presented in table 7.6. In
addition to these files, we added a configuration directory containing configuration files which each contain a
parameter. The reason for using a number of files instead of a single configuration file is that domain specific
files can be parsed by few lines of C language code. In main.c the polling interval τ,which corresponds to
the waiting time for a decision from the AHA daemon, is read from the configuration file pollinterval. A
hook for the sys execve wrapper has been added to the file arch/um/kernel/exec.c: the relevant section
is shown in figure D.2 in the appendix D.3. This function puts a message in the output queue along with
a unique message identifier which is used to ensure that decisions are correctly applied, even when several
system calls are executed concurrently. The function then polls for a reply encapsulated in the flat C structure,
shared between kernel and daemon, shown in figure 7.15.
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Adaptive Honeypot Alternative Daemon
AHAD uses a library, AHAlib, containing the attacker monitoring and adoption mechanisms. The AHA dae-
mon tracks the process hierarchy by following the process tree structure [104]. The relevant information is
provided by the modified UML kernel. If the UML would confuse a decision for a system call initiated by
the system itself with a decision for a system call related to an attacker may have dramatic consequences such
as failures of the system. When an attacker connects to the honeypot, the SSH server clones a privilege sep-
arated process handling the attacker’s connection [129]. The UML kernel notifies the AHA daemon about all
the cloned processes and executed programs. If it sees that the program /usr/sbin/sshd clones a process,
it knows that a new attacker has connected to the honeypot. The process id (PID) is then recorded in a list L
containing all the users connected to the honeypot. This list contains the roots of the process subtrees belong-
ing to SSH connections related to attackers. The AHA daemon creates a reply message stating that the system
call should be allowed or blocked, substituted and whether an insult should be triggered. For each sys clone
or sys execve message, the AHA daemon recursively looks up the corresponding process identifier in the
recorded process tree. If a parent process identifier matches an element in the list L, the daemon knows that the
process belongs to an attacker. If it does not match, the process belongs to the system itself and is allowed by
default.
After having decided whether a process belongs to the system or to an attacker, the AHA daemon is capable
to adopt itself to the attacker. This is the core of our research activities. Reimplementing a honeypot for each
learning solution is not a very productive approach. Hence, we propose a generic framework containing the
implementation of common features, like monitoring attackers, and differentiating between attackers and the
system itself. The AHA daemon uses a library called AHAlib, which is a collection of four classes.
AHAActions This class contains all the necessary functions for communicating with the modified UML. It
contains a functions to load and parse a message from the modified UML kernel. It includes functions to
load, parse, and create reply messages.
KERNEL ERRORS This class contains the errors that can be returned to an attacker’s process. The error
codes are taken from the default Linux development tree and are defined in the file include/asm-generic/
errno-base.h.
ReplyMessage The purpose of this python class is to write a plain C structure. Obviously, the fields of the
structure must be identical with the C structure included in the modified UML kernel (see figure 7.15),
otherwise the decisions will be wrongly interpreted.
ProcessTrees The responsibility of this class is to track process identifiers in order to determine if an executed
program belongs to an attacker or to the system itself. Each time the SSH server clones a process, the
PID is put in a user list in a ProcessTree instance. A process dictionary is also included. This dictionary
is keyed by a process identifier and each entry has an element that points to a parent process identifier.
This information is augmented by an annotated process dictionary, which process identifiers serve as keys
pointing to a third dictionary. This embedded dictionary contains the message creation time stamp and
attacker SSH connection information including her source address. The most important function in this
class is called searchTree(pid,ppid) which takes a process identifier and a parent process identifier
as input and searches in the process tree for a match. If a parent process identifier cannot be found in
the process tree, then it is assumed that the process belongs to the system itself and the value False
is returned. However, if a match is found, the value True is returned, meaning that the parent process
identifier belongs to an attacker. In this case, the current process identifier is also added to the process
tree. The process look up is done recursively. In order to avoid an ever-growing process tree, this class
also has a method to remove processes from both the process tree and the annotated process tree using
information provided by the UML kernel instrumented thread exit function.
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Aha Worker
Execution time is an essential consideration in the operation of an adaptive honeypot. Each system call needs
to be acknowledged by the AHA daemon. If the system calls are suspended for a too long time, the system
may become unstable and unusable. Hence, the AHA daemon should focus only on speedy decision making.
This means that the queues can quickly fill up. Each message exchange results in creation of two files on the
UML host file system. In order to avoid the accumulation of large number of files in a directory, the program
AHA worker daemon periodically checks the queue, selects outdated messages, merges them in a log file and
removes them from the queues. Normally a message initiated by the UML should be acknowledged within
50ms. When a file is created in a queue, the file creation time is recorded. Each file that is older than 1 minute
is merged in the log file and removed from the queue.
Aha Eye
Attacker activity monitoring is an essential task during the operation of a high-interaction honeypot. Aha Eye
takes the merged exchanged messages as input and generates a report describing the sequences of program
executions made by each attacker. In order to determine such a sequence, the process trees are inspected and
recovered by Aha Eye using AHAlib. Each time the SSH server clones a privilege separated process, p0, an
attacker has connected. All the programs executed during an SSH session belong to the process tree of an
attacker, and so have the process p0 as root. The sequences of executed programs from such a tree must to be
recovered with the help of relative timestamps taken from the messages generated by the modified User Mode
Linux. For a process tree of an attacker, that is a subtree of the overall process tree, the privilege separated
process is remembered and considered as the root of the process tree related to an attacker. Each branch from
the root to each leaf is inspected and each edge contains the time difference between these nodes. For each
node on a given branch, the sum of the time differences is computed serving as index in the process execution
sequence. An illustrative example is shown in figure 7.16. The SSH server cloned a privilege separated process,
with the process identifier 4121. After 1 second this process clones another process with the identifier 4127.
This process then executes the program bash with the program argument bash (first program argument set by
default). This means that for this branch (marked in the left part of the figure) the sum of time differences is 1
+ 1 + 0 = 2. After 2 seconds the processes with the identifier 4121 cloned another process with the identifier
4129 which executes after 3 seconds the program bash. For this branch (marked in the right part of the figure)
the sum of time differences is 0 + 2 + 3 + 0 = 5. Due to the fact that 5 > 2 we know that the command bash
was executed prior the program uname. The SSH server also exports SSH environment variables to its child
processes which include the source IP address of the attacker, the source port and the used terminal.
7.7 Conclusions
The best practices [154] for setting up high-interaction honeypots advise that all the network traffic related to
the honeypot should be recorded, for instance, by creating a network tap on the interface to which the honeypot
is connected. Capturing all network traffic results in a large volume of data. In order to facilitate the monitoring
operation, we propose two network traffic visualization techniques. Our PeekKernelFlows approach, of [184]
gives an aggregated overview of overall network traffic based on Aguri. Aguri aggregates network traffic,
resulting in aggregation profiles. We suggest a visualization approach of these profiles. A more detailed attack
distinction is made with our polar representation. Assuming that an attacker on the honeypot could not take over
the network switch and destroy the tap, the attacker could not tamper with the network traces. Even when an
attacker cannot remove traces, we identified techniques she could use to obfuscate her traces. Her raw packets
are still in the trace, but showing she could trigger faulty behavior of commonly-used network tools. We give a
proof of concept in [179] showing how an attacker can hide a stream and how she could terminate the network
analysis by force with our PCAP bomb. The essential problem we described in [178] can be reduced to an
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Figure 7.16: Recovering Attacker Sessions
imprecise definition of network flows that can be exploited by an attacker. Therefore, before performing the
network analysis, the network traces must be preprocessed in order to eliminate such collisions.
Because a honeypot may not immediately recognize the significance of all the attacker related software
which is often malware, our approach published in [185] suggests an in vivo malware analysis approach, where
profiles of system calls are generated during an active attack. The proposed profiles can also be used to harden
our automaton against state tampering made by an attacker.
Like a traditional high-interaction honeypot an adaptive high-interaction honeypot offers a complete operat-
ing system to attackers. However, an adaptive honeypot has also to interfere with commands run by an attacker.
User Mode Linux runs as non-privileged processes on the host operating system and provides useful features
for interacting with the host operating system and allows a variety of functions to quickly implement adaptation
behaviors. As we showed in [180] an attacker can perform a forced take down of the system without any extra
privileges. Hence, the mmap system call has to be patched in order to close the discovered vulnerability. The
vulnerability could also be mitigated using Apparmor or SELinux.
Using these mitigation techniques, we propose an implementation of an adaptive honeypot framework in
order to integrate a variety of learning algorithms into high-interaction honeypots without reimplementing the
honeypot from scratch each time. Each system call related to the process execution of an attacker has to be
acknowledged by a decision-making routine that implements the learning approach. The design and source
code was published in [176] and can be checked out from our publicly available repository [174] which is an
augmented clone of the Linux kernel git repository.
7.8 Limitations
Currently a few challenges needs to be addressed in the adaptive honeypot framework. First of all, an at-
tacker could explicitly look for artifacts specific to the adaptive honeypot. Obviously, an adaptive honeypot is
slower than a regular high-interaction honeypot, due to the necessary interprocess communication and decision-
making. However, it is difficult for an attacker to make a timing attack on the decision-making routine of the
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honeypot. This is mainly due to the constant polling interval, which is set to 50ms in the modified UML. An at-
tacker could also look for the program /sbin/insult, because this tool is not installed on regular systems. An
attacker could even remove this program. Additional work is needed to hide and protect this program by using
traditional rootkit techniques [101]. An attacker could also do an indirect attack on the honeypot. She could
first push an attack script to the honeypot and install a cron job that executes the script. An adaptive honeypot
then only sees and interferes with the deployment of the script. When crond executes the script, the adaptive
honeypot framework classifies its activity to system process executions and allows them by default. In order to
tackle this problem, file system changes also need to be tracked. We could complement our approach by modi-
fying the tty read and tty write functions to assess attackers’ typing capabilities, for instance whether they
use backspaces or cursor keys. Other interprocess communication techniques, like shared memory segments,
named pipes or socket can be explored in order to optimize execution performance and avoid kernel deadlocks.
Other protection mechanisms for User Mode Linux should also be explored to reduce the possibility of interfer-
ence with the kernel. We could also adapt a virtual hardware layer of virtual machines to communicate with the
adaptive honeypot daemon. However, this requires a larger development effort than modifying a Linux kernel
and, as such, was out of scope in providing a proof of concept for adaptive honeypots.
Chapter 8
Experimental Evaluations
In this chapter are described the experiments related to adaptive high - interaction honeypots. We setup state-
of-the art high-interaction honeypot and a low-interaction honeypot to recover traces from attackers. The traces
from the high-interaction honeypots are used to to compute the optimal strategy profiles for attackers and the
honeypot. In a next step, we evaluate adaptive honeypots driven by reinforcement learning and fast concurrent
learning which have a higher adaptation degree than the adaptive honeypot which optimal behavior is defined
through simulations.
8.1 Recovering High-Interaction Honeypot Traces
A high-interaction honeypot capable of recording sys execve and clone system calls has been setup to induce
our hierarchical probabilistic automaton described in chapter 5. The automaton instance serves as ground truth
for the computation of Nash equilibria. The Linux kernel was directly patched in order to avoid detection by
address arithmetic which is an attack described by McCarty [101]. The data collected in kernel space is directly
transmitted to the hardware level in order to avoid it being accessible by an attacker. The honeypot is operated
with the Qemu x86 emulator [18]. The kernel inside Qemu was modified such that process ids are logged. The
host machine stores this data in a database. The honeypot has an additional network interface which transmits
the system logs to a syslog-ng server. The default running service is a SSH server which serves as an entry point
for attackers. It could be configured to use the PAM module pam permit. In this case no password is required
and this may be very suspicious for attackers. Therefore, the pam unix module was modified. The patch
is described in section D.1. It is responsible for password authentication in Linux operating systems. With
the patch, the system asks for a password but then neglects all non-privileged user passwords. The attacker
is asked a password and each password is accepted as valid password. This implementation choice is also
resistant against password changes performed by attackers [135, 138], because the password is not checked
anymore. In theory an attacker could also change the PAM modules during the operation of our honeypot but
this phenomenon has not been observed. At the same time, some attackers installed their own shell in order to
be sure that they are not using a shell with additional monitoring features. Furthermore, other attackers replaced
the SSH server on the honeypot.
From this honeypot, we recovered the process trees related to attackers which are sub trees of the Unix
process tree on the honeypot. These process trees were transformed in process vectors. Each vector corresponds
to an attack. From the observed process vectors a hierarchical probabilistic automaton was created to drive the
simulation. Our data sets and developed software are publicly available1.
The honeypot was operated on one public IPv4 address and consisted of a Ubuntu Linux 7.10 operating
system. The Linux operating system was ran in a virtual machine operated by Qemu, version 0.9.1. We patched
the pam unix module, version 0.99.7.1 in order to facilitate access to attackers and to mitigate the effects of an
1http://quuxlabs.com/˜gerard/jogy-experiment
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attacker changing the password of a compromised account. Moreover, we want to mitigate the fact of attackers
installing compromised SSH servers as it was reported by Raynal et al. [138]. We extended the Linux kernel,
version 2.6.28-rc6 with the sys execve and clone monitoring features.
During the operation of the honeypot, 637 successful ssh logins and 12140 ssh failures were observed.
Despite the patched pam unix module, a high number of ssh failures was discovered. For 61% of the failed
ssh attempts, the root account was targeted which was explicitly blocked by our pam unix module patch.
Besides the 13 system accounts, 12 additional user accounts have been created. Therefore, 25 non privileged
user accounts existed in total. Attackers tested 1763 non existing accounts with different passwords which is
another explanation for the high number of SSH failures. For the successful logins, 183 different IP addresses
were recorded. Some attackers modified the kernel but the virtual machine was configured in such a way that a
reboot was translated into a power off. The kernel changes are noticed because the file system of the honeypot
was periodically mounted (loop back) and checksums were computed to detect changes. Whenever, the kernel
was changed, the modified kernel was replaced with the original.
637 process trees were recovered. The root of each process tree was the privileged separated process by
sshd. The smallest trees have only one node and the tree with the maximum nodes had 1954 nodes. The
small trees can be explained by brute force attacks against the SSH server which were performed by some
attackers using automated tools. Automated tools managed to break into the honeypot but left immediately.
The maximum length of a process tree is due to bots that were installed on our honeypot. The bot master had
long sessions with the bot in order to operate it. Due to data processing capabilities trees of length longer than
100 nodes, were not processed. The average number of nodes per process tree is 105 with a standard deviation
of 231.
Each process tree was converted into a process vector aiming to extract the program sequences performed
by an attacker. The longest process vector is composed of 85 programs and the smallest one contains only 1
program. The average process vector length is 6.16 with a standard deviation of 2.81.
The hierarchical probabilistic automaton was set up using the recovered process trees. We obtained 91 dif-
ferent programs (states). Each program is on its own an automaton based on the command line arguments. To
simplify the automaton, the first command line argument (which corresponds to the program name in a Linux
operating system) was removed. On average, programs have 9.72 command line arguments. The program with
the most observed command line arguments has 181 arguments and some programs have one program argu-
ment. The standard deviation of the program arguments per program is 23.5. A large number of command line
arguments can be explained by substitutions done by the program bash [111]. For instance the argument * is
substituted by the program bash with a file list in the current directory. Moreover the hierarchical probabilistic
automaton contains 581 different transitions. To model unknown or unseen transitions we smoothed the transi-
tion probabilities. Due to the fact that in our simulation the attacker selects the path with the highest probability,
the smoothing factor is selected in such a way that the path probabilities are not affected. Figure 8.1 shows the
evaluation of the smoothing factor from 4.48 · 10−15 to 4.48 · 10−3 which are multiples of 10 of the lowest path
probability. For each smoothing factor, we computed the average number of transitions from the initial states
(always /usr/sbin/sshd) until the final states (last programs executed by attackers2). In the range of 4.48·10−15 to
4.48 · 10−6 the average number of transitions remains constant and for values larger that 4.48 · 10−6 the average
number of transitions linearly decreases due to the fact that an attacker can select artificial shortcuts. We used a
smoothing factor of 4.48 · 10−08, which does not change the number of average transitions and is large enough
to avoid rounding errors. The number of transitions increased to 8281 which is the square of the number of
states which can be explained that we have a fully interconnected automaton.
8.2 Recovering Low-Interaction Honeypot Traces
In order to recover traces from a low-interaction honeypot simulating a vulnerable SSH server, Hali was devel-
oped. Besides, the traces from an high-interaction honeypot, traces of a low-interaction honeypot are desired
2The longest process vector was removed due to data processing limitations.
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in order to compare our adaptive honeypots with a classical low-interaction and high-interaction honeypot.
Hali is a pure python shell serving as low-interaction honeypot. Hali is a bluffing honeypot that reproduces
attacker outputs from previously deployed honeypots. Hali is a shell implemented in python with ncurses [137]
and with a memcached back-end [51]. The memcached back-end is a volatile server containing outputs from
high-interaction honeypots. This means that the information is only kept in memory. Furthermore, memcached
does not use a relational query language but only key-values can be stored or retried. This has as consequence
that lookups are faster than on a persistent database. Furthermore, during the operation of Hali, Hali’s knowl-
edge can be extended without restarting the experiment. This is partially important because hosts with a large
uptime are more interesting for attackers. An alternative implementation choice would be a shared memory
segment. However, ready to use memcached clients exists that can be used by a honeypot operator to manage
the database. Hali reads a command line from an attacker, queries a random pre-generated output from a mem-
cached database. The input characters are logged to a syslog server [16]. Using this remote logging facilities,
an attacker cannot interfere with existing logs. The architecture is shown in figure 8.2. Hali is foreseen to be
installed in a User Mode Linux as default shell, with a patched pam unix module. The User Mode Linux has
two network interfaces. One with a public IP address (network interface tap0) where it is accessible via SSH,
and one private (network interface tap1) which is used to export syslog messages and which is used for the
memcached queries. The tool tc [75] is used to limit the throughput of the network interface having the public
IP address. The network traffic is also filtered with an iptables [136] firewall in order to mitigate scanning
activities performed by attackers. With a limited and filtered bandwidth, attacks towards third parties can be
limited. These are best practices to operate honeypots [154]. An attacker connects to the UML (ssh user @
<public IP address>). Hali records the SSH environment variables via syslog. From these variables the source
IP address and source port of the user is recovered which can be used to correlate network captures with SSH
shell sessions. The correlation is based on the source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination
port and timestamp. Messages are sent to the syslog server that is reachable via the <management IP address>.
The rationale to select two network interfaces is to avoid that syslog starts dropping messages while users are
heavily probing the public available network interface. The user enters a command by typing characters. These
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Figure 8.2: Hali Deployment Architecture
characters are also logged via syslog to the syslog server. When the user hits the key <Enter>, Hali selects an
pre-generated output via memcached, where the server is also accessible from the <management IP address>.
The selected output identifier is also logged via syslog. Hali is configured with a configuration file which is
used by Hali and other tools (memcached) related to Hali. First of all, the User Mode Linux should be correctly
configured, shown in architecture, with one public IP address and one management IP address. On the host
of the User Mode Linux, GNU screen can be started. This has as advantage that a honeypot operator could
remotely attach to each running process for its state inspection. In one window memcached can be started, in
another one the User Mode Linux, and in anther one tcpdump to capture all the network packets. On the host
machine syslog-ng can be installed, acting as syslog server. Inside the User Mode Linux syslog-ng could be
configured to export messages to the host machine using the management network interface.
Hali was our second honeypot experiment and was operated from 2009-09-04 to 2009-12-19, on one public
IPv4 IP address. Within this time frame 342 unique IP addresses were observed. These 342 hosts did 6087
SSH connections. The traces of Hali are not used for computing Nash equilibria but for evaluating the learning
honeypots.
8.3 Computing Nash Equilibria
The hierarchical probabilistic automaton based on the data described in section 8.1 is used to simulate attacks
in order to compute payoffs for each player. These payoffs are then used to determine the optimal strategy
profiles by computing Nash equilibria. We simulated the honeypot strategies (Pr(Block)) and attacker strategies
(Pr(Quit), Pr(Retry), Pr(Alternative)) in a range of 0 and 1 in a step of 0.10 respecting the relation 6.1.
In a second step, we computed Nash equilibria using the game theory simulator Gambit [166]. Only mixed
equilibria have been found. If we consider the first game (upper half of the table 8.1) then one mixed Nash
equilibrium exists: for instance, the honeypot can decide to use either a blocking probability of 0.10 or of 0.90.
It should use 0.10 in 54% of the cases and 0.9 in 46% of the cases. The attacker should use Pr(Quit) equal to 0.3
or 0.4 with associated probabilities 0.73 and 0.27 respectively. Similarly, value choices according to the table
can be set for Pr(Retry) and Pr(Alternative). The second game, (lower half of the table 8.1), has also a mixed
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Rph R
p
a
q Pr(Block) q Pr(Quit) Pr(Retry) Pr(Alternative)
0.54 0.1 0.73 0.3 0.4 0.3
0.46 0.9 0.27 0.4 0.2 0.4
Rth R
t
a
0.3 0.4 0.14 0.6 0.2 0.2
0.51 0.7 0.26 0.8 0 0.2
0.19 1 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.1
Table 8.1: Gambit Simulation Results
equilibrium: the honeypot should use three different blocking probabilities (0.4, 0.7, 1) with corresponding
probabilities 0.3, 0.51 and respectively 0.19. This is interesting, since blocking all transitions ( Pr(Block) = 1
) should be done in 19% of the cases. The attacker can also set his optimal strategies with respect to this table.
The Nash equilibrium regarding the payoff computations Rta tells us that the attacker should leave the honeypot
in most of the cases (60% and 80%)3. Playing a game respecting the payoff computation Rth is more attractive
for attackers but less informative for the honeypot. Therefore, we decided to go for the payoff computation Rph .
In that case, rational attackers leave in at least 30% of the cases and at most in 40% of the cases.
A first prototype of the adaptive honeypot framework (shown in chapter 7.6) was instrumented to use
the optimal blocking probabilities defined in the Nash equilibria. The adaptive honeypot was deployed from
2010-01-19 until 2010-01-28 and in that short period, 31 attackers were observed. Each attacker is identified
with an IP address. The polling interval τ was empirically set to 50ms. The system was still usable and the
program AHAD has still enough time to react. In figure 8.3 we observe that the attackers enter more commands
compared to a standard high-interaction honeypot. The comparison of the two process vector averages shows
that attackers execute 3.45 commands more on the adaptive honeypot than on the regular honeypot. This is a
gain of 55%. In both cases, for the initial high-interaction honeypot and the adaptive honeypot we removed
the process vectors related to probes from brute force scanners just for the sake for this comparison. In case
of a scan a single IP address is probing many user accounts. The original datasets remain untouched and one
attacker from the 31 has been removed. The adaptive honeypot results may be premature due to the short
period of operation. In addition, the experiments have been done at different dates. However, the purpose
of this experiment was to see whether adaptive high-interaction honeypots work in real life and to determine
whether attackers play and accept the challenge or if they just leave. A public available kernel development
fork including adaptive honeypot features has been released4 aiming to contribute to the security community.
8.4 Reinforcement Learning Driven Honeypots
In section 8.1 and 8.2, we operated a high- and a low-interaction honeypot to evaluate Heliza. Each honeypot
was operated until 349 successful attacks have been observed.
In the early stages of our honeypot development, it was questionable whether attackers would react to in-
sults. Such a reaction would be an immediate disclosure of personal information regarding attacker. Particularly
interestingly, we observed 1011 insults from attackers. From a purely ethical point of view, we cannot print
these insults in this chapter5. However, we can give some information (table 8.2) about the used language by
attackers to insult Heliza. For most insults we were not able to discover the language attacker used. Some
3Assuming that the attacker aims at reaching the Nash equilibrium.
4git.quuxlabs.com
5The term insult may be misleading because it also includes typographic errors. As it has been defined in chapter 5 an insult is an
input provided by an attacker that does neither correspond to a system program, nor to a program installed by an attacker, nor an empty
command.
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insults consisted of only one character or some random keystrokes. 17% of the insults were due to misspelled
command, like the command uanme where we believed that the attacker wanted to type uname. From these
attacker inputs it is highly probable that a human being was connected to Heliza, rather than an automated
script assuming that most attackers test their malicious automated attacks before running them. Heliza always
used the English language to insult attackers and, surprisingly, fewer than 10% of the returned insults were in
English and 12% were in Romanian. Some attackers (5%) showed a sense of humor and replied with a smiley.
The right part of table contains the top 10 commands entered by attackers after an insult of the Heliza. Table
8.4 shows the inputs and commands attackers have provided after they were insulted by Heliza. On the x-axis
is presented the number of inputs an attacker provided and on the y-axis shows the amount of attackers. Heliza
insulted 86 distinct attackers and 15% of them immediately left the honeypot. However, most of the attackers
entered at least one command or an insult. After a manual investigation of the attacker input sequences, we
noticed that some attackers believed that the insults are due to other attackers and not from the system itself.
Even some attackers replied with the command wall which is used to display messages in all the terminals of
the users that are connected. Some attackers just pressed enter to clean the terminal and repeated the command
which explains that attackers preferred to continue the attack. Normally the attacker response time for the first
insult is larger than the response time regarding another insult. After a while some attackers get annoyed and
started to enter successive insults. For such a sequence of insults the delay between such successive insults is
less than 2 seconds. Other attackers became curious and started to challenge Heliza in order to understand what
is going on. It is worth to mention, that insults can give indication about other compromised machines. For
instance, we observed some Romanian insults from German, French and Spanish IP addresses. In this case we
assume that Romanian attackers have compromised these machines and used them as rebounds for attacking
Heliza aiming connection laundering. The reactions of attackers regarding strategical blocks are also interest-
ing. On average an attacker retries a command one time and there was an attacker who retried a command 116
times. After having done manual analysis of this attacker’s traces we assume that this attacker tried to challenge
Heliza in order to determine how the decisions are taken. The reaction of attackers namely if attackers continue
their attack or if they get annoyed, their persistence facing resistance permit to draw a profile of attackers.
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Command Frequency Language Proportion
exit 15.77 Undefined 49.1%
ls 11.16 Typographic errors 17.1%
cd 9.95 Romanian 11.8%
uname 5.82 English 9.2%
ps 5.82 Smiley 5.3%
last 5.09 Slovak 5.3%
wget 4.61 Croatian 1.0%
id 4.36 Polish 1.0%
w 4.36 German 0.2%
others 33.06
Table 8.2: Attacker Insult Analysis
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Heliza was configured with two reward functions defined eq. 6.4 and eq. 6.5. The honeypot environment
Markov chain has 46 states. For space reasons, not all states can be discussed in detail in this chapter. Thus,
we present only the most relevant and some general results. For the purpose of comparison and simplification
each attacker connection to Heliza corresponds to an iteration k. Heliza incrementally (k = k + 1) computes an
action value table describing the various states with the actions that provided the best rewards in the long term
(estimated Q values defined in eq. 6.6). After the final attack (k = 349) a stripped action value table is shown
in table 8.3. Generally the highest reward for a given state determines the action which should be taken for this
state in the long run. This table is quite valuable for a honeypot operator who does not want to setup Heliza
but rather simply wants to install static fake services. Despite following the two behaviors, some strategies for
selecting an action for a given state are the same. For instance, when an attacker connects to Heliza, the action
value table suggests to allow the command. An attacker who does not get a command prompt can hardly stay or
install custom tools on Heliza. Some commands are frequently used by attackers to explore the compromised
system. Heliza has decided to block the command last such that the attackers cannot detect other attackers on
the system. The program sudo is a convenient way to get more user privileges and is often used for attacker
maintenance work on Heliza. When Heliza insults an attacker, the attacker needs to investigate the situation,
so spending more time on the system. The attacker needs to determine whether the system itself initiated the
insult (i.e. provocative error messages configured by system administrators) or if the insult is due from other
attackers concurrently connected to the system. However, if Heliza wants to collect tools, this command should
be allowed, because it is often used for installing software on the system. If the purpose of Heliza is to collect
attacker information, the command wget should be allowed6. However, if Heliza aims to waste an attacker’s
time, a forged output should be returned. Attackers usually download their tools as tarballs. Obviously, when
transitions favoring custom-installed tools are desired, this transition should be allowed. If the purpose is to
detain an attacker, the command tar should lie, such that the attacker needs to understand why the required tool
is not working. From an implementation point of view the filename passed to the command tar is substituted
with another filename.
Used reward: rd Used reward: rt
allow substitute block insult allow substitute block insult
tar 100 203 55 127 5.55 5.15 4.94 1.96
sudo 101 101 146 196 5.37 1.16 3.71 4.17
chmod 199 121 140 71 5.33 5.50 8.85 8.05
uname 184 202 190 159 5.02 4.81 4.58 5.49
kill 65 1 295 220 1.83 2.82 5.77 1.82
insult 189 188 199 190 5.42 5.57 5.29 4.69
custom 194 170 163 189 5.66 5.10 4.95 5.37
ps 194 183 214 140 4.82 5.14 4.71 5.44
wget 175 202 163 146 6.34 5.53 5.24 5.20
bash 202 118 37 172 4.93 2.86 3.56 3.90
last 64 81 202 106 0.99 1.07 4.85 2.50
Table 8.3: Final Action Values
It has been proved formally that the SARSA always converges if each state is visited an infinity of times
and if a greedy learning policy is used [152]. In practice, this means that we need to assess how many attackers
are needed to compromise the system in order to have meaningful action value functions. We studied some
relevant bash commands, wget, sudo. The results are presented in figure 8.5(a), 8.5(b), 8.6(a) and 8.6(b). The
graphs 8.5(a) and 8.5(b) show estimated rewards for wget, and the graphs 8.6(a) and 8.6(b) for sudo. In the
graphs 8.5(b) and 8.6(a), Heliza is configured to collect information; in the graphs 8.5(a) and 8.6(b), to waste
6Assuming that Heliza’s outgoing connections are strictly controlled by an Network Intrusion Detection System aiming to avoid
collateral damage.
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Figure 8.5: Action-value Evolution for the State wget
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Figure 8.6: Action-value Evolution for State sudo
attacker’s time. Examining figure 8.5(b), we see that, by iteration 340, Heliza has learned that allowing wget
is the best strategy for collecting information; in contrast to keep the attacker on time as long as possible, the
graph 8.5(a) shows that substitution is identified as best by the 50th iteration. Similarly, Heliza learned after the
40th iteration that the execution of the sudo should be allowed when the purpose is to collect attacker related
tools (figure 8.6(a)). In figure 8.6(b), Heliza learned at iteration 44 that attackers should be insulted for keeping
them busy.
8.5 Honeypot Comparison
In this section we evaluate the performance of Heliza by comparing it with a standard high-interaction hon-
eypot and a low-interaction honeypot called Hali which emulates behaviors for all the commands executed by
attackers. Hali is a fake shell and was developed by ourselves (see section 8.2). The output of each command
is forged. By default, the standard high-interaction honeypot allows all executions of programs; program ex-
ecutions are neither blocked nor substituted nor are attackers insulted. The purpose of this comparison is to
determine whether Heliza reveals more information from attackers than typical low- or high-interaction hon-
eypots. Figure 8.7(a) shows that attackers make more transitions to custom installed programs on Heliza than
on a regular high-interaction honeypot when Heliza is configured to collect attacker-related information. The
x-axis shows the iteration number k, on the y-axis is the cumulative number of transitions to custom installed
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Figure 8.7: Honeypot Comparisons
commands by attackers is shown. The order of attacks may differ among the different honeypots. Alata et al.
[3] reported that attacker launch automated attacks against a honeypot in a first step and come later back to
perform the real attack. During the operation of a honeypot these two kinds of phenomena might be mixed.
Hence, the cumulative number of transitions is considered in order to make the comparison more robust taking
into account an equal set of attacks for each honeypot. For approximately the first 25 attackers Heliza has the
same performance than a standard high - interaction honeypot in terms of transitions to attacker related pro-
grams. However after 347 successful attacks, Heliza provides an increase of 3 times in transitions to attacker
related commands. This increase is partially due to blocked attacker-related programs. However, an analysis of
the actions taken by Heliza for transitions to the execution of custom programs shows that 20% of the attacker-
related programs have been blocked. These programs have been substituted in 26% of the cases. Heliza allowed
transitions to these programs 21%. Finally, Heliza decided in 32% of the cases to insult an attacker when such a
transition is made. The reason for not showing the comparison with Hali is that no installations of custom tools
has been observed for the first 350 attackers. Obviously, if every command is forged, the installation process
for attacker-tools fails. The figures 8.7(b) show the comparison results of Heliza with Hali and a standard high-
interaction honeypot are shown in terms of attack duration (eq. 6.5). On Hali, attackers cannot install tools.
Usually they try for a while and then give up. At first glance (k < 30), the standard high-interaction honeypot
performs better than Heliza in terms of keeping the attacker busy. These short sequences of commands are
often entered by automated scripts. If Heliza interferes with them they often fail. At the beginning of operation
Heliza may take wrong decisions inducing attackers to leave. However, after approximately the 30th iteration
Heliza keeps attackers longer than the standard high-interaction honeypot.
From these experiments we recovered honeypot traces and stored them in an SQLite database [117] which
is freely available [175]. A honeypot trace is a chain of inputs provided by attackers and is composed of the
following elements:
uid is a unique identifier which distinguishes different attacker sessions. An attacker session starts when the
SSH server clones a privileged separated process [129] and ends when this process dies, from which it
can be deduced that the attacker left the honeypot.
id is a numerical strictly monotonically increasing identifier that identifies the input that an attacker gives.
This identifier is essential to establish the order of the inputs that an attacker has provided. Further
details about recovering attacker sessions regarding concurrency issues between attackers and the system
itself are presented in section 5.1.1.
input is the input or command an attacker entered. The input can be a command, a misspelled command or an
insult from an attacker.
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General Statistics Country Code Proportion
Number of attacker sessions 349 RO 47%
Minimal attack duration 0s DE 16%
Maximal attack duration 5849s ES 10%
Average attack duration 162s Unknown 4%
Stdev of attack duration 509s LU 4%
Proportion of allow actions 31% IT 4%
Proportion of block actions 22% MK 4%
Proportion of substitute actions 30% LB 3%
Proportion of insult actions 17% NL 2%
GB 1%
BE 1%
US 1%
FI 1%
AT 1%
FR 1%
Table 8.4: Dataset Description
next input specifies the next input an attacker provided in her session. Usually it is the next command but
sometimes it can also be a misspelled command or an insult.
action is the action the honeypot took. For instance, allow, block, substitute or insult.
delay records the time difference expressed in seconds between the two inputs. Due to system and network
buffering delays we determined a slowdown factor which was taken into account for further processing.
Table 8.4 (left part) describes general statistics about the honeypot experiments including attacker traces of
the honeypot setups. We have observed 349 different successful logins on each SSH server. The shortest attack
duration is between 0 and 1 seconds which is mainly due to automated brute-force tools that were run against
the honeypots aiming to establish a list of successfully exploited user accounts. The maximal attack duration
was 97 minutes. In this SSH session an attacker did heavy configuration work on the system and compiled
large programs which took some time. For a standard high-interaction honeypot, the average attacker session
lasted for approximately 3 minutes and most attacker session durations were below 3 minutes (83%). Heliza
most frequently performed allow actions closely followed by the number of occasions on which it forged output
for the attackers. Heliza explicitly blocked 31% of the inputs and deliberately insulted attackers in 17% of the
cases. The country code corresponding to the IP addresses used by attackers was looked-up and the distribution
is shown in the right part of table 8.4 (right part). Most attackers came from Romanian IP addresses. 16% of
the attackers came from German IP addresses and 10% of the attackers had a Spanish IP addresses.
8.6 Fast Concurrent Learning
Heliza has some weaknesses to interact with learning attackers because their are considered as environment
for Heliza. This problem is tackled with the adaptive honeypot in this section. The learning of attackers is
hard to verify. Therefore, we used the honeypot traces described in section 8.1 and 8.2 as ground truth for
learning evaluation and serve for setting up the honeypot automaton. The traces contain 47 states including
programs installed during the setup of the honeypot. Programs installed by attackers are mapped to the state
u∗ and insults to the states u1..n which are mapped to computed minimal Levenshtein distances with respect to
installed programs. We observed 4360 different transitions between programs. In addition, the delays between
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two successive programs were used, serving as reward for the honeypot. In order to recover the payoffs for the
attackers, the last program execution was recorded where the honeypot allowed all the transitions. This means
that the honeypot had not interfered with the attacker and we assume that the attacker reached their goal. The
observed delays and minimal Levenshtein distances permit us to compute the rewards.
In the following we addressed how fast the learned Q-values stabilize. During the experiment no discount-
ing factor was used (γ = 1) with the purpose of arriving at a worst case scenario for stabilization. By selecting
γ  1, the values should stabilize faster [161]. Due to space reasons only a few relevant states are represented
in figures 8.8(a), 8.8(b), 8.9(a) and 8.9(b). The discrete time t is shown on each x-axis, while the y-axis gives
the learned Q-value. The state ls is a typical system command for listing files and sometimes mandatory for
performing an attack, but in general this command is not dangerous assuming that there are no confidential files
on the honeypot. Hence, the attackers and the honeypot have similar interests when this command is allowed.
In figures 8.8(a) and 8.8(b) the Q value evolution for both players is represented. When an attacker wants to
continue the attack, this command should be allowed. Sometimes, the honeypot also insulted the attacker or
substituted the command ls due to the -greedy explorer, but the respective learners noticed that these actions
are not suited for this state. However, sometimes the interests of an attacker and the honeypot diverge. For
instance, this is the case for the tool wget. This tool is frequently used to download arbitrary files and is often
one of the last steps of an attack. Thus, when an intruder wants to continue the attack, the best choice from the
honeypot is to allow this command (figure 8.9(a)). If the honeypot substitutes the execution of this program,
an attacker usually finds alternative commands for installing the desired customized tool. From the honeypot’s
perspective it is better to substitute the execution of the program wget in order to keep the attacker longer active
(figure 8.9(b)).
For each command entered, the honeypot needs to decide whether to allow this command to block the
program execution, to substitute the output of the program or to insult the attacker. Q values are then recorded
for each player. Figures 8.10(a) and 8.10(b) show the average Q-values, represented on the y-axis, for the
honeypot in different states, shown on the x-axis. Rewards are distributed in a retroactively. This means that
an attacker is at state si and wants to move to state si+1. The honeypot reacts by choosing the action a j. The
state transition is made or not made according to the action a j. After this move the rewards are distributed for
each player for the state si. In figure 8.10(a) a subset of states {id, sh, bash, unset} can be identified, where
the highest averaged Q value occurs when the attacker retries a command. The commands in the set are usually
common system commands and when the attacker arrives at these states, the attack is usually continued by
retrying successive commands. For instance, the attacker has a shell meaning that he or she is at the bash state
and he or she wants to execute wget. Even when this transition is blocked, the attacker can still continue the
attack by retrying the command. The situation is different for the insult state. Attackers sometimes reach
the insult state un when they make a typographical error or when they enter an unknown command. When
the honeypot returns an error like command not found, the attacker assumes that the program is not installed
on the system and tries to use a different program. If the attacker made a typographic error, he may enter
the intended program which is also considered as different program input. Hence, the highest average Q-value
results in the selection of an an alternative path. Figure 8.10(a) presents the average Q values when the honeypot
substitutes the command. The programs w, uname and uptime are first commands entered by attackers in order
to identify the system that has been compromised. In our traces, the command w is often the first command
entered. When the honeypot allows the transition to this state and then starts substituting successive commands
like id, uptime the forged output is often not consistent with the output of the program w. We assumed that
some attackers then realized that they were connected to a fake shell, identified the honeypot and started to type
insults in the terminal, inducing a large Levenshtein distance leading to a high reward.
We implemented a fast concurrent learning module for our AHA framework, which is publicly available
[174]. The resulting honeypot was operated for 8 hours in a controlled environment and 15 attacks have been
observed. The average attack duration is 260 seconds on the honeypot, which confirms the average attack
duration of 238 observed during the experiments driven by traces. In order to do a more fine grained analysis,
additional theoretical research needs to be done aiming at an assessment of learning techniques from empirical
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Figure 8.10: Impact when the Honeypot Blocks or Substitutes Program Executions
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data because we do not know which learning approaches real attackers use. If these challenges are solved, a
larger dataset is needed for doing this analysis, but these preliminary results already confirm that our approach
can be implemented and operated.
8.7 Conclusions
This chapter has described experiments related to our adaptive honeypots. We operated two state-of the art
honeypots in order to to recover data of attackers. In our initial study, a high-interaction honeypot and a a
low-interaction honeypot were set up for this purpose. The traces from the high-interaction honeypot were
used to generate a hierarchical probabilistic automaton. This then served as the basis for computing payoffs
via simulations with these payoffs, we could to compute optimal strategy profiles for each player. The initial
aspect of adaptability of the honeypot to attacker is given by blocking one system call according to optimal
blocking probabilities resulting from the Nash equilibria. These probabilities depend on the payoff functions
used to model the objective of an adaptive honeypot.
We operated an adaptive honeypot with these blocking probabilities and observed that attackers typically
enter three more commands than on a regular high-interaction honeypot. However, this approach has two major
disadvantages. Firstly, the optimal blocking probabilities depend on the particular instance of our hierarchical
probability automaton, and thus depend on recovered traces used to generate it. Secondly, we assume that
attackers are always rational. This might not always be the case. Nicomette et. al. [112] described observations
of script kiddies, who do not understand the details of an attack, but just try blindly to apply a particular attack
technique. Thirdly, the adaptability of the adaptive honeypot is quite coarse grained. The optimal strategy
profiles for an adaptive honeypot define only a probability of blocking or allowing the execution of a program,
while ignores, the context of the execution. Attackers could easily perform a profiling attack on the adaptive
honeypot by executing the same command several times. To address this issue, we operated an additional
adaptive high-interaction honeypot driven by reinforcement learning. This approach, allowed us to estimate
the best behaviors for a given state, which corresponds to an installed program on the honeypot. In addition
we extended the adaption mechanisms of our adaptive honeypots by adding the possibility of substituting the
execution of a program with another program, and of insulting the attacker. The outcome of this experiment is
a final action-value table that defines an adaptive’s honeypot optimal behavior in a given state.
A comparison of the adaptive honeypot with a regular honeypot shows that attackers perform three times
more transitions (see figure 8.7(a)) to customized tools on the adaptive honeypot. In addition, an adaptive
honeypot allows to observe the skills or social background of an attacker. Examples are whether attackers
respond to insults, or are clever enough to find alternative solutions to reach their attack goal. However, the
straightforward reinforcement learning approach defines attackers as the environment of the adaptive honeypot,
and ignores the differing goals of the attackers and adaptive honeypots. It has the weakness that it ignores the
fact that attackers could learn too. Consequently, the learning algorithm has a slow convergence to the optimal
values for a given state. To counter this, we applied a fast concurrent reinforcement learning algorithm in order
to achieve a better convergence for optimal behaviors in each state.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Perspectives
9.1 Summary of the thesis
This thesis presents a new paradigm for adaptive high-interaction honeypots. An adaptive honeypot can strate-
gically interfere with an attacker’s actions in order to make her reveal more information about herself. The idea
of manually interacting with an attacker was pioneered in the early nineties by Cheswick [26]. We did a similar
experience and we observe that attackers have dedicated attack goals and that they want to reach. In order to
reach this goal, an attacker has to follow a path (i.e. has to enter a sequence of commands). We identified three
actions an attacker could perform when she is diverted from a direct attack path. Firstly, an attacker could retry
the command, either unchanged or with different command line arguments. Secondly, an attacker could select
an alternative path to achieve an attack goal. Thirdly, an attacker can simply leave the compromised system
because it is unattractive or because she cannot find an alternative means of reaching the initial attack goal.
After having described the assumed objectives and actions of an attacker, this thesis described the utilities
and actions of an adaptive honeypot. Firstly, the main goal of honeypots is to collect information about at-
tackers such as the tools or programs they use. Secondly, a honeypot should keep attackers busy. If attackers
quickly leave a honeypot this means it is unattractive to them in terms of bandwidth, CPU power or installed
programs. Thirdly, an adaptive honeypot should strategically interfere with an attack, for instance, by block-
ing the execution of an attacker’s customized program. By using an increasing resistance against attackers,
an attacker’s skills can be assessed. They may give up, retry commands or intelligently look for alternative
solutions. Fourthly, attackers often often use already-compromised machines as stepping stones for their at-
tacks. Consequently, an attacker’s source IP address does not necessarily reveal her origin. Hence, an adaptive
honeypot should reveal an attacker’s linguistic skills. For instance, they may use a slang language or profanities
that reveal their ethnic background.
An attacker and a honeypot have differing interests. The interaction between the honeypot and an at-
tacker can be modeled as a game, where appropriate payoff functions model the goals observed in the real
world. Rather than individual attackers, an omnipresent attacker is modeled. Thus, two players are considered.
Attackers penetrate the honeypot with the purpose of reaching their attack goal. The system penetrated by
attackers is modeled with a probabilistic hierarchical automaton. Once attackers have entered a system, they
usually start to execute programs. Each program corresponds to a macro-state of the automaton. In addition, at-
tackers may execute programs with various command line arguments. The effect of a particular command-line
argument depends on the program. Hence, each program is modeled by a distinct automaton, where each state
corresponds to a command-line argument. Attackers enter sequences of commands, i.e. tokens in the alphabet
of the automaton, resulting in program invocation triggering transitions in the automaton. The transitions are
described by transition probabilities.
We first used, traces from a high-interaction honeypot to estimate these transition probabilities and a number
of states. We used the resulting automaton for performing Monte Carlo simulations in order to calculate payoffs
for each player and derive the optimum strategies using the well known Nash equilibrium. However, such
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equilibria depend on the attack traces used to generate the probabilistic hierarchical automaton. Therefore, in
a further study we used reinforcement learning in conjunction with a model-free approach. This means that
the honeypot learns the optimum behavior as consequence of its operation. The honeypot is modeled as an
agent operating in an environment that aims to optimize a reward signal. An omnipresent attacker is modeled
as acting in the honeypot’s environment. However, this approach ignores the fact that players have different
interests, and makes the possibility false assumption that the environment is stationary. Therefore, our final
approach is to use a multi-agent learning approach to frame this problem. This has the further advantage of
being efficient to implement.
9.2 Insights
The competitive nature between players has been modeled with a game between two players, and a major
problem has been to find the optimal behavioral strategies for each player. Different reward functions have
been proposed for each player, including measurable parameters. These include the number of transitions an
attacker makes and the time differences between successive commands and inputs provided by attackers. This
has the advantages that the honeypot can be operated autonomously and that the attacks do not have to be
manually defined in contrast to previously-published approaches. Because it embodies transition probabilities,
our model, although it is presented a as hierarchical probabilistic automaton, does follow traditional attack
trees, in which an attacker can reach a set of states represented as nodes that are logically interconnected. A
premise of such an attack tree is that these logical interconnections must be known in advance. This is not a
requirement for our proposed adaptive honeypots.
Proof-of-concept studies have shown that more information can be gathered from attackers using adaptive
honeypots than regular high-interaction honeypots. We presented the use case of adaptive Linux systems. How-
ever, as discussed in chapter 5, we believe that the paradigm of adaptive honeypots is not necessarily restricted
to a given technology. Our experiments suggest that on an adaptive honeypot attackers make more transitions
to using their own customized tools than on a regular high-interaction honeypot. In addition, we determined
that, on average attackers stay longer on adaptive honeypots than on regular high-interaction honeypots. An-
other powerful tool for an adaptive honeypot is the reverse Turing test that can distinguish between human
and automated attackers. Often when attackers believe that other attackers have insulted, they reply using in-
sulting language themselves. If no insult had been sent to an attacker’s terminal, this information would not
have been captured. Hence, an adaptive honeypot is sometimes able to reveal the linguistic background of an
attacker. As demonstrated in our experiments, adaptive honeypots are calibrated using payoffs or a learning
rule. These can be tuned to collect attacker tools, which are valuable prizes for the anti-virus industry. Adaptive
honeypots can be configured to just keep attacker busy and so to measure the resistance of attackers confronted
by failures. Finally, they can also be calibrated to collect insults from attackers; some combination of insults
and attacker-related programs. Taken together, insults, simulated command failure and the reverse Turing test
serve as solid building blocks in the measurement of attacker behavior and the identification of ethic and cul-
tural background. We have taken care, that adaptive honeypots can be operated in an automated way aiming
to reduce human interventions. We have shown the example of adaptive honeypots in the context of Linux
systems exposing vulnerable SSH servers. However, we believe that the adaptation paradigm is not restricted
to those systems and may be applied to a larger family of honeypots. We believe that the paradigm of adaptive
honeypots may serve in industry to systematically explore attackers behaviors. The retrieved information about
attackers may also serve for an improvement of existing low-interaction honeypots.
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9.3 Limitations
9.3.1 System Attacks
An adaptive honeypot only interferes with program executions directly triggered by an attacker. Attackers can
make indirect attacks by installing a script on the honeypot for later execution by the system itself, for example
as a CRON job. In this case, an attacker can disconnect from the honeypot and the CRON daemon continues the
attack. The honeypot only observes and interacts with the commands related to the deployment of the script.
All program executions initiated by the system are allowed by default. Hence, an attacker could bypass the
adaptation mechanisms by disguising herself as the system. In order to counter this attack, the system model
must be extended with additional information such as internal file system knowledge. A taint analysis must be
made in order to track all pieces of information related to an attacker. Each program handling such pieces of
information has to be considered, and by default should not be allowed.
A similar attack against the system is the installation of an additional remote control mechanism. The
deployment of such a backdoor can be observed and taken into account by the honeypot. The backdoor is then
set up using a program that accepts incoming connections on a dedicated port. When the attacker leaves the
honeypot, she wants the backdoor to remain, meaning that the corresponding program must run as a daemon
otherwise it will be terminated by the kernel. The attacker reconnects to the system through the backdoor and
is presented with a shell. This results in program execution system calls. However, the honeypot believes that
these system calls are related to the system itself and allows them by default. The problem in this case is that
the assumption that attackers enter the system via SSH is violated. However, such an assumption is needed to
guarantee a stable system. If the honeypot interferes with all system calls, the startup of the operating system
would fail and could not operate. The deployment of special firewall rules does not necessarily help. An
attacker could use the Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF) as a backdoor so that the honeypot operator
only observes outgoing HTTP traffic. When HTTP traffic is blocked the honeypot becomes unattractive for
an attacker. Instead of creating a process tree when the SSH daemon clones a privileged process, a process
tree could be created for an arbitrary programs that accept incoming connections on any network interface.
However, this requires additional implementation effort in kernel space. The local network interface also has to
be considered, because an attacker could implement a backdoor that accepts only incoming connections. She
can then connects to this service through a legitimate SSH tunnel.
Moreover, an attacker could confound the states of the hierarchical probabilistic automaton by overwrit-
ing existing programs. This strategy could bypass the learning algorithms when a state-action pair has been
optimized. For instance, suppose that a learning algorithm has determined that the program ls should always
be allowed because future rewards are likely to be high. An attacker can replace the program ls with her cus-
tomized attack tool and ensure that it is always possible to execute it. This attack can be mitigated by computing
checksums of each installed program at each system call that results in a program execution. This checksum is
then compared with the initial tamper-proofed checksums of the programs. However, this mitigation technique
requires additional implementation effort in kernel space and results in a performance overhead.
Also, the Linux Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) could be patched in a different way. A clever at-
tacker might find a machine that has multiple standard accounts like test, admin, ftp etc with the same password,
suspicious. A game making login more challenging for attackers, could be developed.
Kernel Attacks
The honeypot’s interference with an attacker’s commands takes place in kernel space. To circumvent this, an
attacker could install her own kernel and reboot the system. A mitigation technique to such an attack is to
instrument the virtual machine so that a reboot is translated into a power-off. When a honeypot operator sees
that the honeypot had been switched off, he could check the checksums of the kernel binary and determine
whether it has been modified. An attacker could alternatively install and load a kernel module, that modifies
the honeypot adaptation code. In this case, an attacker modifies the system call table that points to the code of
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the system calls. However, in our proposed design, the kernel code is directly modified such that the attacker
must alter more than one instruction and addresses must be consequently realigned requiring a large effort on
the part of an attacker. Furthermore, our honeypot relies on a monolithic kernel, where no additional modules
can be loaded. Another possibility for modifying the kernel memory is through the special device /dev/kmem,
but this feature could also be switched off. Finally, an attacker could use a kernel exploit in order to access
kernel memory. This risk cannot be entirely eliminated because new kernel exploits emerge from time to time.
Therefore, the kernel should always be kept aligned with the latest security patches. Due to the fact that our
modifications have been made in parts of the kernel code that rarely change, updates can be accomplished by
merging our kernel repository clone with the original, using git. An adaptive honeypot may interrupt some
commands in command blocks where normally all commands would be successful or all would fail. The case
where only one fails might be suspicious to some attackers. The introspection of virtual machines is praised
to be bullet proof for constructing high-interaction honeypots [194]. However, assumptions must be made on
interpretation of the observed data. An attacker capable of modifying the kernel could alter the system call
order resulting in misinterpretation of the observed data. Our proposed design is not to be meant bullet proof
however we defined the residual risk as acceptable for the evaluation of adaptive high-interaction honeypots.
9.3.2 Behavioral attacks
Chapter 5 presents a game between the honeypot and an omnipresent attacker. A major assumption of game
theory is that expecting rational players in simple games. In case of attackers, taking this for granted for
attackers is questionable. In practice, it is not always true. There are for instance, script kiddies who simply
copy and paste commands to the compromised system without understanding them. There are also attackers
who have good Windows skills but poor Linux skills [197]. The individual discipline of attackers may also vary
[197]. In order to mitigate the rationality problem, a quantal response equilibrium analysis can be carried out in
order to see how stable the Nash equilibria are [61]. When the traces are recovered to calibrate the game model,
attackers could poison the transition probabilities by performing dummy automated attacks resulting a biased
automaton. Additional research should be done on the hardening of automata in order to tackle this problem.
Another assumption of the Nash equilibrium is that players do not deviate from the optimal strategy. However,
attackers could make profiling attacks to reveal the strategies of the honeypot. As a result, they could change
their strategy during the game in order to gain additional advantage. Such attacks have been partially addressed
by using the model-free learning approach presented in section 6.2.
Since the semantics of the programs are not considered, an attacker could abuse existing programs to
achieve particular goals. Instead using the program ls, to list a directory an attacker could use the command
echo * and obtain the same result. When a learning approach is used, the immediate rewards may be assigned
to the wrong state, possibly slowing down convergence to optimal values. A solution to this problem is to man-
ually define super states [15] on top of the existing hierarchical probabilistic automaton that take the semantics
of each program into account. Program profiles defined in chapter 7 could be used to identify a program in-
stead of using the program file name. Markovian environments with partially visible states [189] could be used
instead of simple Markov decision processes.
9.4 Future Work
In this thesis, the interactions of attackers with a honeypot are formally modeled an evaluated. Attackers are
assumed to be omnipresent. We elected to not consider individual attackers. However, game and learning mod-
els that take into account swarms of attackers could be explored colluding in order to discover their individual
role during an attack.
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9.4.1 Alternative Honeypot Designs and Feature Extensions
Our adaptive honeypot paradigm builds on top of User-Mode-Linux. As described in section 9.3, this design
choice leads to traditional high-interaction problems. Virtual machine introspection [59] could be used in
order to ensure that an attacker cannot modify observations and decision-making routines. An alternative
solution would be to extend mid-interaction honeypots. Jose Antonio Coret [34] implemented Kojoney, an SSH
honeypot purely in Python so reducing the operational risk. The author reimplemented a sub-set of frequently
used programs in Python. The Kippo honeypot is another mid-interaction honeypot implemented entirely
in python. This honeypot includes a fake file system in which attackers believe that they can create files.
These are particularly interesting for a honeypot operator. Such a mid-interaction honeypot could be extended
with the proposed adaptation mechanisms. However, an open problem is to make attackers believe that they
are executing their own programs. Jose Antonio Coret [34] distinguished human from automated attacks by
applying heuristics to an attacker’s keystroke dynamics. Such dynamics could also be included in our proposed
reward models.
Before a widespread deployment of adaptive honeypots, there is a need for a detailed performance analysis.
However, an individual analysis has to be made for each learning algorithm. The proposed adaptive honeypots
are only capable of insulting in English. Language modules could be added such that the honeypot could swear
in different languages or even in the attacker’s native language. Our research activities have focused on adaptive
high-interaction honeypots exposing a vulnerable SSH service. The paradigm of adaptive honeypots could be
extended to other types of services like email and the web [200]. We considered games between attackers
and honeypot operators at the operating system level. However, we could model adaptive network routers
specialized in collecting attackers’ tools based on game theory and reinforcement learning. We could also
investigate the presentation of adaptive client honeypots as autonomous services. Client honeypots were not
addressed in this thesis; instead of emulating a vulnerable service, they mimic a careless user visiting dubious
web sites. A major research challenge in this area is to identify rogue web-sites using a learning approach.
The crawling technique typically used for this purpose consists of recursively visiting web sites. However,
this method is often inefficient, and costly in terms of resources due to the large volume of data that must be
processed. [134]. Autonomous and collaborating swarms of agents driven by reinforcement learning [69] may
be a research track that can tackle this problem. The problem of the in-vivo analysis of malicious software has
been briefly mentioned. However, we believe that additional malware analysis research should be done in this
area.
9.4.2 Additional Honeypot - Attacker System Games
Once an attacker enters the system, she starts to execute commands that result in program executions. Our
current adaptive honeypot can allow this execution, substitute the execution with another program or insult the
attacker. The honeypot can also block the program execution. Chapter 7 suggest that an arbitrary exit code could
be returned. However, in the evaluations, the Permission Denied exit code was used. However, examining
the Linux kernel’s header file defining error types it is clear that many other errors could be returned. A
straightforward extension of the honeypot game would be to integrate different exit codes into the game model.
As a result, the action space of the honeypot would increase in proportion to the number of possible errors.
At system-call level, attackers also create, read and write files. An adaptive honeypot could also interfere with
these system calls. Again, this would dramatically increase the action space of the honeypot. Current adaptive
honeypots only consider programs and ignore their command line arguments in their learning algorithms and
computing the Nash equilibrium. Arguments could also be included, again increasing the action space of the
honeypot. Such increases, impact algorithmic complexity of learning algorithms and the computation of the
Nash equilibrium, but would permit the modeling of finer-actions for the honeypot.
Attackers penetrate the system through the SSH service. A patch for the Unix authentication module has
been suggested for two reasons: firstly, to make it easier for attackers to access to the system; secondly to avoid
the possibility of an attacker changing an account to lock others out. However, a clever attacker performing
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a brute-force attack against the system will notice that several accounts have the same password and become
suspicious. A formal game could be modeled in which the honeypot has to discover the best strategies for
letting more experienced attackers in while discouraging novices.
In this thesis, strategic games have been modeled between attackers and adaptive honeypots. However, other
types of games could be modeled, such as Stackleberg games [151] or bluffing games [19]. In a Stackleberg
game, leaders and followers are defined. Bayesian games [67] could also be modeled, allowing other types of
equilibria to be investigated, among them the Bayesian equilibria, which would provide a link between adaptive
honeypots and Bayesian learning.
Cooperative Adaptive Honeypots
Formally, games defined between attackers and honeypots are games represented in the normal form, and are
either zero-sum or general-sum games which model just one honeypot under attack. Groups of honeypots
sharing data among themselves could be modeled. The shared data might concern vulnerabilities and content
exposed to attackers. In addition, strategies could be exchanged among honeypots. Hence, Stackelberg games
where one honeypot takes a leaders role and the others follows could be developed. Cohen’s deception tech-
niques [31] could be automated and distributed. Each honeypot would offer a given number of services and
relay real services. The leader would then discover the services that detain attackers for the most time, and
share this information with other honeypots in order to keep a larger attacker group busy. By introducing the
idea of having multiple honeypots into the reinforcement learning area, collaborative learning or hierarchical
learning techniques [14] could be used to calibrate cooperative adaptive honeypots.
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Open Source Contributions
Discovered and Reported Bugs
Table 9.1 describe the bugs. The bugs have been reported to the software maintainers. The first column
describes the destination where a given bug was filed. The official bug tracker from the Linux kernel1 has the
code K and the bug tracker Launchpad2 is denoted L.
Destination. Bug Identifier Bug Description
L 289983 Tcptrace is vulnerable against some of the fragrouter attacks
L 245531 Use of uninitialized bytes during TCP reassembly (patch proposal)
L 252604 Stack overflow in the bvi package
L 256122 DOS vulnerability in tcpflow
L 289976 Segmentation fault on tcpick with fragmented IP packets
L 364688 Tcpick uses wrong timestamps in the output
K 11974 UML crashing as non-root with a specific mmap
Table 9.1: Reported Vulnerabilities
Developed Projects
Project Name Project Description Reference
ANNE Malware Sandbox http://sourceforge.net/projects/anne/
FIW Highlevel Debugger http://git.quuxlabs.com
AHA Adpative High-Interaction Honeypot http://git.quuxlabs.com
1https://bugzilla.kernel.org
2https://launchpad.net/
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Appendix A
Vulnerability Measurements
The Mitre organization hosts the officially recognized vulnerability database known as Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE) list. Each time a vulnerability is reported, it is throughly evaluated by an international
committee of experts. The database is freely available and anyone can download it in their chosen format.
Formats currently used are plain text, HTML, CSV, and XML. The oldest vulnerabilities in this database date
from 1999 while the most recent are only a few days old. During our experiment, the newest vulnerability that
is registered in this database was from September 2010. The vulnerability database contained 45866 records.
A centralized approach, permits studies the evolution of vulnerabilities and the tracking of a given software
vendor or product. A stripped1 vulnerability record is presented in figure A.1. Each vulnerability has a name,
a status, a phase, several references and a textual description. At the time of writing, the database consists of
a text file of 49684034 bytes and is a concatenation of such vulnerability records. We implemented a simple
state machine capable of parsing these records and extracted the date of the vulnerability from the phase field.
Although, the CVE database is an attempt to consolidate vulnerabilities, the structure of a vulnerability record
is quite loose, for instance, a field for a software vendor and a product name field could be added. However,
this simplistic approach does allow the number of vulnerabilities reports to be counted. Vulnerabilities may
be discovered by several researchers concurrently and could have been reported several times, resulting in
duplicated entries in the database. Also, a vulnerability record could impact multiple systems and hence,
describe multiple vulnerabilities. Therefore, we discuss the vulnerability reports which correspond to CVE
records in the CVE list.
1 Name: CVE-2008-5161
2 Status: Candidate
3 URL: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-5161
4 Phase: Assigned (20081119)
5 Reference: BUGTRAQ:20081121 OpenSSH security advisory: cbc.adv
6 OpenSSH 4.7p1 and possibly other versions,
7 when using a block cipher algorithm in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
8 mode, makes it easier for remote attackers to recover certain
9 plaintext data from an arbitrary block of ciphertext in an SSH session
10 via unknown vectors.
Figure A.1: Example of a CVE Record
1References were cut out for space reasons
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Appendix B
Quantitative Publication Analysis
B.1 Trend Analysis
The Google trend service is a convenient way to conduct trend studies on given subjects. A appropriate query
about a topic is entered on the web portal of the service, and the trend is either computed based on Google’s
Search Volume Index or by using explicit news information sources. We ignored the later in this study because
we want to focus on scientific publications. The service is multidisciplinary, meaning that it is not restricted
only to domain of information security. This means that an appropriate query must be used. In section B.2
we analyze and manually verify the evolution of publications about honeypots. We used exactly the same
query than the query presented in section B.2 in this experiment by excluding non-related domains. Google
maps these keywords to a two-dimensional hierarchical space. They have defined 27 categories on the first
level and 241 categories on the second [76]. After this mapping, the evolution of the Search Volume Index
is provided. The result is a two-dimensional plot where time, expressed in months, is represented on the x-
axis and the normalized Volume Search Index on the y-axis. This index can be split by on geographic area
but in this study the overall index is used which is independent of the geographic region used. The Search
Volume Index is normalized over the queries over time, meaning that its values are centered around 1 [76]. A
value larger than 1 means that more queries have been performed during a given period, while a value lower
than 1 means that fewer queries were made. Google states that the normalized Search Volume is influenced
by the mean absolute error [76]. To counteract this, we removed all entries from the retrieved trend having
an error estimate larger than 10%. This resulted in a reduction of 12% in dataset size. The earliest data is
available from 2004 and the time when we did the experiment was September 2010. Despite the removal of
possibly erroneous Search Volume Indexes, we still do not know how many queries are considered and which
categorization algorithm Google used. Furthermore, people may retrieve their information about honeypots
from sources other than Google, with the result that this study may be incomplete. Google trends is used for
real-time disease surveillance [23] and to study trends in software engineering [140]. Although studies relying
on Google trends may be incomplete, it is informative enough to reveal the research trends discussed in chapter
2.
B.2 Publication Measurements
The Google company offers a free service to search for scientific literature, describing their service as follows:
“Google Scholar provides a simple way to broadly search for scholarly literature. From one place, you can
search across many disciplines and sources: articles, theses, books, abstracts and court opinions, from aca-
demic publishers, professional societies, online repositories, universities and other web sites. Google Scholar
helps you find relevant work across the world of scholarly research.” [63]. The Google scholar service is
multi-disciplinary and in our particular case we found that the term honeypot is also used in biology, resulting
scientific publications that are completely unrelated to our study. Therefore, the correct keywords must be
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specified in the query: honeypot -bee -insect -biology -animal -bear -bumblebee. This query is
based on Google’s exclusion mechanisms. The global honeypot universe is queried but all contributions that
are not related to information security are excluded. We performed the query on 23 September 2010, meaning
that not the material appearing in the remainder is not considered. This query was made with the text-based
w3m browser and a custom-developed Perl script to format the retrieved data such that, for each year, a file is
generated containing the title and the source of each publication. All available publications from these lists
were acquired and evaluated with the purpose of classifying them into two categories: low-interaction and
high-interaction honeypots. The introduction and the related work section of each paper were discarded, as
these sections often define scope and position the contribution with respect to existing publications in both
categories. For the remaining material, the following criteria have been used for classification:
Honeypot design For each proposed design, the criteria defined by Spitzner [154] are used to determine if
it is a low- or a high-interaction honeypot. If services are exposed to attackers such that the services
are reimplemented from scratch so as to expose fake services to attackers, then it is a low-interaction
honeypot. If a full operating system or real vulnerable services are exposed to attackers, protected by
novel mitigation techniques then it is a high-interaction honeypot.
Usage of existing honeypots The operation of honeypots leads to numerous areas of research. As well as
proposing new honeypots, some research communities focus on the analysis of data collected from the
deployment of honeypots. In such cases, we investigated which existing honeypot the authors used during
their research experiments.
Each publication which matched at least one of those two criteria was classified as low- or high-interaction
honeypot publication. In the period from 2001 to 2010, we identified 223 publications about low-interaction
and 275 publications about high-interaction honeypots1 . However, this simplistic classification approach has
the drawback that hybrid honeypots are associated with both categories. In order to tackle this problem, the
classification criteria have to be more fine-grained and scoring techniques could be used. Moreover, authors
or editors of publications set out the keywords about their publications incorrectly or not at all. Any such
publication is incorrectly indexed by Google’s search engine with the result that we make no claim that our study
is complete. Another reason for incompleteness is that some researchers directly query scientific databases
without passing through the Google search engine. Despite, these limitations, the scope of this study is both
informative and quantitative and thus a simple approach is sufficient.
1According to the previously discussed search criteria.
Appendix C
Honeypot Operation
C.1 Forensic Tool Exploits
Figure C.1 shows a PCAP file of 48KB. Tcpflow generates 1.9GB sessions aiming resource exhaustion.
Figure C.1: Triggering the PCAP bomb
Figure C.2 shows Wireshark displaying an empty window instead of the actual request. The packets con-
taining the actual request are highlighted by red rectangles.
Figure C.2: Hiding a Stream in Wireshark
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Appendix D
Experimental Evaluations
D.1 Modification of the Linux Authentication Modules
The Linux pluggable authentication modules (PAM) are responsible for centralized handling authentication on
systems. They can be used by email, web or SSH servers. These modules supports multiple authentication
techniques. For each technique a dedicated module is implemented. Authentication can be done locally or
remotely for instance via Lightweight Directory Access protocol (LDAP). Our key idea is to modify the Linux
authentication module responsible for local authentication (pam unix) such that attackers can more easily login
the system, and to prevent that attackers from locking out other attackers out by changing an account password.
Using the pam permit module, which bypasses checking would look very suspicious to an attacker. Instead, we
made a few changes in the pam unix module. As result, the module still asks for a password but then ignores
it. The modification also allows a user to change the password of an account without locking other users out.
However, a clever attacker might realize that a particular user account does not have multiple passwords and
thus she may be able to deduce that the system is a honeypot. The file modules/pam unix/support.c of
PAM version 1-0.1 was modified to implement our password policy, and is shown in figure D.1.
D.2 Kernel Modifications
This section describes the core changes that we made in the Linux kernel, version v2.6.33-rc2, in order to
make it adaptive. An excrept of the source code is shown in figure D.2. The sys execve system call was
modified in order to resist to attackers who try to switch it off. In line 7, all the relevant information described
in section D.3 is exported, and the unique message identifier (mid) is memorized for this particularly instance
of the system call. In the function called in line 9, the kernel waits for a given amount of time and reads
the reply from the decision maker. The decision is implemented from line 12 onwards. If program execution
should be strategically blocked, the error code specified by the decision maker is set (line 13) and regular
program execution is skipped (line 14). If the decision was taken to insult or to substitute program execution,
the parameters of the system call instance are modified in line 17 or 20 respectively and the regular code of the
system call is executed.
D.3 Message Exchange
Figure D.3 shows a sample message that exported by the modified Linux kernel. Each message has a simple
key-value format. The key type identifies the message source for instance whether it was originated by a
sys execve, sys clone or sys exit system call. The key done is the final key in a message. When the
recipient of a message encounters this key, it knows that the message is complete. The key file points to the
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1 85,586c584,585
2 D(("running helper binary"));
3 retval = _unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, p, ctrl, name);
4 --
5 D(("Hali: disabled helper binary"));
6 pam_syslog(pamh,LOG_INFO,"Hali: disabled helper binary");
7 07c606,616
8 retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
9 --
10 /* Default = failure */
11 retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
12 /* Do not take user names larger than 256 */
13 if (strlen(name) > 0 && strlen(name) < 0xff){
14 if (strncmp(name,"root",4)){
15 /* Hali All valid users should be able to log on */
16 retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
17 }else{
18 pam_syslog(pamh,LOG_INFO,"Hali: Root selected deny");
19 }
20 }
21
Figure D.1: PAM patch
program file name that was executed and the keys pid, ppid or rppid point to process identifier information. The
argument keys specify command line arguments and the env keys describe a process’ environment variables.
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1 long sys_execve(char __user *file, char __user *__user *argv,
2 char __user *__user *env)
3 {
4 long error;
5 char *mid;
6 struct ReplyMessage msg;
7 mid = aha_dump_execve(file,argv,env);
8 if (mid){
9 aha_get_reply_message(mid,&msg);
10 kfree(mid);
11 /* Implement decisions taken by Adaptive Honeypot Alternative */
12 if (msg.block) {
13 error = msg.block;
14 goto out;
15 }
16 if (msg.insult) {
17 aha_handle_insult_messages(&msg,file,argv);
18 }else {
19 if (msg.substitute) {
20 aha_handle_substitutes(&msg,file,argv);
21 }
22 }
23 // Skipped regular kernel code
24 out:
25 }
Figure D.2: Sys execve Hook
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1 type=1
2 file=/usr/bin/vi
3 argument=vi
4 env=TERM=screen
5 env=SHELL=/bin/bash
6 env=SSH_CLIENT=192.168.1.2 41836 22
7 env=SSH_TTY=/dev/pts/0
8 env=USER=gabriela
9 env=MAIL=/var/mail/gabriela
10 env=PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
11 env=PWD=/home/gabriela/wine
12 env=LANG=en_US.UTF-8
13 env=HISTCONTROL=ignoreboth
14 env=SHLVL=1
15 env=HOME=/home/gabriela
16 env=LOGNAME=gabriela
17 env=SSH_CONNECTION=192.168.1.2 41836 192.168.1.1 22
18 env=_=/usr/bin/vi
19 env=OLDPWD=/home/gabriela
20 pid=1100
21 ppid=1075
22 rppid=1075
23 DONE=1
Figure D.3: Export Message
